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REFUGEE CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

FEBRUARY 5, 1987

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CONTENTS

STATEMENTS OF SENATORS

	Page
Kennedy, Hon. Edward M. (subcommittee chairman)	1
Simpson, Hon. Alan K	20
Simon, Hon. Paul	23

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Panel consisting of: Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State, accompanied by Robert L. Funseth, Acting Director, Bureau for Refugee Programs, Department of State; Charles W. Freeman, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State; and Julia Taft, Director, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Agency for International Development	4
Panel consisting of: James Mayrides, deputy regional director for East and Southern Africa, UNICEF: Rudy Ramp, regional program manager for South Africa, CARE; Thomas R. Getman, assistant to the president, World Vision, and Roger Winter, director, U.S. Committee on Refugees	24

ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND MATERIALS SUBMITTED

Armacost, Michael H.: Testimony	4
Getman, Thomas R.:	
Testimony	44
Affidavit by the ministers of the Capetown area churches	48
Mayrides, James	24
Funseth, Robert L.: Testimony	17
Ramp, Rudy:	
Testimony	27
Situation report—Mozambique	29
Situation report by Province	37
Taft, Julia:	
Testimony	10
Supplemental Feeding Programs For Children in Southern Africa	17
Winter, Roger:	
Testimony	54
Prepared statement	57
Extract from letter to Jean-Pierre Hocke, from Roger Winter, March 10, 1986	66
Letter to Hon. George P. Shultz, April 29, 1986	67

APPENDIX

"Children on the Front Line," a report prepared for UNICEF by Reginald Herbold Green, Dereje Asrat, Marta Mauras and Richard Morgan, January 1987	70
Questions for UNICEF and the voluntary agencies	105
Questions for James Mayrides and Tom Getman	107
Letter to Senator Kennedy from Richard Jolly, Feb. 20, 1987	108
Response to questions from:	
The United Nations Children Fund	109
CARE	116
World Vision	119
United States Committee for Refugees	126

Page

"Refugees from Mozambique: Shattered Land, Fragile Asylum," by Tom Brennan, consultant to USCR 131
Map of Southern Africa 164

REFUGEE CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m., in room SD-430, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Simon and Simpson.

Staff present: Jerry Tinker, staff director; Michael Myers, counsel; Richard Day, minority chief counsel, and Carl Hampe, minority counsel.

SENATOR KENNEDY'S OPENING STATEMENT

Senator KENNEDY. We will come to order.

I first of all want to say what a pleasure it is to be back as chairman of the Immigration and Refugee Affairs Subcommittee. I have a great deal of interest in the issues that are involved in the jurisdiction of this subcommittee. It was the first subcommittee I chaired in the Senate, some 22 years ago, and I have continued to follow closely the issues of immigration and refugees, both overall questions involving immigration to the United States, the way refugees are treated abroad, the reunification of families, asylum, and all those people who look to our country as a source of hope and inspiration. We will also try and focus on some of the very important human needs that exist in other parts of the world and how we as a country and as a society are dealing with those issues. They offer, I think, enormous opportunities for leadership. I think the American people care very deeply about those humanitarian questions, and we always welcome the chance to focus on them.

In reassuming the Chair, I have to recognize the extraordinary leadership that has been provided in the interim when I have not been chairman, by my good friend and colleague, the Senator from Wyoming, who did really an extraordinary job in terms of fashioning the Immigration Act of this past year.

As I said at that time, the legislation was an achievement in that it was not only a challenging public policy issue and question that will affect the lives of millions of people and the quality of justice toward those individuals, but there was very little in it for the Senator from Wyoming—he does not have a great deal in terms of pressure from people involved in that issue in his own State—yet he was tireless in dealing with the many different facets of that

question and I think represented the best in terms of leadership as a legislator.

Senator Simpson is necessarily absent for the moment, but I know he will return here soon.

I also welcome my good friend and colleague, Senator Simon, who has served both in the House of Representatives and here in the Senate and has shown a continuing interest in humanitarian problems around the world and has some special responsibilities in the area of Africa now, as the new chairman of the Africa Subcommittee on the Foreign Relations Committee.

So although we are small in number, I do not think there are probably any more committed or dedicated individuals to these causes, and we welcome the chance to work with our colleagues in the Senate, and most important of all, with the voluntary agencies and the American people of all political persuasions who are concerned about these issues and problems.

ETHIOPIA AND SUDAN

Two years ago this subcommittee conducted a hearing on the overwhelming crisis of refugees and famine victims in Ethiopia and Sudan. At the time, the world was witnessing one of this century's greatest human disasters, where hundreds of thousands of men, women and children were dying of starvation and disease and where millions more were being forced to flee as refugees in search of food and relief.

Thankfully, the world responded 2 years ago. With the leadership of the United States and the American people, tons of food and medicine arrived, and in Ethiopia alone, over 9 million people were saved.

It is one of the extraordinary success stories, I might mention to our friends, Mr. Armacost and others. It is a story that I think the American people have not been really fully made aware of. And it is extraordinary good news. So often in this institution, we rightly focus on the challenges and the problems. But I think there ought to also be a recognition of when we succeed—especially when the American people made such an extraordinary effort. I think the administration is also entitled to a good share of the credit, but most of all the voluntary agencies and the generosity of the American people.

Myself, having visited Ethiopia and Sudan in 1984, and our staff revisiting last year to follow the trail that we had made over Christmas 2 years ago, I am delighted to learn that the progress has been absolutely phenomenal. There still exist some important problems in terms of dislocated families, particularly children, orphans, and other kinds of human challenges, which hopefully we can respond to—but it has been an amazing achievement.

CRISIS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Now, having said that, today the international community is witnessing another escalating humanitarian crisis in southern Africa. We are confronting a regional crisis of people—people on the move not primarily because of drought, not in search of food because of

poor crops, but fleeing conflict, insurgency and failed policies of governments.

We are witnessing a manmade crisis in southern Africa which has much of its origin in the unyielding racial policies and growing racial conflict spawned by South Africa. An entire region of Africa is paying an enormous human price because the minority government in South Africa continues to pursue a policy of apartheid and confrontation.

UNICEF REPORT

According to a new UNICEF report, which we will hear later this morning, "Each day, more than 360 children under the age of 5 will die as a result of war and economic destabilization in Angola and Mozambique—1 child every 4 minutes."

I was interested in reviewing the report, which we will have a chance to go into more details later this morning. They were talking about the impact on child mortality rates, and they were reporting in 1985 that there were some 55,000 excess deaths among children under 5 in Angola, and 82,000 excess deaths in Mozambican children under 5.

I did a calculation in a very rough way, but that would mean 1 million children in terms of the United States, 1 million children if that tragedy occurred here. It is a tragedy beyond our current perception, and it is almost roughly the same in Angola, somewhat less, 55,000 in Angola, 82,000 in Mozambique. So this is a matter of enormous concern.

DISASTER REQUEST FOR MOZAMBIQUE

Last month, our Ambassador to Mozambique cabled the Department of State seeking to invoke the disaster assistance provisions of our foreign assistance program because of urgent food needs. He declared, "It is now evident that the disruption of social and economic life—mainly food production and transportation—by civil strife has reached disaster proportions." He reported that the total population at risk is 3.5 million, of which only 38 percent are accessible to relief agencies. Coupled with urban and others dependent upon foreign food distribution, 5.7 million—over one-third of Mozambique's population—are now in need of assistance.

The picture in Angola is no better, and the flow of refugees into the front-line states is creating a growing need for additional food and relief. But just as the requirements escalate, so do the logistical problems in delivering relief supplies.

The issue before us today is urgent and clear—there is much more than we and the international community must do if a repeat of the tragedy of Ethiopia and Sudan is to be avoided.

Yesterday I joined with Senator Simon and Senator Weicker in a bipartisan coalition of House Member, in introducing legislation that will give substance to the political commitment Congress made last year to help bring an end to the rule of apartheid.

Last year, we passed the Anti-Apartheid Action Act of 1986, that finally sent a message to the people of South Africa, both black and white, that the American people were really on the side of freedom and justice in South Africa.

Today we need to send another message, a signal to the front-line states, that America is also firmly on their side as they struggle to resist the conflict and economic destabilization launched against them by the minority government of South Africa. Our bill will send that message.

We hope this morning's hearing will help Congress and the American people better understand not only what the root causes are behind the crisis in southern Africa today, but what more we and the international community must do to help if an even greater human tragedy is to be avoided.

WELCOME TO WITNESSES

It is a pleasure to welcome to the Subcommittee Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost, who recently returned from a visit to southern Africa, the most senior American official to visit Mozambique, and who will bring some important first-hand observations on the humanitarian issues confronting the region and front-line states.

He is accompanied by Robert Funseth, who is the Acting Director, Bureau for Refugee Programs in the Department of State, sitting in for Jonathan Moore, the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, who could not be here because of a field visit he has undertaken in Central America—another area that will certainly be of concern to the subcommittee in the months ahead.

Charles Freeman is Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs in the Department of State.

Finally, and certainly not least, we welcome the return of Julia Taft to the subcommittee. She is now the Director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance in the Agency for International Development. But this subcommittee knows her well for her many years of work with Indochinese refugees.

Mr. Armacost, will you be kind enough to start off?

STATEMENT OF A PANEL INCLUDING: MICHAEL H. ARMACOST, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT L. FUNSETH, ACTING DIRECTOR, BUREAU FOR REFUGEE PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; CHARLES W. FREEMAN, JR., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND JULIA TAFT, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. ARMACOST. Thank you very much, Senator.

We want to congratulate you on resuming the chairmanship of the subcommittee and pledge our cooperation in the important work of this subcommittee. It is extremely important to the Department of State, to the Executive Branch, and indeed to our country.

We do believe there is a grave humanitarian tragedy in the dozen countries of southern Africa. I had a first-hand opportunity last December to witness the plight of the region's refugees and the efforts of hard-pressed governments to help them.

SITUATION IN MALAWI

In Malawi, where somewhere between 70,000 to 100,000 Mozambicans have sought refuge, I visited a camp on the Mozambique/Malawi border. Several thousand refugees, most in makeshift shelters permeable to heavy tropical rains, depending on the generosity of the Malawian government and Red Cross, were huddled in huts, moving in an out across the border. The local officials and the doctors told me of the increasing burden the refugees are placing on Malawi's limited resources and the real threat of disease in the camp.

I told Malawi's President Hasting Banda of our contribution of $250,000 to the Red Cross and urged that he make full use of UNHCR assistance in dealing with the refugee burden. It happened coincidentally that Gene Dewey, who was formerly in our Bureau for Refugee Programs, and is now the Deputy of UNHCR, was there at the same time and had very satisfactory discussions with the Malawian government. I assured Dr. Banda and other government leaders I met that the United States intends to continue to play its traditional role as leader in the international refugee relief efforts.

The support of Congress is obviously essential if we are to meet this traditional American commitment. The drastic reductions that have been made in the foreign affairs appropriation must not be repeated for fiscal year 1988. The estimated $148.2 million in humanitarian and development assistance that we will provide to the region in this fiscal year will quite literally save millions of lives.

REGIONAL CRISIS

In Africa today, there are some 2.8 million refugees—people who have fled their country of origin because of persecution and/or generalized conditions of violence. Over 30 percent of this total are in southern Africa.

The map to my left shows the magnitude of the major refugee populations in southern Africa, and the directions of those flows. I think it displays very graphically the interrelationships and regional nature of the refugee problem in southern Africa.

In addition, there are millions of southern Africans who are displaced and/or at risk within their countries. The two countries with the largest displaced persons populations are Mozambique and Angola.

DETERIORATING SITUATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

The situation is most acute in Mozambique, where debilitating insurgency combined with a long-term economic crisis have generated more than 350,000 refugees. Offensives by the South African-supported insurgent movement RENAMO and government counterattacks have devastated Mozambique's economic infrastructure, its transportation routes, health centers and schools.

Almost 2 million people have been displaced. Agricultural production has declined steadily. One-third of the nation's 15 million citizens can no longer feed themselves, and 1.5 million more have the resources to buy food, but cannot find it in the markets.

Over the past four years, Mozambique has made significant efforts to deal with its problems. It has progressively abandoned failed Marxist economic policies, opened its economy to greater private initiative, and developed important new diplomatic, economic and security relationships with the West.

When I met with President Chissano in Maputo, he reaffirmed Mozambique's intention to continue these policies and to build on the improvement of relations with the United States which began with the late President Machel's meeting with President Reagan.

I assured President Chissano in turn that the United States would continue to work with his government and that American food aid would continue to assist the Mozambican people.

ANGOLA

In Angola, the Soviet Union and Cuba continue their decade-long intervention on behalf of the MPLA regime in Luanda. The MPLA has thus far chosen to rely on Soviet arms and Cuban troops rather than resume negotiations that could lead to national reconciliation, independence for Namibia, and the withdrawal of all foreign forces—Cuban and South African—from the region.

National reconciliation, which must include the opportunity for the Angolan nationalist movement UNITA to play an active role is essential to peace in Angola. Such a political settlement would surely be welcomed by the almost 400,000 Angolans who have sought asylum in Zaire and other neighboring countries and by the more than 200,000 Angolans who have been internally displaced.

SOUTH AFRICA

Events in South Africa have already generated 20,000 to 30,000 refugees, and the destructive cycle of repression and violence could ultimately induce many times that number to flee.

The United States and many other countries around the world have historically offered asylum to South African refugees. This option must continue to be available in appropriate cases.

However, the crisis in South Africa must be solved through a real political dialogue in which all the people of that country are free to participate. Our contacts with South Africans of all races and across the entire political spectrum are designed to challenge them to get on with this task.

We continue to underscore our readiness to be helpful when South Africans themselves recognize that negotiations and an accommodation of interests are the only way out of their national dilemma.

FIRST ASYLUM IN AFRICA IS GENEROUS

A positive features of the Africa refugee scene is the willingness of nations to provide asylum to refugees from neighboring countries. However, the generosity of host countries is not without significant costs and dangers. The basic needs of refugees often place great stress on economies that are unable to provide adequately for their own citizens. The current tragic situation would be compounded if these pressures resulted in civil unrest between host country and the refugee populations.

Political-military pressures also serve to jeopardize the principle of first asylum in southern Africa. Providing asylum to refugees has often subjected the host countries to attacks from South Africa and from insurgent movements. Bilateral relationships sometimes make it difficult for countries of asylum to acknowledge the presence of refugees. This may limit the ability of international organizations to provide protection to the refugees and lead to delays in providing them much-needed assistance.

INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. ASSISTANCE

As a country, we have been the leader in international humanitarian assistance. We take great satisfaction from that. We actively support international relief agencies. We provide approximately 30 percent of the UNHCR's Africa budget and 25 percent of the ICRC Africa program, in addition to some bilateral projects. That translates into about $13 million for southern Africa this year through those international agencies.

We are extremely concerned about the suffering inside Mozambique, and we have put in place a famine early warning system. AID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, led by Ms. Taft, has provided about $15 million over the last 2 years for emergency relief. Additional funds will help move 150,000 metric tons of essential food commodities which are currently in the approval process to be made available under our Food for Peace Program.

This office is also providing funds for relief and feeding operations in the so-called homelands of South Africa. Nearly 1 million people benefit from that program.

Our response to the refugee and displaced persons crisis in southern Africa has emerged within the context of a long-term American commitment to the economic development and stability of the region. We recognize that these victims of repression and violent resistance are both a manifestation and a cause of instability and injustice in the area.

U.S. POLICY

As Secretary Shultz made clear in his speech last December, the United States intends to remain engaged in the search for peace with justice in southern Africa. We are not just against apartheid, we are for a new, democratic South Africa whose people would enjoy equal political, economic and social rights. We are for a southern Africa free of the threat and reality of violence and economic confrontation which now hangs over the entire region. We are for a southern Africa able to develop its vast economic potential, secure in its historic ties to the West, and free of Soviet and Cuban military intervention.

Over the past 5 years, the United States has provided some $1.3 billion in economic assistance to southern African countries. We provide additional multilateral development assistance through the UN system, through such agencies as the UNDP and through the multilateral development banks.

Our southern Africa assistance effort includes the $25 billion program in South Africa to help victims of apartheid. This program has helped fund scholarships for students to study in the United

States, training of black entrepreneurs and trade-unionists, and projects in the areas of community development, youth activities, and legal aid.

The United States also supports three scholarship programs for refugees from southern Africa for study at the post-secondary and university levels. Over 1,000 refugee students have been trained since the late 1970s. These programs have received bipartisan support over the years, and we welcome continued congressional support.

The U.S. Government provides much of the funding for American private voluntary organizations in southern Africa, including that for a number of development projects to help refugees become more self-sufficient.

Under the Food for Peace Program this year, we expect to provide food valued at $62 million, including that which is badly needed for Mozambique and is now in the approval process. And I believe the Mozambican portion will represent nearly two-thirds of that total.

Last year, President Reagan announced his intention to present to Congress a comprehensive multi-year program designed to promote economic reform and development in the black-ruled states of southern Africa.

ASSISTANCE TO "FRONT-LINE STATES"

Last week the President sent that package to Congress. Peter McPherson is in Gaborone as we speak, outlining some of its provisions to the SADCC countries.

Together with the efforts of our Western allies and Japan, this initiative represents enhanced Western commitment and engagement in the region. It offers Western-backed alternatives to unhealthy and uneconomic overdependence by the region on South Africa and will provide strong support to the significant efforts of policy reform and regional development being made by southern African countries themselves.

As part of the international effort to provide for the relatively small number of refugees who need but cannot find temporary or long-term asylum in the region, the United States maintains a resettlement program for Africans within its worldwide refugee admissions program. In consultations between the President and the Congress, a ceiling of 3,500 admissions, 500 higher than last year, was agreed upon for African refugees in the current fiscal year.

Because the great majority of African refugees avail themselves of the hospitality of neighboring countries of asylum, this ceiling should accommodate eligible applicants.

The United States is of course not alone in addressing the grave problem of the several million refugees and displaced persons in southern Africa. The international community is actively responding as well.

U.N. RESPONSE

The UN Secretary General has formed an emergency task force of all specialized agencies to respond to relief and rehabilitation needs, especially in Mozambique, on a coherent basis.

The UNHCR has established a task force on the southern African situation and is actively helping Malawi develop an assistance strategy for Mozambican refugees and the affected local populations.

UNHCR awaits an invitation to exercise its protection mandate on behalf of the Mozambican refugees in South Africa. The UNHCR team has assessed the situation inside the country to determine how Mozambicans in surrounding nations might be repatriated and will soon report its findings.

INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS

The ICRC continues to operate within South Africa and to meet the basic needs of some 200,000 persons internally displaced by the conflict in the central plateau of Angola. The ICRC has not, however, been able to operate freely in Mozambique. Neither RENAMO nor the government has been able to provide adequate assurances of respect for the neutral Red Cross emblem.

The League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies is training national societies in refugee emergency management. It also launched a $2.1 million appeal for assistance to the Malawi Red Cross efforts in caring for Mozambican refugees in Malawi—an appeal to which we responded promptly. This was the first time Malawi had requested international assistance for refugees.

Our contributions to meeting the refugee crisis in southern Africa have been timely, and we believe, been tailored to the needs and absorptive capacities of the recipients. Our efforts have been entirely consistent with our ongoing efforts to help all people of southern Africa solve their problems through negotiation and mutual accommodation.

In partnership with the Congress, we intend to continue this effort, because it represents the only hope for achieving peace and justice in that important region.

That ends my statement, Senator, and I will be happy to answer questions.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

I want to commend you, Mr. Armacost, first of all by recognizing your contribution toward the constitutional process in the Philippines—which has been reaffirmed in the past few days. Although it is not related to the hearing this morning, I did want to congratulate you on the contributions you made in that effort.

Mr. ARMACOST. Thank you very much.

POPULATION "AT RISK"

Senator KENNEDY. Now, I do not know whether you have had an opportunity to extrapolate on the figures about the numbers of people who are "at risk" in southern Africa, but I daresay the numbers are beginning to reach, if they have not reached or exceeded, what were the early figures during the crisis in Ethiopia and Sudan. I think there is now a sense of urgency just in terms of the figures that have been recently made available. I know that these are difficult to gather, and one might dispute at least some of them, but there is no question that cumulatively, they add up to a

humanitarian crisis, certainly in Mozambique, in the front-line states and in Angola as well.

That sense of urgency has been communicated to the administration, not only by the reports of the voluntary agencies, but also by our own Ambassador in Mozambique, in the cable that he sent to the Secretary of State in January, and I read: "It is now evident that disruption of social and economic life, mainly food production and transportation, by civil strife have reached disaster proportions. The magnitude and the impact of population, the degree of geographical dispersion of affected areas, diminished capacity of the government to provide relief from its own resources, require immediate sustained assistance from the United States."

The assistance program expires in April. There was no reference in the supplemental to any help and assistance to Mozambique. What should we conclude?

U.S. RESPONSE IN MOZAMBIQUE

Mr. ARMACOST. Let me comment, Senator, and then ask Julia Taft to add her own comment.

When Pete de Vos, Ambassador to Mozambique, cabled the Secretary, he indicated a requirement on an urgent basis for 150,000 metric tons. That is what we are prepared to provide, and are currently moving through the approval process.

We have seen estimates, I think, from the World Food Program as high as 620,000 tons of food that may be required. We do not actually know what the actual requirement may be, and our folks are going to join with others during this month to try and assess the shortfall. But we are already making a very substantial contribution which would represent more than 25 percent of the estimate of what is needed by agencies of the United Nations.

One of the problems, of course, in dealing with the situation in Mozambique is not merely getting accurate assessments, but gaining access to the areas where the food may be most needed, and we will be working on that as well.

The answer to your question, though, is that we acknowledge the plea of our Ambassador for urgent help. We are in the process of gaining approval to provide what he requested in the form of this 150,000 metric tons of food. We are working with others to assess the shortfall and will be then working with other governments to encourage matching pledges to meet the urgent requirements.

Let me ask Julia to add to that.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM ETHIOPIA

Ms. TAFT. Thank you.

One of the lessons that we have all learned from the 1984–1985 drought has been the problem in the past of accurate assessments and coming up with coordinated programs.

I think we are really ahead of the problem in Mozambique this time. We have installed the early warning system that looks at drought conditions and other economic factors that are exacerbating the conditions in Mozambique; this is a process that is continuing.

But more importantly, through the funding that is in place for UNICEF, CARE, World Vision (WVRO) and other agencies, there is a network of programs in Mozambique with the people working together constantly to try to identify any alternative, any expansion of access that is possible. I think it has worked very well. These agencies and programs are still in place, and as you mentioned, are being funded through April.

With the supplemental funding running out, we are working now with CARE and WVRO, and we were talking with UNICEF the other day about their programs. We do have funds in the international disaster assistance account to be responsive to continuing their efforts.

We are working with the Food for Peace Office on the extent to which it can cover inland transportation costs associated with the distribution of 150,000 metric tons of U.S. food commodities we anticipate will be provided. Whatever that gap is, we will work either through our funding or with other donors to fill it.

We feel the pipeline is in place with the augmentation of an additional 88,000 metric tons of food which is in the process of approval to bring it up to the 150,000. That should be sufficient through this fiscal year.

The mechanisms are in place. The problem, though, is those mechanisms still cannot adequately reach about 2.2 million people because of the insurgency which has created transportation and logistical problems.

LEARNING LESSONS FROM ETHIOPIA

Senator KENNEDY. It seems that having gone through the Ethiopia and Sudan experience that we ought to be able to establish the kinds of early warning mechanisms, and also be aware of the institutional lethargy as well, in terms of our responsiveness, both from the international community generally and our own agencies.

I think all of us would hope that at least one of the threats of silver lining of the Ethiopia experience would be that we are not going to have it repeated again, and relearn those lessons again in southern Africa. Yet, it seems to me that we have all the preliminary warnings.

We went through the first Ethiopian crisis in the mid-70's, where there was a reluctance to even acknowledge a famine existed because we did not want to embarrass the government of Emperor Haile Selassie. The voluntary agencies understood the needs, and finally the world community responded to the emergency. But we were really quite slow in responding, and we were really late in responding to the Ethiopian and Sudan problem in 1984.

It seems to me that we now have all the earmarkings of another crisis—this time is southern Africa. We have the disruption and civil strife that you have identified, and it does not appear that that is going to be lessening any time soon. We know the challenges that that presents; we have seen similar problems on that issue in Ethiopia, up in Tigre and other parts of Ethiopia, and also in southern Sudan.

But the voluntary agencies were imaginative, and very courageous in a number of instances, in trying to deal with that, and the

administration was quite resourceful in dealing with it in ways which they found effective, without publicizing a great deal of those efforts.

MERCY CORRIDORS

One of the things that we have seen in the past is the establishment of mercy corridors, for example, or the cross-border operations that have had varying effectiveness, certainly in Ethiopia, and in other times of civil strife and conflict. That has to be worked out with those governments and also with the various groups that are involved in the civil conflict.

Are we attempting, in the areas you mentioned, Ms. Taft, in the ones that cannot be effectively reached, are we exploring what possibilities there are, working with the agencies, that we might be able to penetrate those areas? Are we exploring the possibility of establishing mercy corridors, or are we going to have to wait until this gets a good deal worse?

Ms. TAFT. In February, there will be an international mission going down to Mozambique to look at exactly those kinds of questions including the shortfall that is not currently being met.

Senator KENNEDY. That is this month. Who is sponsoring that?

Ms. TAFT. Charles LaMeuniere is going to go down there for UNDP and UNDRO, and we are going to send people down there to work with him. Obviously, all the organizations that are in Maputo, including UNICEF, will be represented in this exercise.

One of the things that will come out of that discussion will be an evaluation of whether the international community should try food truces, and with whom, and how to do that, or whether or not there should be airlifts. I think it is speculative at this moment, until that further evaluation takes place.

Let me say, though, that in terms of creativity and energy and risk, every avenue is currently being explored to get what is available out to the field and to make sure that the pipeline is there.

We were speaking the other day with one of the major agencies about stockpiling some food so that when military convoys would be available to go into inaccessible areas, there are adequate commodities in the pipeline. These are things that we need to explore.

On the other hand, when you find that your relief workers and your convoys are being attacked and destroyed—CARE has lost 12 trucks in the last couple of years—it is a very high-risk business. We do not want to overemphasize that just a little bit more creativity and more money is going to solve this, because the civil strife situation, and the insurgency, is significant in these parts.

But I think we will have more information to report to you after these meetings are held later this month in Maputo and we can identify what additional efforts are possible.

NEED FOR A U.N. COORDINATION?

Senator KENNEDY. One of the actions that was taken during the whole Ethiopian-Sudan crisis was the establishment within the UN framework of an emergency coordinator—Brad Morse was identified as the person to coordinate the various UN activities and worked, I think, effectively in bringing together the voluntary and

government agencies in ways that brought the international community and its influence and prestige and focus in on these questions, and I think were able in a number of instances to find ways of overcoming some of the institutional logistical and political problems. It was basically a recognition of the world community's responsibility to respond to a humanitarian emergency.

Are we at that point yet, or when are we going to know whether we should be at that point where we are requesting that level of attention and political focus as well as coordination in the field?

Ms. TAFT. I think at this point, Charles LaMeuniere is the one who has the status and the mandate to represent UNDP and UNDRO in the further assessments. Now, whether or not he is going to be a Kurt Janssen, I do not know.

A.I.D. has been working with the State Department, UNHCR, UNICEF and UNDP, and many of the private agencies for the last couple of months on how we are going to use Mozambique as a case study for improved coordination, improved information-sharing and improved action in donor cooperation.

We just met last week, as a matter of fact, in the third meeting of this group. The process is in place. Whether or not it will result in the establishment of a single coordinator in Mozambique to galvanize the cooperation is yet undermined. This may be appropriate as soon as we define what additional efforts over and above the current generous and enormous programs can be absorbed in the country. But I think the coordination mechanisms are there. We will certainly communicate to the UN your interest in a clarification of what its role will be in expanding the coordinations. But all the major agencies are in Mozambique at this point.

PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH U.N. COORDINATORS

Senator KENNEDY. Well, we were here at the time of the tragedy in Bangladesh, and at that time the UN adopted a resolution which established Sir Robert Jackson as the principal coordinator of the UN effort. He was a very distinguished individual who had a very substantial standing within the international community, and I think did very effective work.

We had a similar kind of effort later, in Cambodia, and again he was called upon. We eventually went to that kind of approach in Ethiopia and Sudan in 1984–85, and I think quite frankly it made an important difference.

I do not question that you are not working hard and effectively at the field level, but at some time we have to wonder whether there ought to be something done in terms of the political level as well, as has been done in the past. And it seems to me that one of the important lessons of the past is that to the extent that you can get ahead of the curve in terms of these relief emergencies, you have much greater effectiveness in dealing with them.

If you look through the extensive report that is provided by UNICEF on what was happening in terms of immunizations and vaccinations and health problems—and we recognize both in Angola and Mozambique that civil strife is destroying the facilities and the killing of many of the personnel—nonetheless, we have seen where, when finally we have a UN General Assembly Resolu-

tion to outline the responsibilities for a coordinator and marshalling the international community, the voluntary agencies, the efforts that were made by the Administration and those efforts made by other countries in support of trying to provide some relief, were all greatly enhanced.

And I am just wondering, given what I think should be a sense of urgency, whether this kind of international and political initiative is at least on the agenda for consideration by the administration at this time, or what more it is going to take to get it, or whether they feel it is not necessary, and if they do not, why not; if they are trying to get more information, when will they have it?

Mr. ARMACOST. Are you referring, Senator, to Mozambique specifically, or to the region more broadly?

REGIONAL COORDINATOR?

Senator KENNEDY. Well, you would have to work out what would be the particular geographical area; I imagine, it should be for all of southern Africa. I mean, you have common problems in all of those areas, in that whole region. It is a regional kind of a problem, and that is why that kind of an effort lends itself to a regional solution.

Mr. ARMACOST. I think you raise an interesting possibility that we should give immediate consideration to. I frankly have not. I grant your point that such coordinators have played an important role in previous situations of this kind.

But we have been working heretofore principally on establishing the presence of those UN agencies that have a relevant capacity to provide protection and provide relief—the UNHCR, in Malawi; we have made some progress in sustaining the ICRC in South Africa; encouraging UNHCR to establish a presence there. There has been some apparent progress, but no breakthrough as yet.

But the idea of a coordinator is something that we should take a look at.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, I know that you have people who are very familiar with the historic background of previous efforts. We will try and pull that together at least from our experience from our side of the ledger and would hope that when this group goes in February that they at least give consideration to that type of an approach.

Also, I think we cannot get away from some of the political implications and ramifications. I think there is generally a strong degree of support here, as we saw in the debate on aid and assistance to Ethiopia, a desire of providing the support that is necessary for the relief effort.

I know that there are evolving and changing political developments in the Mozambique and Angolan situation, but I think that there has been a good deal of flexibility in the Senate, certainly, about how that aid and assistance can get out to the field, and I think the administration is very familiar with those arrangements.

But I would hope that in this review that is taking place in February that that possibility of elevating this to some kind of an effort at the United Nations under a General Assembly Resolution

as to how best to focus on the region would be something that I think should be worked out.

And I think you can make a pretty candid assessment as to what is going to be the needs in terms of the immediate future. I think that this certainly ought to be something that we as an administration and as a Congress ought to address. If there is justification for more aid, we ought to press for it; if there is not, we ought to know why there is not. That is basically my bottom line. So maybe we will write you a note to request that you examine that possibility.

Mr. ARMACOST. Yes, we will be happy to do that.

CONDITIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Senator KENNEDY. Could you tell us a little bit about what is happening in South Africa, where you are working with the various refugee groups there?

Mr. ARMACOST. With respect to the administration of our aid efforts?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes.

Mr. ARMACOST. Let me ask Chas Freeman to comment in detail.

Senator KENNEDY. What I am thinking about is in terms of is there a role for the UN High Commissioner for refugees in South Africa?

Mr. FREEMAN. The UN High Commissioner has not been able to establish a presence in South Africa. In part that is a reflection of the fact that South Africa is something of a pariah in the United Nations system.

However, as Mr. Armacost mentioned, there is an effort currently underway—there is as yet no breakthrough—to establish a UNHCR presence in the Republic of South Africa.

Senator KENNEDY. Have we requested that they do?

Mr. FREEMAN. We have been supportive. However, it is clear that under current circumstances, the South African government is not very heedful of advice from us on questions of this sort.

ATTACKS ON REFUGEE CAMPS

Senator KENNEDY. Part of the problem that we are facing in Southern Africa has been the armed attacks by South Africa on refugee settlements. I know the Administration has condemned those attacks.

Could you bring us up-to-date about what is happening in that area?

Mr. ARMACOST. I am not aware of any immediate—that is, large-scale, cross-border attacks—from South Africa into Mozambique in the recent past. The Mozambican Government has taken some steps to reduce the profile of the ANC in Mozambique, in part in order to avoid what the South African government might regard as provocation. So clearly they are sensitive to this.

You will recall we were instrumental in negotiating the Nkomati Accords and other agreements designed to limit cross-border violence. The principal involvement that affects the security of Mozamabique has been the support, which we believe is provided in substantial quantities by South Africa, to RENAMO, and the insurgency which that helps fuel.

But I am not aware of any recent cross-border attacks. There have been some in the last 6 months.

Senator KENNEDY. I think a year or so ago, in Botswana and in Zimbabwe, there were some attacks on refugee camps.

Mr. FREEMAN. There have been repeated South African raids—mostly small-scale, sometimes larger-scale—in recent years, over South Africa's borders into neighboring countries. The most recent and best-known example is the one to which you refer, which was May 19, 1986, in which South African forces struck at Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, in many cases striking at facilities associated with refugees which South African intelligence apparently believed were connected with the African National Congress and its military campaign in South Africa.

MOZAMBICANS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Senator KENNEDY. What is the condition of the 200,000 Mozambicans who are in South Africa now, and what are we doing to try to respond to their humanitarian needs?

Mr. ARMACOST. Bob, do you want to take a crack at that? We are not very sure of their status, I think, Senator. That is, how many are economic migrants, how many are genuinely to be categorized as refugees is a little hard to say.

Bob?

Mr. FUNSETH. Our principal effort, Mr. Chairman, is support of the International Committee of the Red Cross' activities inside of South Africa.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, some of those have been reduced as a result of the South African Government. Can you tell us what the status is now? Has the ICRC been allowed to return to additional staffing and additional assistance to those families?

Mr. FUNSETH. In fact it has never left. Although there was an expulsion of the South African delegation at the conference, the ICRC was able to maintain its presence in South Africa. I believe their program is in the neighborhood of $2 million a year.

AID, of course, also has a program in the homelands in South Africa.

Senator KENNEDY. And are we supporting financially the ICRC there?

Mr. FUNSETH. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Have they made any additional requests, and how are we responding?

Mr. ARMACOST. We provide a percentage of the overall budget, but we do not earmark portions of the budget for use in particular countries or for particular projects. We simply subsidize their total budget to the tune of 25 percent.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, it is our information that the ICRC mission has been reduced from 20 to 5 personnel. It is pretty tough to run much of a program with 5 personnel—I imagine it is with 20, as well. Will we be able to persuade the South Africans to try and do anything about that, increase it, or do you expect that it will be increased?

Mr. FUNSETH. We hope that the ICRC will be successful in its efforts with the South African government authorities to restore its presence, Mr. Chairman, and they are at work on that.

Mr. ARMACOST. I believe they were down to two, were they not, and therefore, it may be back on the upswing. As Chas Freeman has said, we register our views with the South African government, but I think we should have no illusions that they are terribly responsive at the current moment to advice and requests that are coming from us.

INFANT FEEDING PROGRAMS

Senator KENNEDY. One of the very important and significant achievements in the Ethiopian situation was the intensive infant feeding programs that were supported by the Administration, by the United States, in both Ethiopia and Sudan.

Are we giving any special priorities to those kinds of programs in southern Africa today?

Ms. TAFT. In South Africa?

Senator KENNEDY. No, in the region.

Ms. TAFT. There are a variety of health programs, and through the UNHCR, some programs directed toward refugees. I am most familiar with the South African programs that are funded by OFDA as well as those in Mozambique. OFDA has a matching program with Operation Hunger, which is now feeding 1 million people, primarily in the homelands. Ina Perlman—I do not know whether you have met her—has a very dynamic program, reaching out to these people.

To the extent they are using supplemental feeding, I do not know, but I will be glad to find out for you.

Senator KENNEDY. Fine. Could you let us know on that?

Ms. TAFT. Yes, sir.

[Aforementioned was subsequently supplied for the record:]

SUPPLEMENTAL FEEDING PROGRAMS FOR CHILDREN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

We have, and are prepared to continue as necessary, to support Operation Hunger's supplemental feeding programs. These supplemental feeding programs are focused on women and children who are suffering from malnutrition. Most of the programs are conducted in the rural "homelands" of South Africa. The feeding usually consists of a high protein supplementary meal provided on a systematic and regular basis. This feeding is done in conjunction with "self-help" activities such as a small craft program or the development of a vegetable garden. Once these self help activities become viable and are able to provide additional income or nutritious food, the supplemental feeding ends. Operation Hunger estimates, as of March, 1987, that it is providing supplemental feeding to approximately one million people. Over the past year, A.I.D. has provided $250,000 to Operation Hunger.

Senator KENNEDY. We have these reports from UNICEF about the impact of the conflict on children and infants, those under five, in that whole southern area is so dramatic, and the feeding programs, as we have seen from previous experience, have such an important and significant effect.

Are we giving any special priority to these programs, and through the agencies that develop them during the period of the Ethiopian experience?

Mr. FUNSETH. Mr. Chairman, in addition to our support of UNICEF, through our regular contributions, the United States has

been a strong supporter of the Red Cross program in Angola. An important feature of the Red Cross program in Angola was its supplementary feeding programs for children.

That program reached a peak in 1985 when they budgeted almost $39 million in Angola. An important part of that went to children, and we contributed about $10 million. In 1986, it was $33 million, and we contributed over $8 million. There has been some decrease in that program both because of civil strife, and also because of the success of the program and the success of the Red Cross in making some of these rural families self-sufficient.

Senator KENNEDY. There is no program in Mozambique, though; is that right?

Mr. FUNSETH. Well, the Red Cross has been pretty much denied an ability to operate for the reasons stated earlier. They cannot get into the areas that they had wanted to operate for military reasons.

Senator KENNEDY. Is that true about CARE, too?

Ms. TAFT. The CARE Program is working with the Government of Mozambique's Department for the Prevention and Control of Natural Calamities (DPCCN) to distribute food throughout the accessible and sometimes inaccessible areas.

What one must remember is that the most important commodity is food. The United States is planning to provide about 150,000 metric tons in emergency food. Even with the contributions of other donors, there will be a shortfall for Mozambique.

Throughout the whole region, though, over $60 million worth of P.L. 480 food has been provided.

FURTHER ASSESSMENT OF NEEDS

What we need to do, it seems to me, is to use the best information that UNICEF has generated, and that CARE also is generating in the field, and data from our own mission and other donors. At this time, other donors do not seem to be as seized with the problem as this committee certainly is, or the administration, and the PVO's here. Collectively, we must identify what additional commodities needed to go to the at-risk populations for the infant feeding that are not currently in the commodity mix. Where those commodities are needed, they should be provided.

More information will be coming forward, I hope, in the next month or so.

There is not a targeted nutritional supplement for under-fives at this point of which I am aware. When you talk with the UNICEF and CARE representatives next, they can give you some more information. We will certainly follow through on this issue, because you have identified a valid concern. But to be able to do a targeted program, more refined information is needed to identify the at-risk populations, how many of them are children, and the commodity mix they are currently receiving. We need to work on that some more, and we promise to do that.

Senator KENNEDY. Just a couple of final questions before I recognize my friend, the Senator from Wyoming.

In the telegram from our Ambassador in Mozambique, besides the 150,000 metric tons, he also mentions other needs in terms of

the coordination and operational roles, personnel, operating expenses, transportation equipment, and grants to World Vision.

Will those be responded to positively by the administration?

Mr. ARMACOST. Indeed.

Ms. TAFT. We currently have the WVRO proposal and are trying to identify what portions of that can be covered by P.L. 480 and which ones we should fund out of disaster assistance funds. These questions should be resolved in the next couple of weeks.

We have not yet received the CARE proposal. We understand it is about a $4.3 million proposal to support the DPCCN, for country-wide distribution of food from all donors. That is a large amount of money, but our intent is to try to leverage funds from other food donors to contribute more substantially to the administrative and logistics costs of transporting their donated foods.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, I hope you will let us know what you are requesting and who is doing what on this in terms of the international community.

Ms. TAFT. Those are the two major organizations.

POLICIES THAT CREATE REFUGEES

Senator KENNEDY. Finally, I do not intend to get into an ideological exchange here over what we are doing in Angola in supporting Savimbi, but I do think it is important that when we talk about the various local strife in this part of the world, whether it is in Mozambique, the civil strife in Angola, or what we had in Ethiopia—or what is going on in Nicaragua and Afghanistan—it seems to me that in any kind of policy consideration of supporting those conflicts with arms and money, we also should give some thought about what the impact of that military assistance on our support for the various insurgencies, what it will mean in terms of the civilian population, particularly with regard to children, and the creation of refugees.

I think that is something we really fail to do in so many instances. I remember in Ethiopia, prior to our visit there, getting a report from one government official talking about the fact that both the east and the west were arming many of these tribes and local groups, and what was resulting was an extraordinary death toll and human misery for all sides. They used to fight those tribal battles with bows and arrows, and a handful of people, tragically, were killed. But now scores are getting killed, and whole communities and villages are uprooted, health centers are being destroyed, with extraordinary devastation to the local population, because of the additional fire power of outside military aid.

We consider around here environmental impact statements. Shouldn't we consider refugee impact statements or civilian impact statements as a result of our foreign policy decisions? I think it would probably be good guidance to all administrations to consider the impact of our policies, particularly military aid on the creation of refugees. I just mention that to get it off my chest here this morning.

Mr. ARMACOST. If I might just comment, Senator, I would simply say that the conflicts in both Angola and Mozambique have raged with scant materiel support from the United States. In the Mozam-

bican case, of course, we have not been providing military assistance to either party; in Angola, our contribution has been extraordinarily modest. Indeed for many years, there was no involvement whatsoever by the United States.

These conflicts are deeply-rooted. However, I take your point that the more sophisticated the equipment, the more impact it has on the civilian population. But our principal involvement in these conflicts has been to try to mount a diplomatic campaign which would produce a negotiated settlement. A settlement has been elusive, regrettably, but our principal involvement in the area over the last 5 or 6 years has been to mount a major diplomatic effort; we will continue that effort.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, I want to complete this point. There was before a congressional ban and prohibition of military aid to Angola. If you take, again, the UNICEF report about the progress that was made during that ban between 1978 and 1980, just in terms of vaccinations, in terms of children, it is quite dramatic and quite significant. And I do not think you can separate the rather dramatic increase in the local strife and the violence just upon tribal conflicts.

Since the ban was lifted we have seen a major increase in American military assistance to Savimbi, and that thing has spilled over in the countryside. We may differ on that about just how much. But if you look through, certainly in that part of the region, there is a pretty close correlation between the disruption in terms of health centers, personnel, in many of these rural communities, and the increased U.S. military aid. Maybe that is coincidental. I do not believe it is; maybe others can make the case that it did not involve our military assistance. But you cannot make that with regard to Contra aid, quite frankly, in Central America, and the number of health facilities and health personnel that have been chewed up down there. I mean, there is enough blame to go around, and without getting into an ideological dispute, I believe there is a very close correlation with the intensity of firepower and conflict and what is the devastation on local populations.

The Senator from Wyoming—it is good to have you here.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SIMPSON

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is my first hearing since "falling from grace" and I want to tell you when I was in the majority, I was always upwind from this damn cigar, and now I am the minority, and I cannot escape it.

[Laughter.]

Senator SIMPSON. Well, I want to congratulate Senator Kennedy on his new chairmanship. It is a pleasure to serve again on the Subcommittee as Ranking Member. There is much to do and plenty to do, regardless of who is in the Chair. And I want to thank Ted Kennedy for his special efforts to me with regard to the immigration bill and the trials and tribulations of that. He gave the maximum possible effort to me, in recognition of all the circumstances. We all know what a tough issue that was, and he was a steady ally in tough times.

I also want to thank Jerry Tinker, who was of great assistance to Dick Day, who was then chief counsel and staff director. We worked well together, and it was a great pleasure.

Well, this is important that we pursue this. I think we have allowed ourselves to become so preoccupied with the never-ending Southeast Asia refugee flow—which was supposed to end, one or two will remember—that we have not paid proper attention to other refugee populations. I think it is very important we do our fair share in providing humanitarian assistance. We must not forget that protection and humanitarian assistance provided to the refugees in the region until safe repatriation is possible is the preferred, durable solution to any refugee problem. That is going by the book: repatriation, regional resettlement, and then third country resettlement. We have apparently reversed the order, very swiftly, under what we have done in Southeast Asia. So maybe we can get back to the essence of refugee policy which is, again, voluntary repatriation and safety there.

So I look forward to hearing your testimony, and I will read it—I have not had the opportunity to yet—but I think the administration has been timely and generous in its response to the situation in southern Africa. I am proud of that effort—$1.3 billion, I believe, in economic assistance to southern African countries over the past 5 years, plus additional multilateral development assistance through UN agencies.

So it is good to see all of you. Each of you, I have come to know in various ways, and I admire you all greatly. You are splendid public servants in the best sense of that word.

And now, do I get 2 or 3 minutes for questions?

Senator KENNEDY. Your time has about expired.

Senator SIMPSON. I was always very charitable.

[Laughter.]

Senator KENNEDY. Proceed. Whatever time, Senator.

DEFINITION OF A REFUGEE

Senator SIMPSON. Just a couple of questions.

The Refugee Act—and this is the tough one in our line of work, and Senator Kennedy knows so well—the definition of "refugee" under the UN Convention and the United States is not understood. There are people who flee lots of things but they are not refugees, and that is very difficult for people to understand. But the definition is clear to all of us—this well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality or membership in a social group or political opinion—those things.

Of the many hundreds of thousands of refugees in southern Africa, how many—and I know this is difficult, because you have already used the phrase, "economic migrants" and that is the one we continue to grapple with, versus "refugees", true refugees—but how many are "Convention" refugees? How many, then, surely deserve our humanitarian attention as a compassionate country, but not our recognition as "refugees" under the Refugee Act of 1980?

Mr. ARMACOST. If I may, Senator Simpson, I would just endorse your comments about the importance of repatriation, and as a second option, handling situations in the region to the extent repa-

triation is not immediately available, and taking refugees into our own country only as a third option.

The striking thing about southern Africa, in contrast to Southeast Asia, has been that these three options have been a feasible approach; it is reflected in the numbers of refugees from that region we are taking and it is reflected in the hospitality accorded to refugees, displaced persons and economic migrants by the countries of the area. We do have these three categories but there are difficulties in identifying the precise figures.

Let me ask Bob Funseth, from our Refugee Bureau, to take a crack at at least a preliminary answer.

Mr. FUNSETH. It is difficult to decide when you look, for example, at the flow of refugees from Mozambique into South Africa, into neighboring countries, how many are refugees in the strict definition of the Refugee Act. But we estimate that there are about 1.1 million refugees in southern Africa, in the 11 countries there, based on those figures that you see on the chart.

Mr. ARMACOST. I might comment, from my experience visiting border camps in Malawi and Mozambique, most of the people were simply temporarily moving out of regions of conflict in order to escape the fighting. I had a limited chance to talk to various people. Those who I saw seemed about evenly-divided between those moving away from RENAMO forces and those moving away from government forces. Residence in the border camps seemed to be a temporary phenomenon driven by the intensity of the fighting and the absence of food. They did not express any intention to stay over a lengthy period. I certainly do not think they would qualify as refugees in our classical terminology. Their hope is to go home. And the Malawian authorities are reluctant to describe them as refugees precisely in order not to create a magnetic flow of people into their own territory.

ARE OTHER NATIONS CONTRIBUTING?

Senator SIMPSON. Let me just ask one final question. I noted, in the overview of the testimony I had, the money the United States has made available to these areas of Africa through UNHCR contributions, ICRC contributions, direct aid money. I think that response is truly commendable and fitting. Have the other major "donor countries" similarly responded?

Mr. FUNSETH. Let me address the UNHCR and ICRC and multilateral effort. The United States has contributed about 30 percent of the UNHCR budget in Africa, and we have contributed about 25 percent of the Red Cross, and the other donor countries have made up the difference.

Mr. FREEMAN. Senator, with respect to aid more generally for economic development, I think our contribution historically to the southern African region has been about 14 percent of the overall Western and Japanese aid effort. That was the figure in 1985. That figure may have fallen now, not because of reductions in American aid but because of increases in aid from others, to about 10 percent of the overall international effort at development in the region.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, I thank you.

Thank you, Ted.

U.S. ASSISTANCE

Senator KENNEDY. I might just mention before Mr. Armacost leaves, that there was a story that was printed in the Post this morning about, "U.S. African Aid Plan appears to offer less than anticipated", about the efforts that were made by your Department to try and get more humanitarian assistance for these groups, and that you were effectively cut off at the pass by OMB.

We just want you to know we have taken note of that, and although we understand that you have to work within the confines of what is eventually worked out in the budget, we also want you to understand that we have a continuing interest to find out what the nature of the problem is, and our responsibility to respond adequately.

So we are going to continue to press, hopefully in a constructive and positive way, to try and find out what the needs are, and to work with you to identify those needs and raise these issues so we can see what response the American people want to provide. I know it will be generous.

I know you have to be on your way, Mr. Armacost, but we are glad to welcome Senator Simon.

Senator SIMON. Thank you. I have no statement. I am here to learn, and I apologize for being late.

Senator KENNEDY. Good.

Mr. ARMACOST. If I might just comment on your last remarks. We certainly welcome the help, any help we can get from you all, in assuring the passage of our supplemental request for fiscal year 1987 to contribute at least a down payment to what we expect will be a multiyear and comprehensive program.

My travel to southern Africa certainly convinced me the economic and needs are self-evident and the political benefits of making a substantial contribution will be very significant for the United States. We are putting down a down payment in the 18 months that lie ahead of $93 million which will be the start of what we expect to be a multiyear program.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.

Mr. ARMACOST. Thank you

Senator KENNEDY. Our second panel represents a number of those on the front lines of the American effort in behalf of southern African refugees and others in need, and I have always found their reports to be extraordinarily useful.

We welcome James Mayrides, who is the Deputy Regional Director for east and southern Africa for UNICEF, who will formerly present for the subcommittee's information the new UNICEF report; representing the voluntary agency CARE, which has a leading role in Mozambique, is Rudy Ramp, who is the Regional Program Manager for east Africa for CARE; Tom Getman is Assistant to the President of World Vision, an organization whose good work I saw in Ethiopia, and finally, to present an overview, Roger Winter, the Director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees.

Mr. Mayrides, would you please start us off?

STATEMENT OF A PANEL INCLUDING: JAMES MAYRIDES, DEPUTY REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, UNICEF; RUDY RAMP, REGIONAL PROGRAM MANAGER FOR SOUTH AFRICA, CARE; THOMAS R. GETMAN, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, WORLD VISION, AND ROGER WINTER, DIRECTOR, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

Mr. MAYRIDES. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to present evidence on the situation of refugees and displaced persons in southern Africa.

I am located in Nairobi, Kenya as the Deputy Regional Director for eastern and southern Africa. This region includes, as you know, all of the SADCC countries and the front-line states.

Here with me today is Mr. Hal Fleming of our Programme Funding Office, who will be pleased to assist me in answering any questions you and members of the Subcommittee may have.

UNICEF REPORT

Mr. Chairman, you have already referred on numerous occasions to the report released by UNICEF on January 29 in London, entitled "Children on the Front Line: The Impact of Apartheid, Destabilization and Warfare on Children" [1] which describes the current plight of children in southern Africa.

The report has a special focus on the situation of children in Angola and Mozambique. Our Executive Director Jim Grant described the report as very discouraging. It documents the fact that infant mortality rates in the region, especially in parts of Angola and Mozambique, are now the highest in the world largely, although not exclusively, as a result of civil war and deliberate targeting of social services facilities as part of efforts to destabilize the economies of those two countries.

Last year an estimated 140,000 children in Mozambique and Angola died as a result of direct or indirect result of war and economic destabilization, and this year is expected to be worse.

As you so well-stated in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, this is really the equivalent of a jumbo jet full of children crashing every day.

The report states that of the estimated 1 million children born in those two countries in 1986, one out of two will be dead or crippled by the time they reach the age of 5. These terrifying facts are a consequence of underdevelopment compounded by war and destabilization.

UNICEF PROGRAM

Last year, UNICEF's 41-nation executive board instructed us to review the situation of children in southern Africa with a view to determining the impact of political and military developments on the most vulnerable populations—women and children. This report fulfills UNICEF's mandate to document and report on the state of the world's children. But I must underline this point—that it is not our intention to probe the causes, but to document the consequences of the world's actions on children.

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[1] For complete text of the UNICEF report, see appendix.

To that end, the report, "Children on the Front Lines," notes that today in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, a child dies every 4 minutes as a result of preventable diseases, malnutrition and war.

Clearly, the tactics of combatants in the region are responsible for a large number of these deaths. Since 1981, 40 percent of the primary schools and 718 primary health clinics have been destroyed in Mozambique, depriving more than 2 million people of basic health care services.

Consequently, easily-preventable diseases are now taking a hideous and rising death toll on the vulnerable age group of infants and children under five.

ESTIMATES OF INFANT MORTALITY RATES

In assessing the impact of war and destabilization on the children of Angola and Mozambique, the researchers compared the infant mortality rates with those of nearby Tanzania, a country at a similar level of development. It is assumed that were it not for the war, that routinely employs terrorist attacks on civilian populations, the infant mortality rates for under-fives in Angola and Mozambique would be close to the Tanzanian level of 185 per 1,000 live births. Instead, the infant mortality rates there are between 325 and 375 per 1,000.

Based on this comparison, we estimate that 55,000 children in Angola and 82,000 in Mozambique died last year as a result of the war.

Senator KENNEDY. I want everyone to speak, but I cannot let that go by without commenting. Just as an extrapolation, if we were talking about that in relation to the United States, it would mean of our 250 million people—if you figure 15 million people in Mozambique, over 1 million children, in excess of what would have died under their own comparable figures in terms of Tanzania, as I understand; is that right—well, I am not asking whether my math is right, but it is of that dimension. That would mean millions of American children and it is just beyond imagination. It is just absolutely extraordinary and virtually comparable figures in terms of Angola as well.

We talk so much about figures around here, and we all saw with Ethiopia the pictures were what really keyed the response to action among the American people. This is just so devastating. I think it is of a dimension which we have little comprehension of in this country.

I hope you will continue. I apologize for interrupting.

Mr. MAYRIDES. Well, we fear, Senator, that in certain areas of those countries, even though the average is 325 or 375, that it could go as high as 500, because there are areas that we cannot reach to survey.

ROLE OF UNICEF

Mr. Chairman, as you know, providing assistance to children in war-torn countries is not new to UNICEF. The Fund was established for just this purpose 40 years ago. And today we find our grim expertise is in even greater demand. Beyond providing relief

and hope to homeless, frightened and discouraged people, UNICEF, working in partnership with other international agencies such as UNDP, UNHCR, WHO, World Food Program, and ICRC, and private agencies such as CARE, Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services among others, is seeking and finding ways to buffer children against the ravages of war around the world, and in particular in southern Africa.

In El Salvador this week, the government and the rebels will for the third year in a row stop the war for 3 Sundays so that UNICEF, WHO, the Catholic Church with assistance from AID and other agencies, can immunize the children.

At the end of 1985 and the beginning of 1986, in Uganda——

CEASE FIRES FOR CHILDREN

Senator KENNEDY. Excuse me. That is an amazing program. It is amazing, if you take all of the strife that is going on in El Salvador, and they are able to secure a cease-fire from both sides, where you have all of that conflict. The immunization of the children is an extraordinary achievement, and it is that kind of initiative and similar kinds of initiatives that we would hope could be worked out in terms of some of the conflicts in southern Africa. I do not know whether it is possible, but we ought to be working on it.

Mr. MAYRIDES. We are, Senator. It is just very difficult for us at this point to go into South Africa or some of the other areas. But we have had the experience. We carried out a similar operation in Uganda, where we established with both sides a zone of peace. We negotiated from Nairobi and in Kampala to set up daily flights of supplies of vaccines and oral rehydration therapy and other medicines for children into western Uganda when the now President Museveni had not quite come into power in Kampala.

So we have done that, and in fact just recently in Lebanon, we have lost our first staff member in this kind of skirmish; one of our staff members was killed. But this was the first time that that has happened, in many years of working in Lebanon.

DOES IT WORK IN LEBANON?

Senator KENNEDY. Do you do that in Lebanon, too? Are you able to get mercy corridors for immunizing or helping children?

Mr. MAYRIDES. Yes, we are trying, Senator, to cross the lines. We have our staff there. We have taken all of our international staff out of Lebanon right now, basically, and we have moved our office over to Amman, Jordan. But we have left the national staff. And it was one of those staff members who was killed in a crossfire.

Senator KENNEDY. But previously, have they been able to move through the various lines for the immunization programs of children?

Mr. MAYRIDES. Yes.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we agree with some of the statements made earlier this morning that we all must work together in southern Africa to find a way to support these thousands of refugees and hundreds of thousands of displaced women and children. And UNICEF is keenly interested to seek opportunities, as we have in other regions, as I have noted, in partnership with relief and de-

velopment agencies to bring food, shelter, clothing, vaccines and medical supplies.

I think above all, what we really have to work for is hope so that we can bring to these women and children the hope that there could be a better tomorrow.

We are also collaborating with the UN community and bilateral donors to develop contingency plans for assisting the poor people and children in all of the front-line states.

Clearly, Mr. Chairman, the end of hostilities in the region can only be achieved by generating international solidarity against terror and for the children.

Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to share our findings with the Committee. I greatly appreciate your efforts to draw the attention of the world to this troubled region.

I am happy to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Ramp from CARE.

CARE'S PROGRAM IN MOZAMBIQUE

Mr. RAMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CARE Program in Mozambique started in October of 1984 specifically to assist the Ministry of Commerce's Department for the Prevention and Combat of Natural Calamities, establish a Logistics Support Unit (LSU) to be able to handle the relief commodities that are being donated by the international community for the population at risk.

The LSU presently is staffed by 25 expatriates based in seven provincial capitals and in the capital of Maputo. The LSU presently has 139 functioning trucks, with roughly 1,500 tons of carrying capacity, and during the months of January and February of this year, we are expecting an additional 154 trucks, which will double our carrying capacity.

I would like to quickly note some of the truck donors: USA for Africa; bilateral donors are Britain, United States, the French, the Dutch, the Japanese; and the NGOs of OXFAM, Save the Children, UK and World Vision have all been donors to this program.

LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS

The bulk of our commodities are moved by truck. Our biggest problem, as you have heard from everyone else, and as you are fully aware, is the insurgency problem. If we look back to when we started in October of 1984, the major problem was one of drought and how do we reach the drought victims.

If you look at the figures now—and in fact you may have quoted them yourself, Mr. Chairman—of the 3.5 million at risk, 2.2 million are as a result of their living in insecure areas, and 1.3 million are in the areas still lingering from the effects of the drought.

Whenever we can, we coordinate with the military. We must move into the insecure areas with military convoy. The Mozambican army definitely has its limitations, and this does slow down our delivery capacity.

The World Food Program finances a coastal vessel which moves food commodities along the coast from the two main points of entry of Beira and Maputo. UNICEF finances airlifts emergency supplies

into those provincial capitals cut off by insurgent activities, while the quantities moved by sea and air are limited, the infrastructure is at least in place.

U.S. AID VIA CARE

The support for CARE's operations, as you have also heard from Ms. Taft, is coming from the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance. We have received in the first grant, $2.2 million. We are now working on a grant of $3.6 million, and are working up a proposal now for an additional $4.2 million, which does include additional trucking. And we will be moving into an eighth province. We are presently operational in seven provinces.

In terms of the food requirement, I think it is of interesting to note that last September we had heard that the food deficit was projected at 450,000 tons, but the figure was given with a caveat that this estimate may be conservative if insurgency activities continue. No one at that time was sure yet how the insurgency activities would affect the farmers' ability to farm their land. Last month another assessment was made, and the figure that has come back is a 728,000 tons food deficit, the increase being mainly attributed to the fact that the farmers to a large extent are not able to farm their lands. Many farmers and their families have moved into urban centers, district and provincial capitals—although we must also give some of the blame to the fact that there were not good supplies of seed.

Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to offer this brief situation report.

[Report follows:]

SITUATION REPORT - MOZAMBIQUE

FEBRUARY 5, 1987

Presented by: Rudy Ramp
Regional Manager, East Africa
CARE

A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

OVERALL, 25 PERCENT OF MOZAMBIQUE'S POPULATION OF 14.2 MILLION IS AT RISK. OF THOSE 3.5 MILLION PERSONS (IN AT LEAST EIGHT OF MOZAMBIQUE'S TEN PROVINCES):

- SOME 800,000 HAVE BEEN DISLOCATED BY INSURGENCY.
- ALMOST 1.5 MILLION OTHERS HAVE BEEN AFFECTED BY RURAL INSECURITY,
- ABOUT 100,000 HAVE BEEN UP-ROOTED BY DROUGHT CONDITIONS,
- ABOUT 1,000,000 HAVE BEEN IMPACTED BY THE LINGERING EFFECTS OF THE DROUGHT, AND
- APPROXIMATELY 147,000 HAVE BEEN PLACED AT RISK BY ISOLATION AND THE INABILITY TO MAINTAIN SUPPLY LINES IN THE EXTREME NORTHWEST.

OF THE TOTAL AT-RISK POPULATION, SOME 1.3 MILLION (38 PERCENT) ARE IN GENERALLY ACCESSIBLE AREAS, WITH THE REMAINING 2.2 MILLION REACHABLE ONLY BY HEAVY CONVOY, BY SEA, OR BY AIR. ANOTHER TWO MILLION MOZAMBICANS (MOSTLY IN URBAN SETTINGS) -- WHO MUST RELY ON TRADITIONALLY IMPORTED FOOD SUPPLIES AND THE NORMAL COMMERCIALIZED FOOD CHANNELS -- HAVE BEEN AFFECTED NEGATIVELY BY CIVIL STRIFE AND AN ATROPHIED ECONOMY.

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B. REASONS FOR PREVAILING DISASTER SITUATION

1. ON GOING CIVIL STRIFE

   A. BEIRA CORRIDOR IS ROUGHLY THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN CIVIL STRIFE AND THE RESIDUAL EFFECTS OF THE DROUGHT.

   B. NORTH OF THE CORRIDOR INSURGENT ACTIVITY IS THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF THE EMERGENCY.

   C. BY THE END OF 1986 INSURGENT ACTIVITY HAS REACHED SUCH A LEVEL THAT IT IS VERY LIKELY SURPASSING DROUGHT AS A CAUSE OF HUNGER IN MOZAMBIQUE.

   D. INSURGENT ACTIVITY IS CLEARLY THE MAJOR CONSTRAINT TO MORE EFFICIENT TRANSPORT AND DISTRIBUTION OF RELIEF COMMODITIES. EXCEPT ALONG THE COAST, MOST COMMODITIES ARE DISPATCHED FROM PROVINCE CAPITALS BY TRUCK CONVOYS WHICH REQUIRE PREARRANGEMENT WITH SECURITY FORCES WHICH ARE ERRATIC AND SOMETIMES DIFFICULT TO COORDINATE.

   E. INSURGENT ACTIVITY IS ALSO PREVENTING SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: TEACHERS, HEALTH WORKERS AND AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS ARE REGULARLY BEING ATTACKED.

2. RESIDUAL EFFECT OF THE PROLONGED DROUGHT IS AFFECTING PRINCIPALLY THE AREAS OF INHAMBANE AND GAZA PROVINCES WITH EXCEPTION OF APPROXIMATELY 50KM FROM THE COASTLINE. BECAUSE OF THE DROUGHT AND LACK OF AG INPUTS, MANY PEASANTS HAVE ALREADY MOVED TO DISTRICT AND PROVINCIAL URBAN CENTERS.

3. EFFECTS OF AN ATROPHIED ECONOMY AFFECT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. THE GOV'T IS PRESENTLY NEGOTIATED A REFORM PACKAGE WITH THE IMF WHICH INCLUDES SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN GOVT SPENDING, REDUCED ACCESS OF GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISES TO LOCAL CREDIT, FURTHER PRICE LIBERALIZATION AND A DEVALUATION OF THE METICAIS. PROJECTIONS ARE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE FINALIZED IN MARCH AND INDICATONS ARE THAT BOTH PARTIES SEEM PLEASED WITH PROGRESS BEING MADE.

4. THE NORTHERNMOST PROVINCE OF NIASSA, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT CABO DELGADO, SUFFER PRINCIPALLY FROM ECONOMIC ISOLATION EXACERBATED BY SOME LOW-LEVEL INSURGENCY.

C. FOOD REQUIREMENTS

1. MOZAMBIQUE HAS EVOLVED INTO A CHRONIC FOOD DEFICIT COUNTY, PARTLY DUE TO THE NATURAL AND MAN-MADE DISASTERS WHICH HAVE AFFECTED THE COUNTRY OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS AND PARTLY DUE TO AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IT HAS FOLLOWED SINCE INDEPENDENCE.

IN SEPTEMBER 1986 A FOOD FOR PEACE TEAM FROM NAIROBI VISITED MOZAMBIQUE AND CONCLUDED THAT THE NEED FOR FOOD ASSISTANCE IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY CONSTANT, WITH DEFICITS OF APPROXIMATELY 450,000 MT PER YEAR. HOWEVER, IT WAS ALSO NOTED THAT THIS ESTIMATE MAY BE CONSERVATIVE IF RURAL INSECURITY CONTINUES. IN JANUARY 1987 THE TOTAL FOOD DEFICIT WAS RE-ESTIMATED AT 728,000 MT, THE INCREASE IN THE DEFICIT BEING LARGELY DUE TO INSURGENT ACTIVITIES PREVENTING FARMERS FROM PLANTING THEIR CROPS AND A SHORTAGE OF SEEDS.

AFFECTED POPULATION BY PROVINCES

1. GOVT. RECOGNIZED IMPACTED PROVINCES

PROVINCE	DISLOCATION DUE TO INSURGENCY	DROUGHT	DROUGHT AFFECTED	INSURGENCY AFFECTED	EXTREME ISOLATION	TOTAL
MAPUTO	22,600	0	71,500	176,800	0	270,900
GAZA	0	0	323,000	11,000	0	334,000
INHAMBANE	0	55,000	339,100	36,100	0	430,200
SOFALA	400,500	63,600	3,800	103,500	0	571,400
MANICA	800	0	53,000	41,000	0	94,800
TETE	114,000	0	90,000	254,000	0	458,000
ZAMBEZIA	262,400	0	0	569,700	0	832,100
NIASSA	0	0	0	300,700	141,700	442,400
	800,300	118,600	880,400	1,492,800	141,700	3,433,800

2. NOT RECOGNIZED BY GOVT AS IMPACTED AREAS

PROVINCE	DISLOCATION DUE TO INSURGENCY	DROUGHT	DROUGHT AFFECTED	INSURGENCY AFFECTED	EXTREME ISOLATION	TOTAL
MAPUTO CITY	0	0	0	0	0	0
NAMPULA	0	0	0	50,000	0	50,000
CABO DELGADO	0	0	0	15,000	5,000	20,000
	0	0	0	65,000	5,000	70,000
GRAND TOTAL	800,300	118,600	880,100	1,557,100	146,700	3,503,800

PROPOSED USG RESPONSE

THE FFP TEAM IN SEPTEMBER RECOMMENDED THE FOLLOWING ANNUAL ALLOCATIONS FOR THE NEXT 2-3 YEARS:

		(MT) USG	NEED	%
- TITLE II (MAIZE, BEANS, VEG OIL) FOR FEEDING IN RURAL AREAS:				
	CWS	4,000		
	WV	23,000		
	DPCCN/CARE	30,000		
		57,000	202,356	28%
- TITLE II (CEREALS & DAIRY PRODUCTS) FOR URBAN AND PERI-URBAN AREAS:				
	GOVT	96,800	247,644	39%
		153,800	450,000	34%

BASED ON LATEST INFORMATION FROM OTHER DONORS THE AID MISSION IN MOZAMBIQUE IS RECOMMENDING THE FOLLOWING REVISED FY87 TITLE II EMERGENCY PROGRAM:

- FOR FEEDING IN RURAL AREAS:

WV (UP TO 50% FOR SALE)	15,000 MT	
DPCCN/CARE (FREE DISTRIBUTION)	15,000	
	30,000	
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE	120,000	
	150,000 MT	

POPULATION DEPENDENT ON ASSISTED FOOD SUPPLY

PROVINCE	TOTAL AT RISK	AT RISK INCL IN NORMAL MKT	RURAL AFFECTED	NORMAL MARKET	TOTAL POP DEPENDENT ON SUPPLY
1. GOVT RECOGNIZED IMPACTED PROVINCES					
MAPUTO	270,800	800	270,000	145,000	415,000
GAZA	333,900	106,800	227,100	152,000	379,100
INHAMBANE	430,200	0	430,200	136,000	566,200
SOFALA	571,400	95,000	476,400	365,000	841,400
MANICA	94,800	800	94,000	142,000	236,000
TETE	458,000	58,000	400,000	146,000	546,000
ZAMBEZIA	832,100	277,000	555,100	307,000	862,100
NIASSA	442,400	88,000	354,400	88,000	442,400
SUB-TOTAL	3,433,600	626,400	2,807,200	1,481,000	4,288,200
2. PROVINCES NOT ANNOUNCED BY GOVT AS IMPACTED					
MAPUTO CITY	0	0	0	870,000	870,000
NAMPALA	50,000	0	50,000	374,000	424,000
CABO DELGADO	20,000	0	20,000	104,000	124,000
SUB-TOTAL	70,000	0	70,000	1,348,000	1,418,000
TOTAL	4,133,600	626,400	2,877,200	2,829,000	5,706,200

ACCESSABILITY OF AT-RISK POPULATION

PROVINCE	TOTAL POP	TOTAL AT RISK	ACCESSIBLE	RESTRICTED ACCESS
A. GOVT RECOGNIZED IMPACTED AREAS				
MAPUTO	540,300	270,900	154,300	116,600
GAZA	1,125,300	334,000	301,000	33,000
INHAMBANE	1,169,800	430,200	337,100	93,100
SOFALA	1,249,000	571,400	82,200	489,200
MANICA	751,600	94,800	44,000	50,800
TETE	974,500	458,100	188,000	270,000
ZAMBEZIA	2,931,000	832,100	185,400	646,700
NAISSA	600,500	442,400	0	442,400
	9,342,000	3,433,800	1,292,000	2,141,800
B. PROVINCES NOT ANNOUNCED BY GOVT AS IMPACTED				
MAPUTO CITY	971,100	0	0	0
NAMPULA	2,818,300	50,000	50,000	0
CABO DELGADO	1,102,300	20,000	5,000	15,000
SUB-TOTAL	4,891,700	70,000	55,000	15,000
TOTAL	14,233,700	3,503,800	1,347,000	2,156,800

FOOD & LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS

PROVINCE	CEREALS NEEDS (MT) TOTAL	THRU DPCCN	LOGISTICS NEEDS DPCCN/MIN COM	PRIVATE SECT
1. GOVT REGOGNIZED IMPACTED AREAS				
MAPUTO	53,016	34,460	12 TRACTOR/TRAILERS(DPCCN)	10 TRUCKS
GAZA	47,666	28,660	12 TRACTOR/TRAILERS(DPCCN)	10 TRUCKS
INHAMBANE	72,332	54,972	17 TRACTOR/TRAILERS	14 TRUCKS
SOFALA	107,488	60,838	TO BE DEVELOPED	N/A
MANICA	30,149	11,999	AIRLIFT SUPPORT	N/A
TETE	69,848	51,127	N/A	N/A
ZAMBEZIA	110,133	70,926	10 4-WD VEHICLES 20 HEAVY VEHICLES 10 TRACTOR/TRAILERS	
NIASSA	56,516	45,269	HEAVY VEHICLES, FUEL AIRLIFT SUPPORT	N/A
SUB-TOTAL	547,148	358,251		
2. PROVINCES NOT ANNOUNCED BY GOVT AS IMPACTED				
MAPUTO CITY	111,142	0	N/A	N/A
NAMAPUL	54,165	6,391	N/A	N/A
CABO DELGADO	15,841	2,550	N/A	N/A
SUB-TOTAL	181,148	8,941		
TOTAL	728,296	367,192		

SITUATION REPORT BY PROVINCE

OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1986

NIASSA PROVINCE

Niassa was declared an affected province in September 1986, as a result of a widespread shortage of food. Excessive rains between late 1985 and early 1986 and the considerable limitation to the communication and transport networks within and without the province, along with mass movements of people are the major reasons for the crisis. The most affected areas are the cities of Lichinga and Cuamba due to a lack of production in all sectors including state farms and cooperatives. Hospitals, schools and the displaced people are amongst the most vulnerable groups. The displaced people are concentrated in the following districts: Cuamba, Metembe, Sanga, Metarica, Maua and Nipepe.

DPCCN/Niassa was organized in October and it is still in the initial phase of hiring staff and acquiring transport. Efforts need to be geared up to strengthen its logistical capabilities. DPCCN/Niassa has sufficient storage facilities, a truck park, fuel depots and an office. However, the warehouse is virtually empty and it has no trucks for relief distribution. DPCCN requires 10 ton trucks and 7 ton trucks and vehicles for Lichinga, Mandimba and Cuamba.

ZAMBEZIA PROVINCE

Zambezia Province is experiencing mass displacements of people throughout the province due to bandit activity. People are facing severe food shortages in almost every district. The lack of DPCCN vehicles is the major cause for DPCCN's difficulties in distributing food to the affected people in the interior. DPCCN has only two 7 ton capacity trucks. The Department requires 10 four-wheel drive vehicles, 28 trucks and 10 tractors and trailers in order to achieve wide distribution to the needy areas. DPCCN/Zambezia is expecting to receive seven UNDP-donated trucks in December.

Communication between the provincial capital and the districts has been very poor due to a lack of radios. DPCCN/Zambezia has representatives in Chinde, Milange, Pebane, Maganja da Costa Ile districts to monitor the distribution of emergency assistance.

Due to a lack of transport, DPCCN/Zambezia has not been able to deliver food to most of the affected areas of the province. Relief distributions are mostly undertaken in the outlying zones of the provincial capital and in the coastal districts by small boats.

The Provincial Director of Agriculture informed DPCCN that in spite of normally adequate rainfall, the 1986/87 harvest may be 30% less than last year's. People are forced to leave their farms due to bandit activity, and therefore are not able to plant. Maize and rice have been planted in some areas of the province and planting will continue through December. However, farmers do not have enough seeds for planting. The green zones around Quelimane are assuming greater importance for the displaced people arriving to the city.

TETE PROVINCE

The provincial government of Tete has created a Commission for the resettlement of displaced people. An estimated 100,000 Mozambicans in Malawi may soon be returned to Tete Province. DPCCN is providing foodstuffs, clothes, blankets and other necessities for the displaced. Some tents have been distributed but many more are required. DPCCN/Tete has sufficient maize committed by donors for distribution in the affected areas until June 1987.

MANICA PROVINCE

Swelling numbers of displaced people due to the bandit activity have been reported during the past few months in several areas of Manica Province. The displaced population has been concentrated in district and locality headquarters. Most of these people are concentrated in Guro, Gondola and Mossurize districts. Rains began in the central areas of the province in October.

Currently DPCCN concentrates its activities in the northern sections as well as the southern parts of the province which have been declared the most drought-prone. No rain has been reported in the northern or southern parts of the province. A serious shortage of clothes in the north has people resorting to wearing bark cloth and animal skins.

SOFALA PROVINCE

DPCCN/Sofala has assigned district representatives to monitor relief distributions and emergency conditions at the district level. It was anticipated that DPCCN would have one district representative and one assistant by the end of November in each of the 13 districts. The district representatives will be responsible for distribution, accountability and provide information on the current situation in the affected districts.

The most affected districts are Caia, Cheringoma, Chibabava, Gorongosa, Marromeu and Muanza. Although no official counting has been made in Beira City, there has been an influx of uprooted populations from bandit-affected areas to Beira City, most of those people are reportedly living with relatives. The problem of displaced people has reduced the agricultural land in the areas around the city and also is straining the already insufficient supplies of the city.

INHAMBANE PROVINCE

Drought conditions have been subsiding along the coast up to 50 km inland. However, in the interior most people are still at risk due to the continuing effects of the drought. Rains have been registered in some areas of the province during October but they were not sufficient for planting in the interior zones. Farmers are in need of maize and groundnut seeds for the current planting season. The lack of water is severe in Mabote and Funhalouro districts; DPCCN has no tankers to transport water from Massinga to those areas.

Vilankulo has four trucks for relief distribution in the northern areas of the province. Two of the units are based in Vilankulo and the other two have been assigned to Inhassouro District. In spite of this fleet, DPCCN/Vilankulo still requires additional tractors and trailers for inland distribution.

Sufficient rain was reported along the coastal areas of Vilankulo and land has been prepared for planting of staple crops such as maize, manioc and peanuts. However, farmers are short of seeds for planting.

In October DPCCN/Vilankulo received a letter from the Mabote District administrator reporting cases of hunger-related deaths, the report emphasized that the district is in urgent need of relief food for distribution. The most affected areas in Mabote are: Papatane, Benzane, Maculuve, Zimane and Tanguane.

GAZA PROVINCE

Drought conditions continue in some areas. Rain was reported in October in the districts of Chicualacuala, Manjacaze and Massingir but farmers are in need of seeds for planting, mainly maize and beans. Other commodities required include clothes, agricultural tools and vegetable oil.

Poor access due to sandy tracks and lack of four-wheel drive trucks inhibits DPCCN from regularly delivering emergency relief to Chicualacuala, Nhanal, Saute, Dindiza and parts of Manjacaze district.

MAPUTO PROVINCE

Rain began to fall in October in several areas of Maputo Province. Nevertheless, the effects of drought and bandit activity are still present in various areas including the districts of Matutine and Magude.

In October the armed bandits burned down 86 huts in the Chivonguene communal village in Magude. Moamba District has been receiving an influx of displaced people from neighboring districts of Namaacha, Manhica and Magude due to the bandit activity.

RAINFALL UPDATE

Planting rains had not started by mid-November in the drier areas of Tete, Cabo Delgado, Nampula and northeastern parts of Zambezia Provinces. The average period of planting rains in these areas is December-January.

Coastal areas from Xai-Xai in Gaza Province up to Queimane in Zambezia Province and Niassa Province had enough rain in late October and early November to begin planting. The rain in Maputo Province had not been sufficient by mid-November to plant dry-land crops. Data are not available for Manica and the wetter areas of Tete Province.

In Maputo Province rainfall was below normal from August to October. Planting began in early November. Planting is expected to continue through December.

Gaza Province had below average rainfall in August and September and normal rainfall in October. Farmers probably began planting in late October in coastal areas but rain may not have been adequate for planting in the interior.

The southern coast in Inhambane Province received a good rain in early August and farmers planted peanuts that month. However, rains were scanty until mid-October thus making the peanuts susceptible to drought and pests. In Vilankulo, planting may have begun in mid-September but the area did not receive rain again until late October. No data are available for interior areas.

Manica Province has no data available yet.

Sofala Province has had good rains since late October and farmers may have started planting maize, beans and other crops.

Tete Province has no data for the wetter zones and in the drier areas rain was not sufficient for planting through October. No data arrived for November.

Zambezia Province had good rains south of Quelimane in late October and farmers in the south probably began to plant maize, beans an in some areas cassava. Data is not available for the rest of the province.

Nampula Province had not registered sufficient rains by early November to start planting.

Cabo Delgado Province is same as above.

Niassa Province experienced the beginning of rains in elevated areas in late October and farmers may have started to plant maize and beans in early November.

LSU/CARE PROJECT BRIEF

A. BACKGROUND

1. At the invitation of Government of Mozambique (GPRM), Dr. Philip Johnston, CARE Executive Director, visited Mozambique in December 1983 to explore possibility of providing logistics assistance during the Mozambican drought emergency.

2. February 1984 The Basic Agreement was signed and a proposal submitted to OFDA for funding.

3. OFDA approved 1-year project commencing April 1, 1984, for $2,210,084. Subsequently OFDA approved additional $763,000 to purchase 23 trucks. This funding was sufficient to cover operational costs through March 1986.

4. In March 1986 OFDA approved a 2nd grant totalling $3,602,831 for the period April 1986 through April 1987. The grant included the purchase of the following additional light and heavy vehicles:

QTY	DESCRIPTION
16	Light Vehicles
10	16-20T Trucks
19	7-9T Tricks

During 1986 CARE also provided, through its own sources, an additional $6,715,000 worth of material goods and contributions in kind to be distributed as relief goods through DPCCN in 1986. The following materials were provided:

2000 MT Maize	CARE-Norway	$ 220,000
1000 MT Maize	CARE-USA	110,000
300 MT Dry Fish	CARE-NORWAY	900,000
135 MT Soap	CARE-NORWAY	70,000
30,000 Cooking Utensils	CARE-NORWAY	115,000
214 MT Clothing (1985-1986)	CARE-USA	5,000,000
125,000 Pairs Shoes " "	CARE-USA	300,000
		$6,715,000

5. CARE is now preparing a 3rd grant request to cover the period May 1987 through April 1988. The request for $4,215,000 includes 4 light vehicles and 20 farm tractor/trailers or 5T trucks and provides funding to expand LSU operations to another province; in 1986 the LSU was operational in 7 provinces.

6. In October 1984 CARE and the GPRM signed a project agreement for CARE to establish a Logistics Support Unit (LSU) as a permanent disaster logistical unit within the DPCCN. Through the LSU the DPCCN coordinates the logistics activities and resources of the international donor community with the concerned government departments and operational entities. Note: GPRM was not willing to accept a foreign organization assuming the function of the GPRM in:

   a. the coordination of donor inputs; nor in
   b. the management of an independent logistics system.

7. The LSU has been established by the assignment of professional CARE expatriate technical and logistical managers, each complemented by a Mozambican counterpart, with the intention that the unit become an entirely Mozambican entity within four years of project initiation. In addition to having management responsibilities, CARE expatriate staff are also responsible for training of local staff.

8. The LSU is directly responsible for port clearance, handling, storage, maintenance and operations of vehicles and establishment of information systems for assessing needs and monitoring commodity flows.

9. During the past year UNICEF has assigned workshop technicians to all provincial workshops, a unique collaboration between 2 NGO's.

B. STATUS OF OPERATIONS

1. Office Locations

- Maputo: Main Office
- Provincial offices in Zambezia, Tete, Manica, Sofala, Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo.
- Each installation usually consists of sufficient warehouse space, truck parts, workshops, fuel pumps and office space all provided by the GPRM.

2. Expatriate Staff:
13 in Maputo, 12 in provinces (9 nationalities)

3. Truck Fleet

PROVINCE	TRUCKS	CAPACITY	of which	OPERATIONAL	MT	INOPERATIVE	MT
Maputo	43	521	"	37	481	6	40
Gaza	19	161	"	15	124	4	37
Inhambane	33	380	"	29	349	-4	31
Sofala	24	218	"	15	128	+9	90
Manica	21	210	"	18	190	+3	20
Tete	44	410	"	23	215	*21	195
Zambezia	2	14	"	2	0	0	0
Niassa	0	0	"	0	0	0	0
TOTALS	186	1914		139	1501	47	413
PERCENTAGE	-	-		75%	78%	25%	22%

Note that 6 trucks of 73 tons capacity are fuel tankers.
- 1 truck of 7 tons lost due to attack in 1986.
+ 1 truck of 10 tons lost due to attack in 1986.
* 9 trucks of 77 tons lost due to attack in 1986.
5 trucks on temporary loan to the army.
4 trucks on loan to AGRICON (Govt marketing agency).
25 trucks out of service due to accident or repair.

The national fleet will be expanded significantly by the arrival early in 1987 of 115 new trucks of 1056 tons capacity, representing a 62 percent increase in the number of trucks and a 55 percent increase in capacity. In addition to the 39 new trucks of 455 tons capacity already received in 1986, the 115 new trucks were committed during the past year. Trucks received or committed in 1986 are the following:

NO.	TYPE	TONNAGE	DONOR	COMMENT
6	Leyland	7 T.	USA for AFRICA through UNICEF	Received
5	Leyland Tankers	11 T.	USA for AFRICA through CARE	Received
11	Leyland	16 T.	USA for AFRICA through CARE	Received
11	Leyland	10 T.	Britain Bilateral	Received
2	Leyland	16 T.	World Vision	Received
4	Renault	10 T.	French Bilateral through UNICEF	Received
7	Volvo	10 T.	UNDRO	Ordered, ETA Jan 87
12	Volvo	16 T.	CARE	Ordered, ETA Feb 87
8	Mercedes 4x4	9 T.	CARE	Ordered, ETA Feb 87
11	DAF (5 of 4x4)	10 T.	Dutch Bilateral	Confirmed, ETA Jan-Feb 87
8	Leyland	10 T.	Save the Children UK	Ordered, ETA Jan 87
2	Leyland	7 T.	OXFAM UK	Ordered, ETA Jan 87
26	Nissan	9 T.	Japan Bilateral	Ordered, ETA Feb 87
38	Nissan	7 T.	Japan Bilateral	Ordered, ETA Feb 87
3	Nissan (w/crane)	6 T.	Japan Bilateral	Ordered, ETA Feb 87
154		1511 T.		

These additional truck commitments to DPCCN by different donors effectively doubles the operational fleet.

4. Commodity Handling

1. During 1986 the LSU moved approximately 125,000 MT of commodities to end-users of which 110,000 MT was food from 44 different donors. The DPCCN maize requirement for 1986 was estimated at 199,584 MT.

2. Throughout 1986 the World Food Program sponsored the coastal marine vessel 5 JUIN to carry emergency food cargo between Maputo, Inhambane, Vilanculos, Inhassoro, Beira and recently Quelimane. During 1986 the 5 JUIN made 31 voyages with 31 ports of loading and 49 ports of discharge, carrying a total of 10,670 tons of emergency food.

3. LAM, the Mozambican national airline, undertook designated cargo flights for DPCCN from Maputo to provincial capitals at a favorable rate of US$0.50 per kilogram. This activity, funded by UNICEF, provided 62 flights that transported 596 MT of cargo to 7 provincial cities.

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Getman?

WORLD VISION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Mr. GETMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a particular privilege for me to be invited to reflect with you and your colleagues on the heart-rending experience of my family and I walking with our friends in South Africa over the last five years.

In a word, we believe that before the probable turn to holocaustian violence, there is much left to do in battling hunger and illiteracy and homelessness and disease and alienation.

World Vision, my organization, spent nearly $4 million in South Africa itself last year on relief and development. Six hundred thousand people were in the feeding programs in which we participated. One hundred and twenty thousand were fed directly by World Vision. In addition to what Operation Hunger and the Red Cross are doing. We have 100 national staff people in that country.

Mr. Chairman, some of the most severe apartheid laws have been repealed by recent actions of the South African Parliament. It would be negligent of me not to mention this fact or that, among many progressive Afrikaners, there is a significant recognition of and repentence for the injustices and cruelties inherent in apartheid law. Yet, in daily practice the spirit of these old laws still has a tenacious grip on the lives of the people of color . . . especially under the harsh police emergencies

In hearing my report, Afrikaner friends bemoan the fact that it does not capture, to their satisfaction, the deep and widespread reformist mood that is growing in South Africa. Black friends, on the other hand, assert that the report is "a good reflection of the spirit that remains". Such is the complex and paradoxical nature of the South African reality. Neither the viewpoints of the people there, nor the issues they are confronting, sort out into a black/white, good/evil matrix. An external observer must, therefore, distinguish between the despised structure of apartheid and the courageous people of all races and backgrounds who are living and working under its dark shadow.

OPPRESSION OF APARTHEID

Apartheid is an oppression that affects all members of South African society. An Afrikaner Member of Parliament has acknowledged that the creation of apartheid is now recognized as a monstrous mistake which has deeply divided the population. "Just talking with blacks in the liberation movement or speaking out about police provocation puts our lives at periodic risk. My family and I have talked about the possibilities and have decided that we must pay the price to bring change and live with as much grace as possible in the midst of this terror." (Two weeks ago this M.P. Wynand Malan resigned from the National Party to run as an Independent in the May election). Although white South Africans who decry apartheid also take risks, the countless displaced people within South Africa face the harsh uncertainties of life under apartheid every day. My distinguished colleagues here can focus on the other

areas of the region, but since this is where we are the major American PVO, that is where I will focus for a few minutes.

Especially with the formal dismantling of some apartheid law, the economic and political powerlessness of the poor causes frustration and lack of trust. One black speaks for many when he says, "Man can measure the depths of the oceans, but who can measure the hurt we feel in our hearts?"

Coloreds and blacks, because of apartheid, have been forced to stay in or move to isolated homelands, to live in substandard townships, to depart these to live in squatter camps or to flee the country altogether.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED

Those who are internally displaced are not legally refugees, according to the definition of the United Nations Convention on Refugees. Yet, after seeing the circumstances under which these people must live, it is clear that they are refugees in the spirit of the term.

Elfan Rees more broadly defines a refugee as "anyone who has been uprooted from his home, has crossed a frontier, artificial or traditional, and looks for protection and sustenance from a government or authority other than his own."

Many people in the black areas now depend upon private voluntary organizations to provide their daily needs. Nearly two million people a day are being fed by PVOs in the townships and in the rural areas.

In 1986, 54 percent of the blacks were jobless in the Eastern Cape communities, near Port Elizabeth and East London. While unemployment for whites was also unusually high at 5 to 6 percent. Maldistribution is the bitter harvest of apartheid which will be reaped no matter what the future government.

On several recent trips to South Africa, I have had the opportunity to visit a number of the tragic black townships, nine of the ten homelands, and a dozen squatter communities. The human relationships were often heartrending, leaving one in tears or outraged. Deliberate deprivation of people of color by whites has in many cases forestalled the provision of even the most basic amenities and disrupted normal family lives. The images and heartache become deeply carved into one's consciousness.

LIVING CONDITIONS

The living conditions within many of the townships resemble abject refugee camps, more than viable communities. Housing was originally built as temporary lodging; however, much of it has never been replaced.

Like many refugee camps encircled by fencing and barbed wire, Soweto, a township-city of some 2 million people, is inhumanly surrounded by a no-man's-land. Containment, control and coercion of blacks living there is carried out with mechanistic efficiency.

Dr. Nico Smith, the renegade Afrikaner white pastor of a black church in Mamelodi, has pointed out so well: "Apartheid has worked well. Ninety-five percent of the people in Pretoria have never been to Mamelodi"—which is, by the way, only 6 miles

away—"to discover what wonderful but suffering people these are." He adds, "We need a miracle of grace. People of different races must open their hearts and homes to one another to ensure peaceful transition."

The chasm between the communities appears to be insurmountable. The present-day townships, however, are a result of the deliberate and, to an extent, legislated poverty imposed upon blacks to consolidate the white ruling party's political and economic power.

Fifty-year-old Alexandra is a 1-mile-square township of over 100,000 people. It is surrounded by the wealthiest of white Johannesburg suburbs, yet it still has few homes with running water or sewage disposal.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Government officials until recently refused to improve the services there or provide investment capital because, as they said to me personally, "The black people should not be there anyway but in the homelands where they belong."

The township of Oukasie is another deplorable example of the mistreatment of blacks. The residents there have been told that Oukasie has been "abolished" because it has been declared unhygienic.

Most of the remaining residents there now say that they will not move. Living in more modern Lethlabile would require a long, more costly and inconvenient commute to work. They are also angry over being forced to live where the government puts them and being denied basic human rights.

Residents say that the government has purposely allowed the conditions in the township to deteriorate by cutting off most of the municipal services. A member of the Black Sash said angrily, "The government can upgrade the area for whites, but not for the 10,000 black residents. The real reason they are doing this is that it is too close to a white area."

SITUATION IN THE "HOMELANDS"

The homelands provide a staggering picture of other injustices the blacks must bear. According to the South African Government, forced removals to the homelands have been stopped after Magopa in 1984. But in reality, blacks are still surreptitiously being moved. In KaNgwane, one of the senior homelands officials as recently as June decried the helplessness that he feels in resolving the complexity of the problem of dealing with people forced to live there. He said, "People are being dumped here, and there is seething discontent. Dying people have no power, only those who have something to do and to eat. The violence directed at children is one of the biggest problems. I am the target of the anger. Please pray for me and encourage development organizations and American politicians to come here and to see and to help."

Squatter camps are primarily a result of the need for jobless people to move out of the rural areas and into the cities to find employment. Housing has not been provided for them in order to discourage their migration to the cities.

CROSSROADS

Teeming Crossroads, which you have seen, and neighboring KTC and Nyanga, are well-known as places of struggle for those squatters who try to maintain a semblance of family life. In May and June, winter months when it was drizzling and cold, about 40 degrees, 70,000 Crossroads residents were left homeless when underlying tensions erupted into vicious fighting and home burning that reportedly was provoked by the police. Instead of reconciliation being sought, polarization is enhanced.

By the way, I have an affidavit here that I would like to submit for the record by the Ministers of the Capetown area churches that explains what happened at Crossroads from their perspective, along with a report that I gave at the International Council of Voluntary Agencies [ICVA] Conference in Geneva.

Senator KENNEDY. It will be included in the appendix.

[Aforementioned material follows:]

December 12, 1986
ICVA South Africa Contact Group
Geneva, Switzerland

Tom Getman South Africa Survey Trips
Feburary 21 - March 20
May 23 - June 7

1. Conversations with citizens and National Party leaders alike indicate that the central government has allowed the military and police to carry on the day to day operation of the country through the State Security Council. Parliament is increasingly becoming superfluous. Major decisions are made through a shadow state structure often without consulting the cabinet. The independent strength of the courts remains to be affirmed or belied.

2. Police and military provocation, torture and indiscriminate killing are commonplace throughout the country and are especially directed toward the young people in both rural and urban areas. This has been well-documented in the Crossroads situation (see attached).

3. The United States' response must take into account the black, Coloured and Asian communities' suspicion of our motives and fear of recriminations if they appear to be consorting with the enemy.

4. There is great risk that misguided zeal and misdirected commitment of U.S. aid or intervention could deepen the divisions; sensitivity and discretion are of the utmost necessity. "We need your understanding more than your money," is the general plea.

5. Because the needs are great, people and organizations are willing to take further risks, but they are asking for personal involvement, empowering of the grass roots development process (i.e., The Durban Educational Crisis Conference over Easter Weekend) and careful participation with the Civic Associations (not Councils).

6. The severe needs in the rural areas (including the homelands), which are often overlooked because of political tensions, could receive resources through women's education and development coalitions in small scale projects and through spin-offs from ICRC or UNHCR activities.

7. Using internal black organizations as facilitation centers for both choosing recipients and distributing resources would be resisted as a power grab and nonsupportive of the emerging democratic processes of Civic Associations and Crisis Committees.

8. All proposals for selections of partner organizations and distribution of assistance are fraught with risk, but it appears that an optimum alternative would be for patient joint processing with concerned and politically astute NGO Americans and willing local leaders, subject of course, to the consultative group's suggestion/approval and the prevailing political situation.

9. Suffering people have been encouraged by the GM actions in Port Elizabeth and the Eminent Persons' Group visits. Dr. Crocker's comments about "Black majority rule" and "freedom fighters" embolden some as well, while others see them as only political opportunism and delivered much too late in the game. Anything we can do to move beyond "constructive engagement" with action-oriented accomplishment will help establish bona fides.

10. One possible option would be for a few selected and well trained western PVOs to join ICRC, Operation Hunger, World Vision and the local Catholic and Lutheran Missions along The Kruger Park in Northern Transvaal. This would allow participation with a small bite of Refugee/Displaced Person action while entering into the complex learning curve of the more general Southern Africa situation.

11. Whatever we do must have a dual purpose: (1) To aid the emergence of people who are oppressed and beaten down, partnering with them by giving away any power/resources we have so that they might regain their dignity and self-sufficiency; and (2) to act as facilitators and encouragers as local leadership sets their own house in order with communications coalitions and administrative structures.

12. Finally, there have been ongoing discussions through out the year which have re-enforced the necessity of solidarity with our South African colleagues. As we take their lead on development and educational activities, we must be constant and prayerful in contact with them in order to deal with the unavoidable risks we will encounter. In fact, American PVOs are now awaiting specific instruction from the informal consultative group about whether and how they should be more involved.

THE REALITY OF CROSSROADS

1. WE BELIEVE THAT WHAT YOU HAVE HEARD AND READ ABOUT THE CROSSROADS CRISIS IS A DISTORTION OF THE TRUTH.

The picture which has been presented to the public, through the media of the press and SABC television and radio, has been one in which the conflict within the Crossroads community is portrayed as little more than a faction fight. The situation is far more complex than this, however, as there are divisions within the community along lines of power structures, all imposed from above by state policies. The state, in the form of the security forces, have been presented as an impartial peace-keeping force. However, an on-the-spot examination of the situation by the undersigned group of church people indicates clearly that this is not in fact the case.

2. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS NOT A FACTION FIGHT.

2.1 No tribal differences of any consequence exist within the Crossroads community.
2.2 Outside intervention in the structures and running of the community have sparked off the current unrest.
2.3 The current unrest has been presented as a straight forward fight between 'conservatives' (so-called 'witdoeke') and 'radicals' (so-called 'comrades').
2.4 **Who really are the 'witdoeke'?** They are a minority group within the Old Crossroads community and a great number of them actually come from outside Crossroads.
2.5 **Who are the 'radicals'?** These are the residents of the three satellite camps at Nyanga Bush, Nyanga Extension and Portland Cement sections of Crossroads, who were permitted by the original Crossroads community to settle on those specific pieces of land in 1981. Leadership of these groups was established by popular election. These groups are often incorrectly referred to as the 'comrades'.

3. WE BELIEVE THAT THE STATE IS INVOLVED.

3.1 **The leader of the 'witdoeke' indicated his willingness for a community council to be established in Crossroads.**
3.2 **This envisaged council would have power in the area of Crossroads which includes those areas referred to as Nyanga Bush, Nyanga Extension and Portland Cement.** The people living in these areas have popularly elected leaders and do not support the 'witdoeke' who have minority support even in the area of Old Crossroads itself. That only 4 000 out of 47 000 residents in that area took part in the February 1986 elections bears testimony to this fact.
3.3 **The chairmen of the executive committee which resulted from this election announced his intention to become a community councillor.** This resulted in the resignation of three of his committee members who, along with others opposed to this decision, were forced out of the old Crossroads community.
3.4 **At this time intense harassment by state forces started in the three satellite camps.** Their leaders were detained and tortured during interrogation and an entire busload of women from

these communities was detained. Doors were broken down and houses searched. During a prayer service at the house of one of the satellite camp leaders, shots were fired at the worshippers and a wounded man dragged away by police wearing balaclavas.

3.5 Meanwhile in Old Crossroads all progressive organizations were banned. The leadership of the 'witdoeke' went as far as attempting to close down the SACLA clinic which they considered to be a disruptive political influence undermining their authority.

3.6 The three satellite camps decided to accept most of those who had been evicted from Old Crossroads by the 'witdoeke' into their own communities. The meeting at which this incorporation would have been finalized was planned for Sunday 19 May, the day on which the 'witdoeke' first attacked the three satellite camps.

3.7 A group of concerned church people went to Crossroads to investigate. At any one time at least three people witnessed and experienced the following:-

* The group was twice tear-gassed by the security forces.
* All teargas attacks were aimed at the victims in the satellite camps, but never at the approaching 'witdoeke'.
* Security forces made no attempt to disperse groups of heavily armed 'witdoeke' but constantly dispersed small groups of victims who tried to retrieve their belongings.
* Security forces stood by while 'witdoeke' gangs burned down shacks and looted the possessions and building materials. At the same time the 'witdoeke' were permitted to drive off satellite camp people who attempted to save their possessions.
* The security forces openly allowed the 'witdoeke' to set up and man road-blocks, with military vehicles parked alongside these illegal actions.
* The church group witnessed people being chased and assaulted by 'witdoeke' in the direct presence of the security forces without their intervention.
* There was absolutely no evidence of the officially claimed buffer of the security force members between the two opposing sides. Contrary to the claims made by the security forces that the Mahobe Drive is the borderline between the victims and the 'witdoek' gangs, the actual 'frontline' is located at least a kilometer deeper into the area. Therefore the heavy security force presence on Mahobe Drive cannot be seen as the acclaimed 'peace-keeping buffer zone'.

4. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS ACTUALLY A FORCED REMOVAL.

4.1 In October 1984 the state announced that all squatter groups would be moved to Khayelitsha.

4.2 In February 1985 Crossroads erupted in violence when the presence of a removal squad made it obvious that the state's continued intention was to forcefully move the squatter people to Khayelitsha.

4.3 The violence subsided once the state began negotiations with the people, but the Crossroads residents firmly rejected the offer to be moved to Khayelitsha. The authorities promised that Crossroads would be upgraded but indicated that some people would have to be removed to a controlled squatting area next to Khayelitsha. Residents of Nyanga Bush, Nyanga Extension and Portland Cement who were to be moved to this controlled site refused to move.

4.4 A series of coercive attempts to move these people were made by the authorities. These attempts met with little success. The leaders of these communities called for the recognition by the government for their right to live lawfully in Cape Town. Having fought for their promised permanent status and having shed their blood on that land, they now claimed the right to remain there.

4.5 The current systematic destruction of shacks in the satellite camps can therefore only be interpreted as form of forceful eviction. Thus far their intentions of rebuilding or even of recovering what is left of their possessions have been thwarted by 'witdoeke' and security forces. A delegation of women from the area to parliament was told that they have to move to Khayelitsha.

The above leaves this group of church people with the following questions:

IS THIS THE PATTERN OF 'ORDERLY URBANIZATION'?

IS THIS THE DEMOCRATIC WAY IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS GOING TO TREAT OPPOSITION TO THEIR POLICIES?

IS THIS THE 'EXTENSION OF DEMOCRACY' ON WHICH THE FUTURE REGIONAL SERVICE COUNCILS WILL BE BASED?

Signed by:

Rev. A. Simons *(Methodist Church)*; Rev. P. Grassow *(Methodist Church)*; The Rt. Rev. P. Matolengwe *(Anglican Church)*; Rev. C. Davids *(Anglican Church)*; Rev. S. Jacobs *(Anglican Church)*; Rev. N. Brandt *(Lutheran Church)*; Rev. J. Isaacs *(Lutheran Church)*; Rev. D. Kapa *(Presbyterian Church)*; Rev. B.N. Mgujulwa *(Presbyterian Church)*; Rev. W.M. Mabuza *(World Vision - Methodist Church)*; Rev. P. Oberholzer *(World Vision - N.G. Sendingkerk)*; Rev. N. Bixa *(Methodist Church)*; Rev. R.M. Vithi *(Methodist Church)*; Rev. Z. Mlengu *(Apostolic Faith Mission)*; Rev. M. Mfenyana *(Anglican Church)*; Rev. T. Lester *(Anglican Church)*; Rev. S. Birchfield *(Lutheran Church)*; Rev. B. Birchfield *(Lutheran Church)*; Rev. A. Smith *(Anglican Church)*; Rev. P. van den Heever *(Methodist Church)*; Rev. J. Seremane *(SACC - Anglican Church)*; Rev. G. Quinlan *(Anglican Church)*; Ms R. Quinlan *(Anglican Church)*; Mr J. Liddell *(Methodist Church)*; Ms L. Liddell *(WPCC - Methodist Church)*; Ms E. Huismans *(WPCC - N.G. Kerk)*; Mr W. van der Westhuizen *(N.G. Sending-kerk)*; Ms V. West *(Lutheran Church)*; Mr V. Petersen *(Anglican Church)*; Rev. J. Ashe *(Anglican Church)*; Rev. T. Steyn *(Anglican Church)*; Rev. T. Pearce *(Anglican Church)*; Rev. C. Jones *(Anglican Church)*; Rev. J. Davies *(Baptist Church)*; Rev. P. Mentoor *(A.M.E. Church)*; Dr H.T. Pearce *(Methodist Church)*; Mr R.B. Crowder *(Methodist Church)*; Ms J. Joubert *(Methodist Church)*; Rev. H.S. Maswu *(African Reformed Church S.A.)*

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EXTERNAL REFUGEES

Mr. GETMAN. One can not adequately look at the refugee situation in South Africa without recognizing the fact that there is a substantial number of Africans from surrounding countries who have chosen to seek asylum or employment in South Africa. They often come trying to escape the poorer, or sometimes more life endangering, conditions in their own nations.

One aspect of the treatment of refugees to be encouraged is many South Africans' acceptance of the more than 75,000 Mozambican refugees estimated by relief workers to be in South Africa. In addition, it appears that upwards of 200,000 will continue for the near future to seek refuge as illegal aliens. It is reported that, while the government's orders to the South African Defense Force include keeping refugees out or returning them to Mozambique, a number of cases have been reported where humanitarian action by individual, increasingly restive, soldiers has saved refugees' lives or has guided them to reception areas.

Of those Mozambicans who make the harrowing trip into South Africa, many of these ethnic cousins to black South Africans have been assimilated into the population. Others have been resettled by voluntary agencies into fairly well run and partially self-sufficient refugee villages. These refugees have been absorbed into the communities and often benefit from relief, and health services provided locally by the authorities. Approximately 45,000 refugees live in Gazankulu, about 25,000 are in KaNgwane, and almost 5,000 reside in Lebowa. Mozambicans seeking refuge in South Africa must survive the frightful escape through minefields within their own country, electrified barbed wire fences, Mozambican and South Africa soldiers, wild animals and days of living off of the perched land.

In terms of the external refugees, my friend Roger Winter is much more qualified to talk to that, and will supplement my testimony.

MOZAMBICAN REFUGEES IN SOUTH AFRICA

It remains to be seen, however, how much longer Mozambican refugees will be allowed to come or stay in the country before they too are used as pawns in the larger political and economic power struggle. A "push back" is a real possibility.

Many Americans are individually and collectively through private voluntary organizations searching for ways outsiders can responsibly help in the transition and healing processes that lie ahead.

Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations, among others, along with The Council on Foundations, had a meeting on February 3 in New York to discuss this.

Those who make the difficult emotional and spiritual journey to and from South Africa often see that the oppressed and even the oppressors are victims in a situation which requires from us a deep level of humility, understanding and accountability. The protection of refugees will of necessity be a closely-watched issue during this time of increased tension, suspicion, cross-border raids, and counter-raids.

Along with the U.S. Government, many U.S. foundations, corporations, service organizations, and agencies are involved in South Africa through the funding of black relief, development and education projects. As we in the PVO community understand it, the recent U.S. sanctions legislation is not intended to prevent humanitarian assistance.

InterAction and our European counterpart, ICVA, are committed to finding ways of increasing their members' involvement in the region.

For South African refugees, both internal and external, the fearful consequences of life under legal and economic apartheid continue. As long as the policy of apartheid is enforced by such laws as the Group Areas and Population Registration Acts, the displaced people within South Africa will continue to suffer injustices similar to those of other refugees throughout the world.

Klaus Nurnberger, professor of ethics at the University of Southern Africa, summarizes four possible scenarios for the future of South Africa. First, there could be ruthless and successful white repression for several more decades. Second, there might also be a quick and successful black revolution brought about by the police and military's loss of resolve. Third, there is the possibility of an extended, no win low intensity war of attrition with both Marxist revolutionary and right wing counter revolutionary dynamics driving the country into chaos and destruction. Finally, the South African government could make progressive concessions and adaptations leading to true reform and a multi-racial black majority democracy. The first two alternatives are unlikely. The last, although hoped, worked, and prayed for, is improbable without some miraculous hinge event, as in the Philippines. Sadly, given the nationalistic recalcitrance of many—although certainly not all—South Africans, the third scenario seems to be the most likely. Yet, there are moderate people—even within the South African government—working toward reform.

We must continue to cling to the possibility of the surprise ending, where the powerful would move down to enable the powerless to move up, until there is some political and economic balance.

Regardless of the outcome in the long term, it is inevitable that more refugees will be internally displaced by civil strife and forced to flee the country because of their politics. There will continue to be a need for refugee advocacy and support over the upcoming months and years as the struggle for fundamental justice continues. As many South Africans of all races work toward the long range goal of a multi-racial democracy, the immediate needs of South Africa's "refugees" must not be forgotten.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I would like to conclude with just a few brief recommendations: Number one, that the U.S. Congress and PVO community not be dissuaded by the difficulty and risk, but continue to do the negotiations and authorization of funds necessary to assure continued humanitarian assistance to the suffering displaced people in South Africa, especially for maternal and child health and education and community development.

Second, that assistance be increased to the Front-Line states to shore them up against the economic pressure of apartheid and to develop them into staging areas for humanitarian assistance to conflict zones.

Third, that the number of partnerships be increased between churches, universities, and other communities to provide exchanges and places of refuge for South African activists, and encouragement of conciliation activities. The Rev. Dean T.S. Farisani of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in South Africa, pleaded for this when he was here in October, prescient about his soon detention, I think.

And then finally, if I may, I would like to suggest that we pray actively and in our own way for the detainees and the displaced—those, as they say there, who are in "spiritual graduate school"—for their families and for their support systems, and learn new ways for us to contribute to that support.

Thanks very much. I appreciate being here.

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Winter?

U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

Mr. WINTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

May I say before I get started that we continually notice and appreciate your willingness to seek out the views of the voluntary agencies. It has been very helpful to us.

Rather than giving my testimony in a comprehensive way, I will only make three particular points from it.

First of all, we should put some dimension to the problem to demonstrate its seriousness. While Ethiopia continues to be the continent's primary producer of refugees, Angola and Mozambique are second and third, respectively. More than 10 percent of Angolans are displaced internally or have sought refuge in a contiguous country. Nearly 11 percent of Mozambicans are uprooted. The impact for each of those two nations is equivalent to more than 26 million U.S. citizens being uprooted by violence. And of course, neither Angola nor Mozambique nor their neighbors have nearly our resources to cope with this problem.

Although one cannot speak with total precision on numbers when discussing internally displaced populations, it appears there are now proportionately far more uprooted Angolans and uprooted Mozambicans than there were uprooted Ethiopians during the tragedy of 1984. This is a serious and growing problem.

MOZAMBICAN REFUGEES IN SOUTH AFRICA

Second, Mr. Chairman, may I focuss on the issue—the perhaps almost anomalous issue—of Mozambican refugees fleeing to South Africa.

Aside from Mozambicans in Zambia, Zimbabwe and elsewhere, the largest group of Mozambican refugees has gone to South Africa itself. Their flight is dramatic and perhaps is one measure of their refugeeness. Most do not reach secure asylum.

Inside Mozambique, they must avoid armed forces of either side. Both FRELIMO and RENAMO are proven to harm or at least stop those seeking to leave. They must also avoid mines along the Mo-

zambique side of the border, placed by FRELIMO to deter what they call "desertion." At the border, the refugees encounter a fence network erected by the South African authorities, including 16 miles of fence electrified with a regulatable charge that is at times set at "Lethal." There are a number of confirmed cases of would-be refugees having been electrocuted.

If the refugees get past the fence, they are then in South Africa, specifically, in the Kruger National Park, the region's premier game park. Many young people amongst the refugees, not used to wild animals, have died trying to cross that park.

In late summer 1985, the South African Defense Force was mobilized to stem the entry of the refugees from Mozambique. Other security forces, including park rangers, have similarly been mobilized. If these forces encounter the asylum-seekers anywhere outside of or en route to the homeland of Gazankulu or other so-called "homelands", they arrest them and force them back to Mozambique. If the refugees reach their kinsmen in Gazankulu, they are generally safe.

While such refugees are in de facto asylum, they have no real legal protection, nor do they benefit from any official system of assistance. The primary caregivers to the refugees are their poverty-stricken kinsmen. Church groups and voluntary agencies assist, but given the realities of life in South African homelands, services both for South Africans there and for the refugees are exceedingly limited.

EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE NEEDED

The last point, Mr. Chairman, is this. While it is important and obviously critical that we focus on and arrange mechanisms for immediate emergency assistance to these current victims, it is also critical that we look at longer-range planning for emergency preparedness for an expanded humanitarian-type emergency.

There is no question that rational people amongst us hope that the worst-case scenario will not develop in Southern Africa. But almost any rational person will also agree that a worst-case scenario is possible.

There are some concrete things that can be done. Already some things are being done. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has set up a region-wide working group to deal with refugee issues. The League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies is conducting training to improve the capacity of Red Cross agencies in the front-line states to deal with humanitarian emergencies.

InterAction and ICVA have set up Southern Africa Working Groups to try to coordinate their services and define needs better on a regional basis. These are all important.

But the United States can foster the needed analysis and contingency planning if it is conscious that it is necessary to begin doing it now. It can provide leadership, diplomatic encouragement and the resources to help see this through.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, this is a serious issue. This is an issue that has unique features, such as Mozambican refugees fleeing to South Africa and being in great jeopardy there; and lastly,

that the prospects are that the situation will deteriorate, and we must plan for that now.

Thank you.

[Statement follows:]

Testimony of

Roger Winter, Director

U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

USCR is a program of the American Council for Nationalities Service

on

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Long a disaster area in human rights terms, southern Africa now has the potential for becoming the location of a regionwide humanitarian emergency of biblical proportions. Every day we follow the unfolding drama inside the Republic of South Africa, which is, in turn, involved in conflicts in neighboring states. There is no question that efforts to redress the imbalance of power in South Africa are of the highest priority, as must be efforts to assist apartheid's victims. There are, however, other humanitarian tragedies in the region involving massive numbers of refugees and internally displaced people; these victims are the primary subject of this testimony.

As 1986 closed just a little over a month ago, there were nearly 900,000 refugees and close to 7 million persons internally displaced throughout southern Africa. The number of internally displaced inside South Africa--displaced through violence and as a consequence of apartheid policy--approaches 4 million, or 20% of the black population. Elsewhere within the region there are an additional 2.7 million persons displaced by civil conflict. While Ethiopia continues to be the continent's primary producer of refugees, Angola and Mozambique are second and third, respectively. More than 10% of Angolans are displaced internally or have sought refuge in a contiguous country. Nearly 11% of Mozambicans are uprooted. The impact for those two nations is equivalent to more than 26,000,000 U.S. citizens being uprooted by violence. And, of course, neither Angola nor Mozambique nor their neighbors have nearly our resources to cope with this problem. Although one cannot speak with total precision on numbers when discussing internally displaced populations, it appears <u>there are now proportionately far more uprooted Angolans and uprooted Mozambicans than there were uprooted Ethiopians during the tragedy of 1984</u>. Their numbers are rising and their conditions are tragic. Last week UNICEF estimated that 140,000 children under five in Angola and Mozambique died during 1986 as a consequence

of war and destabilization. Every four minutes a child under five dies as a consequence of violence in these two countries.

Uprooted Mozambicans are the subject of a report issued by the U.S. Committee for Refugees in November entitled Refugees from Mozambique: Shattered Land, Fragile Asylum. We are now working on a similar report on uprooted Angolans, to be followed by a report on refugees from South Africa and Namibia.

Let us focus on uprooted Mozambicans. Of Mozambique's population of 14 million, nearly 1.5 million are uprooted internally or have taken refuge in neighboring countries. However, over 3 million more are seriously affected by the violence which has ravaged the countryside and by the after effects of drought. "Seriously affected" implies they remain in their villages but are essentially cut off from adequate supply channels and are, in many cases, desperate.

Violence against civilians in Mozambique has been particularly gruesome. After Mozambique became independent in 1975, first Rhodesia and then South Africa supported the insurgents of the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) against the governing FRELIMO party which had assumed power from the Portuguese. By the early 1980s violence was widespread and atrocities against civilians were commonplace, most often attributed to RENAMO's forces but occasionally also to FRELIMO. Often refugees we have interviewed are unable to identify who perpetrated the violence against them.

Because of the escalating violence, large numbers of Mozambicans have made the difficult choice to abandon their homes and seek asylum in neighboring countries. As the chart and map which accompany this testimony indicate, many have gone to Zambia and Zimbabwe. In 1986 many also went to Malawi with a major influx occurring last fall. Malawi at first obfuscated the presence of refugees within its borders until their numbers became seriously burdensome. Finally, about six weeks ago, Malawi, which had been forcibly repatriating some groups of Mozambicans, decided to allow the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to establish a presence there to help meet the refugees' needs.

Perhaps the presence of Mozambicans in South Africa--the largest presence in any contiguous country--is the most anomalous. Aside from Mozambicans present in South Africa for employment purposes, many have entered in flight from the violence in Mozambique. Many had been successful small farmers, whose loss has further compounded Mozambique's woes. They enter South Africa seeking refuge with ethnic kinsmen who reside in several of the so-called

"homelands", particularly Gazankulu.

Their flight is dramatic and most do not reach secure asylum. Inside Mozambique they must avoid armed forces of either side; both FRELIMO and RENAMO are proven to harm or at least stop those seeking to leave. They must also avoid mines along the Mozambican side of the border placed by FRELIMO to deter "desertion". At the border they encounter a fence network erected by the South African authorities including some 16 miles of fence electrified with a regulatable charge that is at times set at lethal. There are a number of confirmed cases of would-be refugees being electrocuted. If they get past the fence, they are in South Africa, specifically the Kruger National Park, the region's premier game park. Many young people, not used to dealing with wild animals, have died trying to cross the Park. In late summer 1985, the South African Defense Force was mobilized to stem the entry of refugees; other security forces, including park rangers, have been similarly mobilized. If these forces encounter the asylum seekers anywhere outside of or enroute to Gazankulu or another homeland, they arrest them and force them back to Mozambique. If they reach their kinsmen in Gazankulu, they are generally safe.

While such refugees are in de facto asylum, they have no legal protection, nor do they benefit from an official system of assistance. The primary caregivers to the refugees are their poverty-stricken kinsmen. Church groups and voluntary agencies assist but, given the realities of life in a South African homeland, services both for the South Africans there and for the refugees are exceedingly limited. In some instances, medical and other assistance is provided locally by the authorities.

As harsh and uncertain as the lives of Mozambican refugees are, it is generally the case that internally displaced Mozambicans are even worse off. Forced to abandon their homes and farms, most are now wholly dependent for their survival on food rations donated primarily by Western nations and distributed through government and international relief agencies. The gap between domestic production and total food requirements greatly exceeds the amount of food donated, however, and constant interdiction of supply routes by RENAMO has severely curtailed distribution. Malnutrition and its related diseases are common, and famine threatens large areas of the country. Most severely affected are the areas immediately north and south of the Zambesi River--the provinces of Zambesi, Sofala, and Tete--and the provinces of Gaza and Inhambane north of Maputo. On January 8, the U.S. Ambassador to Mozambique declared a food emergency in Mozambique noting that "the disruption of social and economic life (mainly food production activities and

transportation infrastructure) by civil strife has reached disaster proportions. The magnitude of the impacted populations, the geographic dispersion of affected areas, and the diminished capacity of the government of the People's Republic of Mozambique to provide relief from its own resources require immediate and sustained assistance from the United States."

We agree and commend the Ambassador, AID, and the Bureau for Refugee Programs for their initiative in responding to both Mozambican refugees and internally displaced Mozambicans. We encourage them to be especially bold in assisting the little victims of the region's strife--children, peasants and other innocents. These humanitarian initiatives must be adequately supported. Yet the appropriation which has been utilized to support relief in Mozambique will soon run out, as will funding for the very important Famine Early Warning System. And resources to meet nonfood needs such as medical care, water supply and transport infrastructure have been chronically inadequate.

Across the continent in Angola, the situation of the civilian population mirrors that in Mozambique. Armed conflict between government and insurgent forces of UNITA has forced some 376,000 Angolans to seek refuge in neighboring countries and has uprooted another 480,000 within Angola. Destruction of the logistical infrastructure and interdiction of supply routes have resulted in serious food shortages among the displaced populations. On the Central Plateau, where most of those displaced are located, malnutrition is widespread and infant and maternal mortality rates are high. Outside Angola, the presence of large numbers of Angolan refugees has heightened tension between Angola and its neighbors and has complicated the domestic political situations in the countries of asylum.

Turning to the matter of South African refugees, it is of course remarkable, given the level of violence within South Africa, that the numbers of blacks, whites, and others who have left the country and become refugees or are in refugee-like circumstances are comparatively small. Still, the South African authorities have gone to great lengths to blur the picture and equate "refugee" with "guerrilla". This is of course untenable. It appears to be a tactic to intimidate front line states and justify military attacks against refugees such as those that occurred in Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe last year. Refugees also figured prominently in South Africa's pressure on Lesotho in January of last year, which resulted in the deposing of that country's government.

The matter of South African refugees raises a number of other issues this Subcommittee should explore. For refugees in Lesotho connected to one of the South African resistance movements and in need of resettlement, there are unique problems which are summarized in the attached extract from our March 10, 1986 communication to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. While not many South Africans are seeking third country resettlement outside the region, a few are. This includes some individuals who find it necessary to flee South Africa but who are not affiliated with either the ANC or PAC. Often such people are truly vulnerable and need a rapid solution. Yet the U.S. resettlement system, with its limited ability to respond quickly in southern Africa, generally does not represent a viable option. As the attached April 29, 1986 correspondence indicates, we have raised this issue with the State Department with as yet unknown results. For numerous reasons of policy and fairness, the U.S. should carefully think through the implications, current and future, of the actual or potential migration of South Africans of all races to the U.S.

Of even greater humanitarian importance, however, is the need to improve the capacity throughout the region for dealing with a dramatically increased humanitarian emergency. International organizations and others need to think through assistance mechanisms on a regionwide basis and foster the structuring of mutual aid systems across borders and other mechanisms for coordination and communication. UNHCR has set up a southern Africa working group and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies is taking steps to improve the capacity of Red Cross societies in front line states to respond to humanitarian emergencies. InterAction and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies have structured working groups to analyze and improve the role of international and national nongovernmental agencies to respond to humanitarian emergencies in the region. We understand, too, that Congressman Leland will soon introduce a congressional resolution to encourage the free passage of emergency food relief throughout southern Africa. These are all positive steps.

The U.S. can foster the needed analysis and contingency planning with positive leadership, diplomatic encouragement, and resources. No rational person wishes to see the region further enveloped in violence, with its attendant devastation of civilians. But virtually everyone familiar with the dynamics of the region will acknowledge that the "worst case scenario" there,

while horrible to contemplate, is distinctly possible. In this case, none of us with roles to play in a humanitarian emergency can claim we did not have adequate warning.

The armed conflicts that pervade southern Africa reflect a web of political and economic relationships which bind together all the nations in the region. The civil wars, the hunger, the displaced and refugee populations--even apartheid, itself--are regional problems requiring regional solutions. Unfortunately, there is little evidence to indicate that peaceful solutions are viable. Thus the regional conflicts will almost certainly intensify in the future. Justice is the prerequisite for peace in the region and we pray both will ultimately prevail. In the meantime saving the lives and futures of today's victims and tomorrow's victims must become a clearer priority.

Southern Africa 1986*



U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

Uprooted Populations of Southern Africa 1981–1986

COUNTRY	INTERNALLY DISPLACED		IN EXTERNAL REFUGE		TOTAL UPROOTED	
	12/81	12/86	12/81	12/86	12/81	12/86
Angola	30,000	480,000	197,200	376,000	227,200	856,000
Mozambique	—	1,100,000	—	348,800	—	1,448,800
Namibia	20,000	50,000	41,700	78,000	61,700	128,000
So. Africa*	—	100,000	24,300	34,650	24,300	134,650
Zambia	—	—	2,500	1,800	2,500	1,800
Zimbabwe	30,000	20,000	30,000	4,200	60,000	24,200
Totals	80,000	1,750,000	295,700	843,450	375,700	2,593,450

Equals 537% increase 12/81–12/86

*Figures for South Africa do not include an estimated 3,500,000 persons forcibly relocated since 1961 under the South African government's "homelands" policies.

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
1981-1986

ASYLUM COUNTRY	REFUGEES				DISPLACED PERSONS		TOTAL PERSONS UPROOTED	
	Source Country	1981	Source Country	1986	1981	1986	1981	1986
ANGOLA	Namibia 35,900 S. Africa 6,000 Zaire 18,000	59,900	Namibia 70,000 S. Africa 9,000 Zaire 13,200	92,200	30,000	480,000	89,900	572,200
BOTSWANA	Angola 200 Namibia 300 S. Africa 500	1,000	Angola 200 Namibia 150 S. Africa 500 Zimbabwe 4,200	5,050			1,000	5,050
LESOTHO		2,000		2,500			2,000	2,500
MALAWI			M'bique 70,000	70,000				70,000
MOZAMBIQUE	S. Africa 1,000 Zimbabwe 30,000 Others 1,000	32,000	S. Africa 100 Various 300	400		1,100,000	32,000	1,100,400
NAMIBIA	Angola 40,000	40,000	Angola 40,000*		20,000	50,000	60,000	50,000
S. AFRICA			M'bique 175,000	175,000	**	100,000**		275,000
SWAZILAND	S. Africa 6,500	6,500	S. Africa 7,000 M'bique 4,800	11,800			6,500	11,800
ZAIRE	Angola 139,000 Zambia 1,800	140,800	Angola 290,000	290,000			140,800	290.000
ZAMBIA	Angola 18,000 Namibia 5,500 S. Africa 1,800 Zaire 5,000 Others 200	30,500	Angola 86,000 M'bique 33,000 Namibia 7,000 S. Africa 3,000 Zaire 9,500 Others 2,500	141,000			30,500	141,000
ZIMBABWE			M'bique 66,000 S. Africa 500	66,500	30,000	20,000	30,000	86,500

U. S. Committee for Refugees, January 1987

*Angolans in Namibia have been granted permanent resident status and, thus, are no longer refugees in need of international protection or assistance.

**Approximately 3.5 million persons who have been forcibly dislocated and resettled in "homelands" in South Africa have not been included in this table, but are certainly "displaced".

Extract from letter to Jean-Pierre Hocke from Roger Winter, March 10, 1986

Lesotho's national security and the security of refugees from South Africa are obviously intertwined. . . Also, there are obviously problems in sorting out UNHCR's obligations to refugee activists on the one hand, and combatants on the other. Yet this refugee situation should not be mischaracterized by overly casual reference to combatants. This is largely a refugee situation--one with the prospects of growing more complicated and dangerous in the future. UNHCR will obviously be a central actor.

In looking ahead, there are, I believe, a number of prudent steps that should be considered by competent authorities. In some perhaps tenuous ways, Lesotho parallels the role played by Austria in Europe. Many refugees will need to be moved on, but Lesotho is the gateway. Under prevailing conditions perhaps the most that can be expected of Lesotho is that it not repatriate people involuntarily to South Africa. This requires that the system for transferring refugees from Lesotho be made more efficient. Currently, each contingent's transfer must be negotiated on an ad hoc basis with receiving countries. UNHCR should seek to recruit additional receiving countries. More importantly, however, prearrangements with countries to receive South Africans from Lesotho in pressure situations should be pursued. Of particular importance is the achievement of an international understanding regarding an air corridor through which refugees can be evacuated from Lesotho. This could be pursued through the Representative of the Secretary General in Lesotho. Further, limited resettlement in the West of South African refugees from Lesotho should be pursued. Though numbers need not be large, the very existence of a resettlement program would improve refugee protection in Lesotho.

UNITED STATES
COMMITTEE
FOR REFUGEES
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Informing the public since 1958

April 29, 1986

The Hon. George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
7th Floor
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing to request that this year, when the Department begins to prepare its materials on refugee admissions for FY 1987, the fullest consideration be given to the matter of refugees from South Africa. Having recently returned from southern Africa, it is clear to me that there is a role for limited--but increased--resettlement of South Africans in the United States.

Over the last several years the U.S. has resettled a small number of South Africans. There have, however, been a number of instances when resettlement of South Africans was warranted and was desired by the refugees, but could not be achieved. On occasion this may have been because arranging such resettlement was not a priority for the involved embassy. More often it seems to have related to the length of time it takes to complete U.S. processing. If you made it a point of specific concern, these sorts of impediments seem simple enough to overcome.

I do not suggest the U.S. commitment to resettlement of South Africans needs to be large. There are, however, a number of black and white South Africans who are not affiliated with one of the liberation movements as well as some who are for whom resettlement outside the region is desirable.

I encourage you to assure this possibility is studied and then reflected in a commitment by the U.S. to increase its resettlement of South Africans in FY 1987.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Roger P. Winter
Director

RPW/mm

NEED FOR U.N. COORDINATOR?

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much to the entire panel for your statements. We have got to vote on the Senate floor, but I will just ask a couple of questions.

I think you were here when I inquired of the administration, given our experiences in Bangladesh, in Cambodia, and in Ethiopia and Sudan, where we had a very special kind of focus and attention on those particular problems; and when we did, we had some success. We had success with Sir Robert Jackson in Dhaka and also in the Cambodian situation, and then later on with Brad Morse and others working within the UN framework.

We now have a very dramatic problem at the present time in southern Africa. The numbers, as have been mentioned by the whole panel, are dramatic. And I think what is inevitable is that we are going to see continued deterioration. I think there is very little that anyone can really foresee on the political horizon that is going to indicate that any of these front-line states are going to have the resources to be able to deal with these growing humanitarian needs. And there is very little indication that South Africa is going to alter or change its confrontational policies. I think you can say that without any fear of contradiction.

So the flow line in terms of increasing humanitarian needs of refugees and others are going to be significant and dramatic.

Do you think that we ought to raise the whole level of focus and attention to the extent that the world community can reflect that in a United Nations resolution, and try to fashion and shape a more structured and organized process in which hopefully, we the United States can play a role and other countries can play a role, and work toward meeting the direct needs as well as explore the possibilities of mercy corridors and the other kinds of devices which have met with some success in other parts of the world?

I gather from all of you there is a sense of urgency, and what I am asking, in addition to the points that have been made in the testimony, is do you think we ought to elevate this issue and raise the need for a U.N. coordinator at this time?

Mr. Winter, please go ahead.

Mr. WINTER. If I may, we certainly think the issue needs to be approached on a regional basis and that dealing either bilaterally between this country and an individual country there, or having the UN system do the same thing, is a mistake in the long run.

It is necessary to plan for and as appropriate implement cross-border mercy corridors, cross-border communication systems, cross-border mutual aid systems in order to make the overall effort effective. So we in fact support the kind of suggestion you make.

Mr. GETMAN. I would be happy to talk some more about this in private with your staff, if that would be helpful. We are being a bit guarded publically about how much we say regarding how we are caring for our own staff people there, what the plan is for staging areas in the front-line states, and the growing activity by our organization in conjunction with CARE and other PVO's. But I think the primary thing is to reassert that our vision is a regional one, and InterAction and ICVA are working very, very hard to develop an adequate regional plan that will, whether we are able to use the

Beira Corridor or not enable ways to get assistance to suffering people in the region, even if it becomes the worst holocaustian situation.

I would trust that the Congress does not diminish support for direct humanitarian assistance to South Africa's suffering poor while you are increasing the amount for the front-line states and especially the Beira corridor and Trazara railroad.

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Ramp?

Mr. RAMP. Mr. Chairman, our activities are primarily limited to Mozambique, therefore, I am not that familiar with the more global picture as the others. I am, however, not aware of any dialogue that the international community has had with RENAMO in Mozambique, with the exception of some work that ICRC has done for the release of prisoners held RENAMO.

The situation with RENAMO in Mozambique is not like with the John Garang group in Sudan, where there has been dialogue with the international community, and in Ethiopia and Sudan, working cross-border, where rebels have a very specific area which they control and allowed international relief supplies to be moved into.

In Mozambique, our activities are very much dependent on the Mozambican military to try to move commodities into these insecure areas.

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Mayrides?

Mr. MAYRIDES. Mr. Chairman, I know that we are rushed. We feel that emergency assistance in southern Africa has not been effectively mobilized as yet, and we would very much welcome some sort of a structure to help us to do that.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Senator KENNEDY. What I would like to ask is if the four of you would visit with the staff, both minority and majority, to go over some other issues privately, just to give us some further recommendations. Could we do that since we have to go to the floor to vote?

Mr. MAYRIDES. Fine.

Senator KENNEDY. I want to make sure that anybody who wishes to further complete their comments will be able to make it a part of the record. [See Appendix.]

I am going to recess the hearing, but ask all four of you, and if there are other voluntary agencies here, too, if they would meet with the staff and further review this, because I think all of us are familiar with what the implications are for the future if we don't act now.

So we will recess the formal hearing and ask if those representatives of the voluntary agencies will meet informally. I do not like to close it to the press, but I think in terms of this kind of a conversation, it would probably be wise to do so.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

CHILDREN ON THE FRONT LINE

The impact of apartheid, destabilization and warfare
on children in southern Africa

A report prepared for UNICEF by
Reginald Herbold Green, Dereje Asrat, Marta Mauras and Richard Morgan

January 1987

Extracts from resolution 41/199 adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 1986

SPECIAL ASSISTANCE TO FRONT-LINE STATES

"The General Assembly,

"Deeply concerned at the deteriorating situation in southern Africa, which has aggravated the economic problems confronting the front-line states and other bordering states, arising from the apartheid policies of the Pretoria régime,

"Conscious of the responsibility of the international community to address the problems of the region,

"Mindful of Security Council resolutions 568 (1985) of 21 June 1985, 571 (1985) of 20 September 1985 and 581 (1986) of 13 February 1986, by which the Council, inter alia, requested the international community to render assistance to the front-line States,

"Strongly urges the international community to provide in a timely and effective manner the financial, material and technical assistance necessary to enhance the individual and collective capacity of the front-line states and other bordering states, to withstand the effects of economic measures taken by South Africa, or by the international community against South Africa, in accordance with their national and regional plans and strategies;

"Requests the Secretary-General to mobilize organs, organizations and bodies of the United Nations system so that they may respond to such requests for assistance as might be forthcoming from individual States or the appropriate subregional organization, and further urges all States to respond favourably to such requests;

"Appeals to all states and appropriate intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to support the national and collective emergency programmes prepared by the front-line states and other bordering states, to overcome the critical problems arising from the situation in southern Africa."

CONTENTS

	Preface	v
I.	The state of southern Africa's children Child health and mortality Education and literacy Nutrition and food security Household incomes of poor and vulnerable groups	1
II.	The legacy	8
III	The price of war The economic costs The human costs War-related deaths	9
IV.	What must be done? Child, mother and household survival The national context International solidarity and support	13
V.	Conclusion	19
Table I	Selected quality of life indicators: southern Africa, 1984	4
Annex A	Infants and children under five killed by war in Angola and Mozambique, 1980-1986	21
Annex B	Note on the economic costs of destabilization and aggression, 1980-1986	23

Main references and documents consulted

- iii -


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Preface

Children are currently the victims of armed conflict in almost 50 countries of the world - and children and women typically comprise three-quarters or more of the victims. In 1986, UNICEF's Executive Board decided on a number of measures which UNICEF should take in support of children in such situations, including advocacy to draw the world's attention to their needs and suffering.

The situation of children in the nine countries forming the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) - Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe - deserves more of the world's attention than it has received so far. Apartheid in the Republic of South Africa has been almost universally condemned, as have South Africa's military involvements and incursions into its neighbouring states. But the extent to which South Africa's policies of apartheid, economic disruption and destabilization have seriously affected the lives, health and welfare of children in other countries of southern Africa has been hardly reported upon, and almost certainly too little appreciated. To help remedy this deficiency, UNICEF has commissioned this paper.

The impact of drought on Africa has been vividly brought home in literally thousands of news reports and television programmes. But in southern Africa, the impact of war and apartheid has often been greater than that of drought, and appears to be intensifying as drought recedes.

This document was originally commissioned by UNICEF as part of its regular work in assessing the situation of children and children's needs in different countries of the world. The important findings which emerged suggested, however, that the document should be used to draw international attention to the serious and, in many ways, deteriorating situation of children in the SADCC countries, as part of UNICEF's global mandate for advocacy on children's needs and protection. Although direct observation by UNICEF confirms the broad conclusions of the analysis, it must also be made clear that the paper represents the views of the authors, not necessarily on every point those of UNICEF. It must also be made clear that some final editing of language has been done to ensure that the document matches the cautious euphemism expected of international agencies. Time and distance have made it impossible to check each change with the authors concerned.

In releasing this study, UNICEF's intention is not to enter the politics or the international political complexities of this tragic situation, which are for others to assess and deal with. UNICEF's purpose is not to probe the causes but to document consequences, especially the human impact of this situation, in particular the impact on infant and child mortality, and on the lives and welfare of children and women in these countries.

This document is also concerned with what can be done to respond to the needs of children in these countries. The major part of the response must of course be political - which goes beyond UNICEF's mandate, role and approach. But UNICEF has a mandate to respond to the needs of children everywhere, and, as part of the United Nations family, is committed to work with its sister agencies and with non-governmental organizations in responding to these needs. Indeed, UNICEF staff in all the countries concerned is co-operating closely with representatives of other United Nations organizations and agencies in preparation of programmes of action within the framework of a United Nations response to the General Assembly's resolution 41/199 on special assistance to front-line states. We are also conscious of the major role which non-government organizations are playing - and UNICEF re-affirms its commitment to work in partnership with them.

The proposals at the end of the paper identify some of the actions which are urgently needed. UNICEF, with others, is already exploring how it can best respond to those needs. We encourage all who share our concern for children in these countries to explore how they too can take action.

Richard Jolly
Deputy Executive Director, Programmes
United Nations Children's Fund

I. THE STATE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA'S CHILDREN

Infant and child mortality rates in Angola and Mozambique are now estimated to be the highest in the world. The underlying cause is underdevelopment compounded by war and economic destabilization and the resulting setbacks and dislocations. The tragic consequence is that every four minutes, a small child who would have lived is dying in Angola and Mozambique.

The number of Angolan and Mozambican children under the age of five whose lives were lost as a consequence of war and destabilization totalled an estimated 140,000 in 1986. This year the figure is likely to be even higher.

The peoples and societies of southern Africa care about the welfare of their children. The late President Samora Machel of Mozambique repeatedly referred to his country's children as "the flowers that never wither". The agonizing reality is that today war is trampling them under and cutting them down by the scores of thousands.

It is not only children in Angola and Mozambique who are affected. The state of the 15 million children under the age of five who live in countries bordering the Republic of South Africa is grave, and getting worse. They are caught up in external supported civil conflict and economic destabilization which they are too young to understand or counter.

Drought, floods, lack of access to hard currency, falling terms of trade, rising debt service, the legacy of past mistakes in domestic policy, all play a role in undermining the health and welfare of the children of southern Africa. But the main culprits are war and economic pressure. Their targets are not only economic and military but the social fabric of nations. The deaths stem from the destruction of health and education facilities, the dislocation of communities, the loss of food production, and the constriction of health and water budgets as a result of the war.

The loss of output, of export earnings and of government revenue interacts with the destruction of health and water facilities and the violence which prevents the distribution of food and medicine. These are the costs of war and economic destabilization. The physical destruction of economic and social infrastructure and the ambushing of food and medical transport have so far been concentrated on Angola and Mozambique. However, the economies of all nine countries of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) - Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe - have suffered from South Africa's policies of apartheid, economic destabilization and armed aggression and/or from the necessity to maintain abnormally high levels of security expenditure. The total impact of this enforced austerity on infant and child health, malnutrition and mortality cannot, as yet, be quantified. But it is certain to be considerable.

In Mozambique, for example, 718 health posts and centres have been destroyed since 1981. This means that over 2 million people have been deprived of health care. More than 300,000 primary-school children are without places because their schools have been destroyed.

In areas of southern Angola, and much of rural Mozambique, vaccination programmes have been halted because of the security situation. Many health workers have been killed, wounded, maimed or kidnapped. The result of all of this is that easily preventable diseases or curable illnesses are now taking a hideous and rising toll on the vulnerable age group of infants and children under five.

The costs to other southern African states have not been negligible. The need to maintain abnormally high levels of security expenditure has adversely affected Botswana, Lesotho, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In addition, the destruction of shorter and cheaper trade routes has severely increased the freight bills of Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Angola and Mozambique, which provided these routes to the sea for the landlocked hinterland, have been deprived of the revenue they would have earned. Mozambique's direct and indirect losses in the ports and railways sector have been officially estimated at $US 1 billion since 1980. Lesotho has been the victim of recurrent partial or full economic blockades as well as direct military raids and sabotage.

This summary report is drawn in part from various UNICEF analyses covering the nine SADCC countries. Because of the agony of the children of Angola and Mozambique, whose countries are the particular victims of violence, it deals more specifically with them.

Child health and mortality

Life expectancy at birth in Zimbabwe is 56 years, the highest in the region. It is lowest in Angola estimated at 43 or even lower. Angola has been at war for a quarter of a century, longer than any other country in southern Africa.

The Quality of Life data given in Table 1 shows both similarities and divergences on twelve key indicators. The mortality of children under five ranges from 100 deaths per 1,000 live births (Botswana) to over 325 per 1,000 (Angola, Mozambique), and the mortality of infants under one from 75 per 1,000 (Botswana, Zimbabwe) to 200 (Angola, Mozambique), the highest in the world with Afghanistan. Access to health services is 89 per cent at best (Botswana) and 30 per cent at worst (Angola, Mozambique), while access to safe water ranges from 76 per cent in Botswana to a staggering low of 13 per cent in Mozambique.

Vaccination data are highly variable by disease with an average recorded rate in the 1980s of the order of 60-70 per cent. Very substantial improvements were achieved in the 1970s which have since been endangered by economic recession (Tanzania, Zambia) or partially reversed by war (Angola, Mozambique).

These divergences have been growing steadily since 1980, after a period of substantial progress in the 1970s. Botswana and Zimbabwe, the two least poor countries, appear to have the strongest health programmes, while Lesotho, Swaziland and Tanzania have sustained a forward momentum. Malawi, from very

low levels in most indicators, has shown some improvement. However, Angola and Mozambique, after considerable groundwork in the 1975-1978 post-colonial period and rapid progress during 1979-1980, have since slipped back. It is no accident that the rise in infant mortality coincides with the time and targets of war and destabilization.

TABLE 1

SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS - SOUTHERN AFRICA 1984

	Angola	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mozambique	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe
Population (millions)	8.5	1.1	1.5	6.9	14.0	0.6	22.0	6.5	8.5
Under 5 Mortality (per 1000 births)	325-375[a/]	100	145	280	325-375[a/]	185	185	135	120
Infant Mortality (0-1) (per 1000 births)	200[a/]	75	110	160	200[a/]	125	110	85	75
Infant and Child Malnutrition (%)	NA	32	NA	31	NA	NA	(50)	28	NA
% Avg. Calorie Intake Relative to Requirements	87	(94)	100	97	79	(108)	101	89	89
Access to Health Services	(30)	(89)	NA	80	(30)	NA	(70)	75	71
Access to Safe Water	21	(76)	(14)	(41)	(13)	48	(47)	46	(52)
Primary Enrolment (%) (1982)[c/]	66	76[b/]	71	46	46[b/]	84[b/]	87[b/]	94	131
Adult (Over 15) Literacy (%) (1982)	28	61	70	(36)	27	(61)	85[b/]	69	69
One Year Olds Fully Vaccinated (%): TB	40	70	91	72	(46)	95[b/]	(84)	87	88
DPT	8	82	59	66	(56)	79[b/]	(58)	49	68
Polio	55	77	64	68	(32)	60[b/]	(56)	47	63
Measles	62	75	63	64	(32)	51[b/]	(82)	56	55
Life Expectancy at Birth	(41)	55	50	46	(45)	54	52	52	56
GNP per capita	490	960	530	180	(230)	790	210	470	760

( ) = 1980 (or nearby year).

a/ Reestimated on fragmentary data taking into account impact of war. Standard projections showing 245 under 5 mortality for Angola and 255 for Mozambique assume continuation not reversal of rapid 1975-1980 immediate post independence period gains.

b/ 1983.

c/ Net ratios except for Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Source: Statistics on Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries, UNICEF, April 1986, except for GNP per capita taken from World Bank World Development Report 1986, OUP.

The basic reasons for the extremely high mortality and morbidity rates among infants and children in southern Africa are well known. The least favourable figures come from those countries with the poorest colonial legacy. Their new governments overcame tremendous odds to improve these figures within three to five years after independence from colonial rule. But conditions began to deteriorate rapidly after 1981, when war began to escalate.

Population growth in the SADCC countries is 3 per cent or more, with the exception of the badly dislocated economies and societies of Mozambique and Angola for which it is 2.6 per cent. As a result, almost half of the population of most southern African countries is under 15 and about 20 per cent under five. Both the growth and the age structure place heavy demands on health and education services which in times of budgetary constraints are very difficult to meet, especially in the poorest countries.

Annual population growth in the SADCC countries is 3 per cent or more, with the exception of the badly dislocated economies and societies of Angola and Mozambique, where it is 2.6 per cent. As a result, almost half the population of most southern African countries is under fifteen and about 20 per cent under five. The rate of population growth and the age structure both place heavy demands on health and education services which in times of budgetary constraint are very difficult to meet, especially in the poorest countries.

Nutrition and food security

Fragmentary data suggest that child malnutrition is a grave problem in Malawi, Tanzania, Angola and Mozambique and serious in all of the southern African countries.

On a national scale, the ratios of average daily calorie intake as a percentage of the daily basic requirement range from 100 per cent or more in Swaziland, Tanzania and Lesotho to the low estimate of 79 per cent in Mozambique. But household food security is considerably more vulnerable than these national averages might suggest. In almost all the countries of the region, poor peasant families in marginal areas have been relatively more severely affected by drought and have often had poorer access to relief or subsidized food aid than city dwellers or peasants in less remote areas. Moreover severe dislocation, probably affecting nearly 9 million people, has drastically reduced the self-sufficiency of populations in Angola and Mozambique. Extremely low urban real wages and informal-sector incomes in the most constricted economies - Zambia, Tanzania, Angola and Mozambique as well as Malawi - have reduced the food security of urban low-income households and, judging from fragmentary data, have radically increased the rates of urban malnutrition.

Education and Literacy

Southern African countries have set high priority on extending primary education and adult literacy. By 1982 three countries (Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia) had achieved virtually universal primary school enrolment. Three more (Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho) had enrolment ratios of 71 per cent to 84 per cent. Angola had 66 per cent in 1982 although rural violence may have

reduced the level since. After an initial post-independence surge Mozambique's primary school enrolment has been held to 46 per cent by the destruction of 40 per cent of schools and resulting lack of access for many of nominally enrolled pupils. Malawi's 46 per cent enrolment appears to represent a lesser priority accorded to education. In each country, except Lesotho, the proportion of boys enrolled is higher than that of girls.

Adult literacy rates, especially for women, tend to be correlated with better child care and lower infant morbidity and mortality. In Tanzania 85 per cent (including 80 per cent of women) but in Mozambique - where an early energetic adult literacy drive succumbed to the rise of terrorism - only 27 per cent are literate (12 per cent of women). In five countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Swaziland) adult literacy ranges from 60 per cent to 70 per cent, with over 50 per cent female literacy. As with primary education, Lesotho is the exception to the rule, with female literacy at 81 per cent substantially higher than male literacy (58 per cent). Malawi's 36 per cent rate (25 per cent for women) again appears to reflect a lower priority.

Household incomes of poor and vulnerable groups

Absolute poverty is associated with female-headed households with no remittances from an absent male head, with crop-oriented agriculture on land of marginal quality and/or in drought-prone areas, with residence in an isolated rural area, and with urban informal-sector casual employment or self-employment. In cattle-raising areas it is also associated with lack of cattle and of access to draught power for ploughing. In the absence of targeted supplementary feeding programmes (which exist on a comprehensive basis only in Botswana), poverty almost inevitably means child malnutrition and increased susceptibility to disease.

Vulnerability is somewhat different from absolute poverty but entails the risk of being forced into absolute poverty. It is traditionally associated in Africa with drought-prone areas. However, a new factor has emerged in recent years - dependence on remittances from migrant labour in South Africa.

By 1985, though, South Africa had radically reduced its employment of Mozambicans and halted the recruitment of workers from Zimbabwe. Now it is threatening to repatriate all migrant workers from the independent southern African states and has begun to do so in the case of Mozambique.

How many households may be affected by this is far from clear. The number of workers from the SADCC region who are officially registered as migrant labour in South Africa is of the order of 300,000. However, South Africa claims that there are also 1.2 million unregistered "illegal" workers. While the asserted total of 1.5 million is highly suspect - it includes purely seasonal employment in the domestic, agricultural and other sectors - the true total of households dependent on remittances from migrant labour may be of the order of 600,000 to 750,000 households, comprising up to 4 million people or about 7 per cent of the population of the region.

This vulnerability is unevenly distributed. In Lesotho, where remittances from South Africa supply 70 per cent of the gross national product (GNP), the vulnerability is extreme. In Mozambique remittances are a very important influence on the balance of payments though not on the GNP; and in Botswana and Malawi they are a significant but hardly crucial influence on balance of payments. However, rural household incomes in much of southern and central Mozambique, southern Botswana and southern Malawi are very heavily dependent on remittances. Not merely households but whole rural districts could be pushed into absolute poverty by the rapid withdrawal of employment opportunities in South Africa. This happened in Mozambique over 1974-1977 and could possibly happen again in 1986-1987.

Absolute poverty is correlated with lack of adequate access to public services. This is largely because of the relative geographic isolation of many absolutely poor rural families, and because most absolutely poor urban households are in squatter or other peri-urban areas which are ill served, especially if they were established or grew rapidly during the post-1979 (post-1975 in the case of Zambia) years of constrained public budgets.

Except for Botswana, which has a wealth of diamonds and whose per capita gross domestic product (GDP) had risen above $1,000 a year by 1985, all of the states in the region are very poor economically. Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania had an average per capita GNP of about $210 in 1984, while the GNP of war-torn Mozambique fell to much less than $200 in 1985. Furthermore, several nations have suffered inadequate growth of food production because of drought, and a reduced capacity to import food to make up for the shortfalls.

Each state of southern Africa has suffered at least one season of drought since 1978-1979, and most have had three or more drought seasons. Mozambique and Tanzania experienced drought for five years in a row over 1979-1984, while Botswana is now in its fifth consecutive drought year. This has limited domestic food production. Falling terms of trade and rising debt service, resulting from an increasingly hostile international economic environment since 1979 (since 1974-1975 for Zambia and Swaziland), have exacerbated the problems of financing imports of food as well as drugs and vaccines, and of sustaining national budget expenditure, including health, education, water, drought relief and supplementary feeding.

The governments of the region have not always acted quickly enough to give the highest priority at all times to family food production, health, education, provision of pure water, and other specific measures to address child malnutrition. For example, in the 1975-1980 period, Angola and Mozambique - as both now admit - concentrated too much attention and resources on trying to salvage the large commercial farms abandoned by expatriates at the expense of assisting small-scale family food production. Although since 1980, and especially since 1983, the focus of agricultural policy has shifted to the family sector, the two countries have lacked the resources and transport facilities to make this effective. World recession and low commodity prices have also taken their toll. For example, Zambia's cuts in health expenditure and the resulting serious weakening of rural medical services do not stem from policy changes. Rather, they flow from increasingly

constrained budgetary and foreign-exchange allocations. These, in turn, are to a substantial extent the result of higher transport costs and higher security budgets, which were increased as a direct response to escalating attacks on Angola and Mozambique and similar threats against other southern African countries.

But where relatively good economic and budgetary growth has co-existed with an emphasis on family needs, notably in Botswana and Zimbabwe, improvement in health and nutrition has been rapid, even in the face of severe drought and negative shifts in terms of trade. Angola and Mozambique have given high priority to the health sector ever since independence, and yet have achieved minimal progresss. Why?

II. THE LEGACY

Mozambique became independent from Portugal in June 1975 and Angola in November the same year. Few countries have attained independence with such an appalling legacy of colonial neglect.

Mozambique inherited an illiteracy rate of 93 per cent. At independence, over 70 per cent of the population of 10 million lived out of the reach of any form of health care. In Angola illiteracy was somewhat lower - perhaps 85 per cent - but the proportion without effective access to the health system was at least as high and probably higher.

More than 450,000 Portuguese and other expatriates, who were the main traders, importers and exporters, fled Angola at independence, leaving few Angolans skilled in those and other areas. In Mozambique only 15,000 of 250,000 expatriates stayed on.

The post-independence policies of both Angola and Mozambique gave high priority to primary health care, placing emphasis on preventive rather than curative medicine. Networks of health posts and centres were created in the rural areas. Thousands of primary health workers, able to give rudimentary medical care, were trained. Mass vaccination campaigns were carried out.

By 1980 life expectancy at birth had increased to 41 years in Angola and 45 in Mozambique. The mortality rate among under-fives had been reduced to 260 and 270 per 1,000, respectively.

Given the development of these primary health care and preventive medicine systems, and the resulting fall in mortality among under-fives, the position in Angola and Mozambique today should be comparable to that of Tanzania. Yet in Tanzania the mortality rate of under-fives is 185 per 1,000, whereas in Angola and Mozambique, by stark contrast, under-five mortality had risen to an estimated 325-375 per 1,000 by 1985. The difference between the statistics of Tanzania and those of Angola and Mozambique is one measure of the "excess" war and destablization-related deaths.

III. THE PRICE OF WAR

Since independence Angola and Mozambique have been beset by internal fighting and external attacks from South Africa. Hardly a week has been passed in peace.

The widespread and continuing conflict in these two countries has been virtually ignored as most of the world has concentrated its attention on events within South Africe and in Namibia. It is necessary to outline here its instruments, its economic and social costs to the region and, above all, the human cost in terms of the lives of the region's children.

Military destabilization has affected other countries in the region - including direct attacks on Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe - and exerts considerable economic pressure on them in various ways.

Malawi, for example, has suffered financially from the sabotage of the transport routes through Mozambique which used to carry almost all of its trade. According to semi-official estimates, the diversion of traffic through Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana to South African ports has at least doubled Malawi's previous freight costs.

Economic destabilization in 1986 alone has included the blockade of Lesotho, and interference with transit shipments to Zambia and Zimbabwe. In addition, the destruction of Malawi's external trade routes to the Mozambican ports of Beira and Nacala has greatly raised transport costs, delayed crucial imports, and rendered two major exports (sugar and maize) uneconomic. The threatened expulsion of Mozambican migrant workers from South Africa will decimate the income of households dependent on remittances, plunging them deeper into destitution and increasing their vulnerability to drought and malnutrition. It will also reduce Mozambique's foreign-exchange earning capacity, production and revenue, thereby curtailing programmes to enhance household food security and constricting imports and budgets for education and health.

The use of sabotage units has increased rapidly since 1981. The region's transport and power infrastructures are the main targets, but other targets include major production units, especially those earning foreign exchange such as tea estates, mines and cement plants in Mozambique and mines and petroleum installations in Angola. The economic costs are evident, but less so at first glance is the reason for the deliberate concentration on destroying regional transport routes. This increases the dependence of landlocked states on routes through South Africa, and forces them to pay additional transport costs amounting to at least $300 million per year.

The share of the national budget that goes to recurrent defence costs in Mozambique is 42 per cent, one of the highest in the world. Angola's defence budget is much larger than Mozambique's in absolute terms, and may absorb a comparable percentage of total spending. Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe also have large armed forces, and Zimbabwe is spending in the order of $3 million a week to defend its own and the region's trade routes through Mozambique. The effect of such spending on the availability of funds for

health, education, water and food security in such poor countries is self-evident.

One of the deadliest weapons of the war is the mass terrorism carried out by forces which have burned crops and farmhouses, pillaged and destroyed schools, clinics, churches, mosques, stores and villages, poisoned wells by throwing bodies down them, and attacked the transport system which is a vital part of rural life. Members of religious orders, mainly Catholics, have been murdered and kidnapped. So too have foreign aid workers from both the West and the East. In Angola and Mozambique teachers, nurses, agricultural technicians, engineers and geologists have also been killed and kidnapped, maimed and mutilated.

The carnage has been indiscriminate, with infants and children not exempted. The results are clear and tragic: death for many, and for the survivors fear and flight, destruction and displacement. About 8.5 million Angolans and Mozambicans - roughly half the rural population of the two countries - have been displaced or are internal refugees in their own countries.

The costs of the war are cumulative, have been escalating since 1981, and are likely to continue to do so.

The economic costs

The macro-economic costs can be estimated in various ways: destruction of assets, enforced military expenditure, higher transport costs, lost output, or the need for relief and survival support to large numbers of refugees and displaced persons. Serious estimates differ substantially, but what is significant is the agreement on how massive the costs are. An official SADCC estimate of the 1980-1984 costs - including war damage, specific output losses, additional defence expenditure and lost economic growth - totals $10.14 billion for the region. If 1985 and 1986 costs are included, to reflect the rising scale of aggression and inflation and the cumulative impact of output losses, the estimated total of the nine countries' economic losses from the war, measured on the basis of lost GDP, comes to $25-$28 billion for 1980-1986. (See annex B for a detailed explanation of the calculations.)

An estimate of physical damage and its consequences, prepared by the Angolan government in conjunction with the United Nations, totals $17 billion for that country alone over 1975-1985. Mozambique has estimated its losses over 1980-1985 at $5.5 billion.

The losses of the other seven states of southern Africa have been smaller, though Zambia's and Zimbabwe's have been quite significant (largely as a result of higher transport costs, production losses caused by transport difficulties, and the reduction of productive investment forced by the size of the defence budgets). Since 1984 Malawi has also lost output and export earnings because of the destruction of its normal routes to Beira and Nacala.

To understand the broader implications, these figures must be considered in relation to others. For example, $5.5 billion represents about three times the total production of the war-ravaged Mozambican economy in 1985. Similarly, $25 billion is equivalent to the southern African region's total production in 1985, as estimated by the SADCC and the Economic Commission for Africa. Therefore the 1980-1986 costs of destabilization and aggression are at least of the same order of magnitude as a whole year's production in the region. Put differently, they come to $400 for each man, woman, child and infant in the southern African region. The absolute and relative losses are staggering, and minor adjustments to the calculations will not alter that fact. These are the economic costs of full-scale war, not of marginal destabilization, civil disorder, or border-area conflict.

The human costs

The human costs are equally severe. By the end of 1985, 25 per cent of health facilities in Mozambique had been destroyed and hundreds of medical personnel wounded or maimed; 40 per cent of primary schools had been destroyed or abandoned and 20 per cent of the pupils forced out of school.

The figures for Angola are far from complete, but at least 10,000 people were mutilated in 1985, and the delivery and use of health services declined by 30 per cent throughout the country. About 20 vaccination posts were destroyed in 1985, and overall immunization coverage is very low. Supervisory visits to rural health units and schools are virtually impossible. So is the distribution of essential supplies, which is often hampered by the destruction of vehicles, especially in landmine explosions.

The exact number of deaths among civilians and health ministry staff due to the war is not known. But what is known is that health workers, as well as clinics and other health posts, schools, teachers and pupils, foreign aid personnel and vehicles transporting health and relief supplies, are all deliberately chosen as targets of the war for the purpose of causing a breakdown in civil administration and making large areas of both countries ungovernable.

In Angola, 600,000 of the most severely affected peasants displaced by war are totally dependent on government assistance for survival. In Mozambique, 3.8 million people are currently estimated to be at risk of famine, largely because of the destruction of food crops and transport capacity, and the loss of export earnings to pay for replacement food imports.

War-related deaths

There are at least three categories of deaths caused by military and economic destabilization. The first concerns deaths caused directly by military action. Secondly, there are deaths where, because of the combination of drought and the security situation, food is not available. The third category is that of rising infant and child mortality as the result of the interlinking effects of malnutrition, disease and a breakdown in the network of rural health services.

Thousands of deaths are caused directly by the fighting, while thousands more result from sabotage and military raids. Deaths among adults caused by untreated injury or disease, and by unchecked epidemics, would total thousands more. Mozambique has recently estimated its 1975-1985 military and civilian deaths - from Rhodesian, South African and Mozambican National Resistance (MNR) action - at 100,000.

At least another 100,000 human beings perished in the 1983-1984 famine in Mozambique. That famine was not caused primarily by weather nor by agricultural policy. The basic causes were MNR dislocation of rural life and food production in southern Mozambique; the destruction of Mozambique's ability to raise export earnings to purchase food and distribute it; the tardiness of the international community in formulating an effective response; and interference or outright prevention of food relief distribution.

In Angola, it appears that during 1980-1985 at least 100,000 deaths occurred through war-related famine and its effects.

The third and largest death toll, however, is that of infants and children under five. Most of these deaths are not caused by bullets or beatings but by malnutrition and diarrhoea, untreated diseases and immunizations not given, lack of access to pure water and to child-care clinics, and inadequate health education. To calculate the numbers precisely is impossible. But for Angola and Mozambique, the most ravaged countries, reasoned estimates are possible.

In 1977-1980 both governments were implementing policies which by 1985 could have been expected to lower their infant and child mortality levels to those of Tanzania. Like the Tanzanian government, they were stressing primary health care, pure water supply, immunization, and mother and child-care clinics. Similarly, they were focusing attention on the availability of food. Indeed these programmes, especially in Angola, had stronger financial backing than in Tanzania. Tragically, they have been overwhelmed by the direct and indirect effects of war.

In the absence of war, Angola and Mozambique could have attained by now a child mortality rate comparable to that of Tanzania, which has similarly low levels of per capita income and high government commitment to health and social welfare policies. But instead of an under-five mortality rate in the range of 185 per 1,000, Angola and Mozambique can be conservatively estimated to have a child mortality rate of 325 and possibly as high as 375 per 1,000. The difference between these two estimates - of what the child mortality rate would have been in the absence of war and destabilization, and what it actually is - gives an idea of the additional numbers of children who are dying. In Angola and Mozambique, respectively, some 406,000 and 602,000 babies were born in 1985. Taking into account the difference in the child mortality rate between Tanzania and those countries, in 1985 there were some 55,000 "excess" deaths among children under five in Angola and some 82,000 "excess" deaths in Mozambican under-fives.

These calculations are rough but cautious (see annex A). Infant and child mortality in these countries is estimated as ranging from 325 to 375 per 1,000, but the lower figure was used for the calculations. Angola's per capita income is in fact considerably higher than Tanzania's because of its oil wealth, and with peace, Angola would have been expected to make greater progress in providing better health services and other conditions leading to a healthy environment for children. Assuming that the death rates would have declined to Tanzanian levels gradually over 1980-1985, war-related deaths among infants and children over that period totalled over 150,000 in Angola and over 230,000 in Mozambique. On the same basis, the 1986 war-related deaths of infants and young children would be over 55,000 in Angola and about 85,000 in Mozambique even if the war had not further raised the mortality rates. But the conflict and destabilization continue to escalate and so does child mortality. These deaths could have been prevented had peace prevailed, and had undamaged economies and health programmes continued to have the promised impact on child welfare, bringing down mortality rates to levels comparable with other poor countries in the region.

In summary, a reasoned estimate is that in 1986, some 140,000 children died in Angola and Mozambique alone from war and destabilization-related causes. This figure represents almost 45 per cent of infant and young child mortality in these two countries.

This 1986 death toll for infants and children under five from war and destabilization-related causes means that every four minutes, a small Angolan or Mozambican child was lost who would otherwise have lived.

And over the period 1980-1986, the total of war-related "excess" deaths of infants and children under five in Angola and Mozambique was just over half a million.

IV. WHAT MUST BE DONE?

Economic and military actions against the states of southern Africa - especially against Angola and Mozambique - have escalated since 1980. That trend can be expected to continue, affecting other countries more severely. South Africa has explicitly stated that its reaction to sanctions against apartheid will be to escalate the suffering of its neighbours by, among other things, blocking the transit of American grain supplies. The MNR has said it will destroy rail routes through Mozambique to maintain the region's dependency upon South Africa's ports and railways.

The government of South Africa has also threatened to repatriate the region's migrant workers, whom it estimates at over 1.5 million. The impact of this on vulnerable and low-income households in southern Mozambique, Botswana and Lesotho would be very serious and could have a destabilizing effect on society, particularly in Mozambique. Future recruitment of Mozambican workers has already been banned and some 61,000 miners will be returned to Mozambique on completion of their contracts. South Africa has begun to force out the 160,000 Mozambican workers not employed in mines who it

estimates are in its territory "illegally". This will destroy the economic base of a quarter of a million households and threaten the survival of as many as half a million children.

Having ensured the weakening or destruction of alternative trade routes through Angola and Mozambique, South Africa has since 1980 increasingly imposed sanctions on its neighbours by using the weapons of transit delays and economic blockades. Shipments that have been delayed or blocked have included petroleum products, fertilizers and drugs - vital to agricultural production, nutrition and the health of children.

In the past few months, the sabotage and disruption of alternative transportation routes has escalated sharply, particularly in Mozambique. SADCC member states have indicated that they take seriously the renewed threats to the transport and supply of vital products, and they are engaged in contingency planning which involves rehabilitating transport systems and building up large reserve stocks of essential supplies. To act on this planning, they require massive international support. If they are to act in time to avert serious economic cost, human damage and loss of life, they need that support before, not after, South Africa's actions create a clearly visible emergency throughout the region.

Specific actions are needed to protect the lives and to enhance the welfare of children. These require attention to the welfare of their mothers and of vulnerable households. It is not practically possible to protect children fully outside the context of the households of which they are members.

Beyond that it is necessary to look to the national context. For example, kerosene for refrigerators and motor spirit or gas oil for vehicles are essential to immunization programmes in rural areas. Their continued supply is at risk. However, the problem of ensuring fuel supply clearly needs to be addressed nationally, since its implications stretch beyond its direct impact on child survival programmes.

Finally, recognizing specifically the human needs of children, households and countries of southern Africa will itself be of real significance and will help lead to identifying how the international community can respond. The countries of southern Africa are poor; most have been severely buffeted by the international economic environment and all by drought. Two, Angola and Mozambique, have already been crippled by war and more are in danger of being crippled by the extending and intensifying of that war. They cannot protect and preserve the lives of their children without international assistance and solidarity.

It is tempting to divide support into two categories: immediate emergency help, and longer-term support. In the case of the present crisis, this distinction may not be entirely helpful. In the first place, the crisis is one which cannot be resolved - or even significantly alleviated - by small, one-off exercises. Second, certain actions are crucial, especially in the national context, and without them no child or household can be guaranteed adequate income, food, health or survival; and these actions include

rehabilitating or constructing and maintaining a series of large projects, notably the port, rail, road and pipeline facilities of the Dar es Salaam and Beira port corridors. Third, while an alternative set of sources and routes not dependent on South Africa could be built up in a finite period, perhaps three to five years, these would remain at risk so long as apartheid and aggression persist. This is not to argue against setting priorities and taking action in phased steps - but rather to warn that it is unrealistic to approach the challenge of protecting the children and peoples of southern Africa as a short-term matter, or as a problem readily amenable to the techniques applied to natural disasters such as droughts which are self-terminating. Even in such cases, UNICEF's experience suggests that failing to plan the post-emergency action, or failing to plan it in time to integrate it into the initial emergency actions, is a frequent, and in the end costly and damaging, mistake.

Child, mother and household survival

UNICEF and others should not remain silent nor stand aside in the face of the mounting onslaught on the lives of children in southern Africa. UNICEF's mandate and purpose is to support their well-being and save their lives. Already UNICEF has supported substantial government programmes in the areas of primary health care (especially immunization and oral rehydration therapy to combat diarrhoeal dehydration), rural water supply, supplementary feeding and household food production. However, it is increasingly clear that much more needs to be done along these lines and that looking at particular health and nutrition initiatives outside the context of the mounting macro-economic and food-shortage problems is unrealistic. This implies a series of responses.

First, basic health services - especially in rural areas - need to be restored or sustained and strengthened. Immunization, antenatal care, the monitoring of child growth and health, the supply of basic drugs and the provision of oral rehydration therapy are more important than ever.

To achieve this requires additional supplies of drugs, vaccines and medical supplies, of vehicles, and of materials to build or rebuild clinics. In some cases it may entail interim expatriate personnel, or, more probably, training programmes for primary health workers. Given the real danger of transport being interrupted, guaranteeing services requires at least six-month stocks of key items distributed at national, regional and district levels.

Second, family food security - already eroded by drought and poverty as well as by war - must be restored. For infants and children one approach is to distribute supplementary foods to virtually all children of low-income or vulnerable households at clinics, schools or other distribution points. This approach - given finance, food, transport and organization - can be very effective, as demonstrated by Botswana. But the approach also has distinct limitations where rural terrorism has limited the physical availability of food supplies and transport, and where governments with limited personnel and administrative resources as well as scarce financial resources are faced with the need to serve large numbers of poor and vulnerable households, people displaced by war, refugees and repatriated workers.

Food production needs to be restored, especially by giving displaced households the means to do so. This is important both to increase the physical availability of food and to restore the incomes of vulnerable households. Returning workers unable to secure non-agricultural employment will also need to be enabled to return to farming, so as to avert a sharp decline in rural incomes and growth in the number of destitute households. Tools, seeds, fertilizers, consumer goods and transport will be needed.

Food aid - whether distributed directly or through cash-for-work programmes, or sold and the proceeds used as wages - is needed both to finance employment programmes for some of the returning workers and to restore and sustain the cash element in rural household incomes.

Third, access to pure water - both to reduce the incidence of water-borne diseases and to reduce the burden on women and girls of having to walk long distances to fetch water - remains central to reducing infant and child deaths. In addition to ongoing programmes - and the restoration of facilities destroyed by war - new facilities are needed to meet the requirements of displaced rural people clustered in less war-prone rural and peri-urban areas and in camps or new settlements.

Health facilities, food and pure water are the essential elements in any strategy for sustaining the lives of the hundreds of thousands of children at risk of death in the present southern African context. But they have to be seen within the broader context of national survival.

The national context

Nationally, a series of key requirements can be identified. Probably the most basic is transport. South Africa has so far focused on preventing the landlocked states from using Angolan and Mozambican routes and thereby forcing them to use South African routes. This strategic thrust has been stepped up in recent months. Unless transport to southern African ports can be guaranteed, no other security is possible. The southern African states - both individually, and collectively through the SADCC - have recognized this imperative. Co-ordinated transport programmes and projects exist and (to the extent that finance has been secured) are under implementation. The rehabilitation of the Dar es Salaam and Beira corridors could provide basic transport security to Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia. The rehabilitation of the Nacala corridor could do the same for Malawi, and the use of the Maputo link for Swaziland. Lesotho's situation is far more difficult because it is not merely landlocked but locked inside South Africa. At least for key goods and in emergencies (such as another South African blockade), airlifts from Maputo or Harare may be necessary.

Internal transport security, including fuel and vehicles and the capacity to repair war-damaged vehicles and routes, is just as key to national - and especially child - survival. Only with functioning rural transport systems can rural services be maintained, domestic and imported food collected and distributed, and displaced people resettled and helped to rehabilitate themselves.

Fuel security interlocks with transport. Without fuel, transport halts. But even now, perhaps, and certainly after rehabilitation, the Beira and Dar es Salaam pipelines and the Nacala and Maputo rail links are capable of conveying adequate volumes of fuel to the landlocked states.

Food security at the national level twins with transport and finance. The SADCC states as a group have net grain and sugar surpluses and fairly small deficits in other key foods. However, this is a sum of large surpluses in two countries (Zimbabwe, Malawi), near-balances in others (Zambia, Tanzania, perhaps Swaziland) and large deficits in four (Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho). Without both transport and finance (e.g. via triangular food aid, with a donor country funding the transfer of food from one country of the region to another), the region's potential for basic self-sufficiency in food will remain on paper only and in the staring eyes and unfed mouths of real, hungry human beings.

Safeguarding household income in the context of the southern African war turns on three related challenges: sustaining the overall levels of economic activity to preserve existing employment and services for peasants and informal-sector workers; restoring their production capacity to displaced rural households; and creating employment (including agricultural and other self-employment) for workers expelled by South Africa. The key requirements are continued flows of imports and exports, job creation programmes (in some cases building on existing programmes keyed to drought relief or the alleviation of rural poverty, as in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Lesotho) and finance, especially for creating jobs and for rehabilitating displaced or returning workers. In the cases of Lesotho and rural southern Mozambique, employment creation is absolutely essential because household cash income is at present totally dominated by remittances in cash and kind from migrant workers.

Preserving and expanding basic services is a national requirement. Its main aspects have already been noted above in the context of child survival.

Meeting broader macro-economic requirements includes protecting exports (by rerouting and redirecting them) so as to safeguard import capacity and government revenue. Unless this can be achieved, general economic malaise will affect the provision of basic services and reduce the quality of life for households and children, even if transport and food are physically available.

Providing the resources for imports - in several cases now largely procured from South Africa - should be relatively easy provided the transport routes are open. South Africa is not, in general, a particularly low-cost supplier, and the countries of the region appear to face no major technical obstacles in developing their ability to import from other suppliers, though there might be interim cost problems and the countries currently lack the necessary commercial expertise.

Safeguarding the power supply is a major requirement in certain cases - Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and southern Mozambique. National projects and SADCC regional projects in the energy sector - the Oxbow project in Lesotho,

power transmission from Cahora Bassa to Maputo and Swaziland, the Zimbabwe and Botswana power grids - could fairly quickly ensure the required self-sufficiency in energy supply.

International solidarity and support

The requirements outlined above can be met. They cannot be met by the southern African states, especially war-ravaged Mozambique and Angola, entirely out of their own resources. They need international co-operation. Clearly, that co-operation must be on a broad front. UNICEF alone cannot possibly play more than a small role in mobilizing or supplying such support, and the whole United Nations family of agencies can only make a partial albeit vital contribution. Support from bilateral and international development agencies is essential if the southern African states are to succeed in meeting the challenges they now face.

Several fairly specific types of requirements can be identified. The largest requirement is probably finance for infrastructure, i.e. the transport and power projects already identified on a co-ordinated basis by the national governments in the SADCC programme of action.

Food aid is another major area. It is needed both to provide relief and supplementary feeding to displaced persons and refugees, and to be sold as a means of financing employment creation and rural rehabilitation programmes. Ideally a large portion should be in the form of triangular food aid drawing on the excess stocks of those countries in the region which have a surplus. Employment creation and household income protection will, however, require more than food aid, and cash in the form of foreign exchange will be needed for complementary inputs such as seeds, tools and construction materials.

The problem of gauging the exact needs has been compounded by the non-existence of up-to-date and reliable information. The countries of southern Africa should therefore be given urgent assistance in improving their present monitoring systems, especially those covering household food and economic security, nutrition, and the deaths of infants and young children. Several countries have already established a base for nutritional surveillance, household surveys, and early-warning systems to monitor nutritional status. This base should be built on and rapidly extended to other countries in the region.

Direct support for basic services in health, education and water is already substantial but needs reassessment and expansion, with special reference to displaced and refugee populations. Finance is also needed to build up stocks of key commodities, including but not limited to food, fuel, drugs and raw materials for manufacturing basic agricultural supplies and consumer goods.

Protecting imports and redirecting exports is likely to require interim trade finance (to replace the dependence on South Africa), technical assistance, commercial expertise and improved market access. Improving market access might include reallocating to other regional exporters the quotas imposed by South Africa, de jure or de facto, on the region's exports of textiles, sugar, steel and other products.

70-661 O - 87 - 4

Virtually all of this support would need to be in the form of grants or soft loans, and in several cases (notably that of Mozambique) it would have to be accompanied by a major reconstruction or outright cancelling of external debt. The rising cost of war and economic destabilization makes these states quite unable to undertake and service substantial additional external obligations at commercial rates.

In sum, support is needed not only for the immediate future, but will be vital as long as war and destabilization continues to affect the children of the region.

V. CONCLUSION

These proposals may at first sight appear similar to those put forward for sub-Saharan African states in general and may therefore seem to have little direct relevance to the war situation outlined earlier. This is misleading in two senses.

First, safeguarding transport, power, industry and food production, as well as rehabilitating the health, education and water systems and building up the stockpile of emergency supplies, will play a direct part in limiting and reversing the consequences of past, present and future economic or military actions. Similarly, the focus on employment creation stems directly from the need to resettle displaced people and to offset the human and economic costs of South Africa's expulsion of migrant workers back to their neighbouring states.

Second, health, nutrition, pure water supply and the opportunity to produce and be employed which education provides, are crucial to the quality of life - indeed a question of life and death - in southern Africa. The military conflict alters the degree of urgency and the particular context for achieving these goals, but not their status as basic human needs.

It is urgent that action be taken now, not only to alleviate the costs of past and present military actions, but to create the capacity to resist and to cope with future actions. As the 1984-1985 drought emergency in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrated only too clearly, to wait until the damage is done and the crisis is visible at a glance is to wait too long and to waste lives - especially the very vulnerable lives of young children. Even if war and destabilization come to an end, many will continue to die from its effects until health services and agricultural production can be restored, and displaced families rehabilitated to enable them to renew household food supplies and incomes. These efforts at reconstruction will require substantial external support over at least three to five years.

To cost the programmes sketched above is not possible without far more detailed specifications. Some independent estimates - which include the creation and safeguarding of employment - suggest a cost between $2 billion and $2.5 billion a year. Others are about half as high. The transport and power projects included in the SADCC programme, which are designed to meet the minimum requirements for safeguarding transport and power supply, appear to require $500 million over and above the funding already obtained.

But against these costs it is necessary to set the gains. The investment in infrastructure and rehabilitation, and in much of the domestic job creation as well, would be economically justified even in the absence of continued war and destabilization. Re-establishing displaced rural residents, refugees and workers is necessary to both social and economic development, as is the strengthening of basic services. A programme along the lines sketched above could begin to reverse the appalling losses of human life and productivity relatively quickly. Even in narrow cost/benefit terms, the restoring of security can almost certainly be shown to make good sense.

The international community has an obligation to help these states and their peoples to halt and reverse the spiral of rising deaths and deteriorating quality of life. Co-operation is required between a wide range of bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental agencies to mobilize and co-ordinate the massive and complex programmes of assistance required.

If this is not achieved, 140,000 infants and young children will continue to die each year in the years to come, as they did in 1986.

ANNEX A

Infants and children under-five killed by war
in Angola and Mozambique: 1980-1986

1. In 1979/80 it appeared likely that Angola and Mozambique would, within five years reduce their infant and under-five mortality rates to levels comparable to Tanzania's. They had adjusted to the traumatic transition from Portuguese rule to independence and had articulated health, education, water and food strategies.

2. These, like Tanzania, placed emphasis on primary health services - especially immunisation, basic drug provision, mother and child clinics, ante-natal and birth care - on access to safe water; on universal primary education and massive adult literacy programmes; on improved nutrition by increasing food production, reducing income inequality and providing famine relief. Over 1979/80 they, indeed, made demonstrable progress.

3. Over 1980-85, no such convergence of mortality rates occurred. Tanzania's continued to decline - albeit more slowly than before. Angola's and Mozambique's rose, losing some of the hard won gains of the early post colonial period.

4. Why? Not because of drought - Tanzania was probably the hardest hit of the three by climatic conditions. Nor because of terms of trade shifts - both Mozambique and Tanzania faired badly while, until the 1985 oil price erosion Angola did well. And not because of general budgetary and import constraints - Tanzania suffered from these almost as severely as Mozambique and more so than Angola.

5. The cause - the basic difference in context and performance - was the escalating effects of war and destablization in Angola and Mozambique. Its nature is detailed in the main text.

6. The impact of war and economic destabilization on under-five deaths can be estimated by comparing the probable difference in Under Five Mortality in Angola and Mozambique with that of Tanzania in 1985. These were an estimated 325-375 per 1000 live births for the two war ravaged states and 185 for Tanzania. The difference is 140 per 1000 live births if the conservative mortality estimate of 325 is used.

7. In 1985 there were around 406,000 births in Angola and 602,000 in Mozambique. Applying the 140 "excess" of war and destabilization caused infant and child death rate gives 56,840 deaths of 1985 Angolans and 84,280 of Mozambicans before the age of five which would not have happened in the absence of the war. To estimate 1985 war and destabilization deaths these figures need to be reduced by 2.8 percent because the age one to under-five mortalities were from populations relating to the 1981-1984 (not the 1985) births which averaged about 7.1 percent lower than in 1985.

8. Therefore, 1985 under-five war and destablization deaths were:

Angola	55,248
Mozambique	81,920

9. To estimate 1980-1986 total infant and child war and destabilization deaths it is assumed that:

a. the mortality rates would have converged on Tanzania's gradually over 1981-1985;

b. there were no war and destabilization-related infant and child deaths in 1980;

c. 1986 deaths are 3 percent higher than 1985 as a result of higher births with no increase in the mortality rate from the escalating warfare.

10. The second and third of these assumptions are grossly optimistic so that the following estimates under-state war and destabilization-related deaths of infants and children.

	Angola	Mozambique	Total
1980	0	0	0
1981	10,000	15,000	25,000
1982	20,000	30,000	50,000
1983	31,000	46,000	77,000
1984	42,000	63,000	105,000
1985	55,000	82,000	137,000
1986	56,000	84,000	141,000
Total	215,000	320,000	535,000

ANNEX B

Economic Costs of Destabilisation and Warfare 1980-1986: A Note

1. The most detailed estimates based on totalling particular costs and the economic growth losses resulting from reduced investment are those of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (Overview, SADCC Harare, SADCC Gaborone, 1985 Annex B) and a revised estimate by R.H. Green and C.B. Thompson "Political Economies in Conflict: SADCC, South Africa and Sanctions" in D. Martin and P. Johnson, Destructive Engagement, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1986, pp.271-273).

2.

Head	SADCC Estimate	Green and Thompson
Direct war damage	1,610,000,000	1,610,000,000
Extra defence spending	3,060,000,000	3,310,000,000
Higher transport, energy costs	970,000,000	970,000,000
Smuggling (looting)	190,000,000	190,000,000
Refugees (including internal displaced persons)	660,000,000	660,000,000
Loss of existing production	800,000,000	800,000,000
Lost economic growth	2,000,000,000	4,000,000,000
Trading arrangements	340,000,000	590,000,000
TOTAL 1980-1984	10,120,000,000	12,940,000,000

The detailed definition of the categories and a review of the methodology are presented in the sources cited.

3. Adjusting through 1986 - on a basis consistent with the original estimates:

	SADCC	Revised
1980-1984	10,120,000,000	12,940,000,000
1985	7,000,000,000	7,000,000,000
1986	8,000,000,000	8,000,000,000
	25,120,000,000	27,940,000,000

The sharp increase in 1985 over the 1980-1984 average relates to escalation of conflict, the rising defence bill, cumulative output losses and inflation.

4. The Angolan 1980-85 estimate (in Security Council, S/17648, 22-xi-85, United Nations, New York) of $10.5 billion would, on the assumption that Angolan losses are 55 percent to 60 percent of the regional total which seems to apply to the other estimates, imply a regional total of $17.5 billion to $19.1 billion dollars versus the alternative estimates of $17.12 billion and $19.94 billion set out in para. 3. However, the Angolan estimate specifically states that certain indirect costs have not been included.

5. Mozambican 1980-1985 national social production loss has been calculated on the basis of the following assumptions:

a. by 1979-80 Mozambique had recovered from its traumatic transition to independence and after April 1980 was also freed from the negative impact of severed trade and transport links with the UDI regime in Rhodesia (as it was until mid-April 1980);

b. because of the ample slack in the economy as well as new assets financed out of relatively accessible foreign loans rapid recovery toward past levels was possible; indeed began to be attained from the middle of 1979 through late 1981;

c. in the absence of war and destabilization, Mozambique should have been able to achieve a real output growth rate comparable to that of Zimbabwe in the absence of economic destabilisation;

d. as Zimbabwe - despite not insignificant destabilisation and drought - achieved an annual growth rate of 4.5 percent, the probable Mozambican rate in the absence of war should have been of the order of 5 percent;

e. 1979 losses are - conservatively - set at 0 on the basis that the transition to a position from which sustained growth could be achieved was completed in 1979-80 which is therefore the least unreasonable base year.

6. On this basis the constant 1980 and current price GDP loss in billions of meticais is:

	Actual GDP		5% Growth		Loss	
	1980 Prices	Current Prices	1980 Prices	Current Prices	1980 Prices	Current Prices
1980	78.2	78.2	(Base Year)		-	-
1981	78.9	81.5	82.11	84.82	3.21	3.22
1982	76.1	92.3	86.21	104.56	10.11	12.26
1983	64.2	91.2	90.52	136.77	26.32	45.57
1984	63.9	108.8	95.05	161.85	31.15	53.05
1985	59.6	147.0	99.98	246.13	40.20	99.13
1986*	55.6	194.6	104.79	366.77	49.19	172.17
Total	479.5	793.6	639.50	1,178.5	160.00	385.00

*Preliminary estimate assuming continued 6.5 to 7.0 percent GDP fall and 42 percent odd price increase.

7. Converted at official exchange rates (1980 for the constant price series and current rates for the year for the current price series) these losses total $4,950 million ($4.95 billion) in 1980 and $9,266 million in current prices over 1980-86. The conversion poses some problems even though the very great magnitude of the loss absolutely

and relative to GDP is evident. The meticais has become increasingly overvalued since 1980. On a rough estimate of converting at an average of 60 percent of the official rate, the loss comes to roughly $ 5,500 million over 1981-86. This appears consistent with the World Bank's 1984 GNP estimate of slightly over $2,000 million which with subsequent output decline would correspond to $1,750-1,850 in 1984 prices in 1986. It is also consistent with Mozambique's October 1986 estimate of output loss resulting from the war of $5,500 million

8. The pattern of estimated losses corresponds very closely to the rise in the level of destabilisation, sabotage and mass terrorism. This rose from low levels in 1980 and the first half of 1981 to sustained high levels from 1983 through 1985. In 1985-86 the focus of fighting and terrorism has shifted away from southern to northern Mozambique and from September the intensity of the war rose to new levels so that the 1986 loss figures may well be underestimates.

9. Were the loss calculations run against a 3 per cent non-war and destabilization growth rate assumption, the 1980-86 losses would be of the order of $4,250 million. While lower this is still very high and still implies that by 1986 war was costing Mozambique almost half of its normal non-war situation GDP.

10. For Angola calculations are much harder because of the fragmentary nature of the national output data; the massive pre-1980 costs of war and destabilization and the fact that the Angolan oil boom makes it difficult to identify a plausible country for comparison.

11. But as of 1979-80, Angola while still having an output loss hangover of perhaps $0.50 to $0.75 billion a year from the 1975 war had achieved a transition to orderly government, economic policy co-ordination and growth. Therefore growth at a high rate - but are moderately below Botswana's 10.77 per cent a year of 1973-84 - should have been attainable in the absence of reescalated war. 8 per cent may be a reasonable estimate. Certainly most oil boom and mineral economies in Sub-Saharan Africa have been able to achieve growth rates of 8 percent and those - like Botswana and the Cameroon - which managed use of the new resources cautiously have sustained high rates for a decade or more.

12. Very rough actual and projected GDP figures in billions of constant 1981 price US$ are:

	Actual	Projected*	Difference*
1980	4.11	4.86 (4.61)	- 0.95 (- 0.50)
1981	4.14	5.25 (4.98)	- 1.11 (- 0.84)
1982	3.53	5.65 (5.37)	- 2.12 (- 1.84)
1983	3.71	6.10 (5.80)	- 2.39 (- 2.09)
1984	3.89	6.59 (6.26)	- 2.70 (- 2.37)
1985	4.00	7.11 (6.76)	- 3.11 (- 2.76)
Total loss 1980 $			-12.18 (-10.40)
Total loss 1985 $			-15.60 (-13.50)

( ) Bracketted figures assume carry forward annual output loss from 75-79 at $0.5 billion, others at $0.75 billion.

13. A reasonable loss range estimate for 1980-85 would appear to be of the order of $12 to $15 billion - just under three times achieved GDP in 1985 and the 1985 loss was equivalent to 70 to 75 per cent of the output actually achieved. Even were a lower non-conflict growth rate of 6 per cent adopted the loss would still be of the order of $9 to $10 billion. A rough 1986 loss estimate is $3.5 to $4.0 billion (like the $3.5 to $4.0 billion in 1985) but this is a very rough guesstimate given the fragmentary nature of Angolan national accounts and the sharp fall in the world petroleum price during 1986 which has more than offset Angola's significant 1986 growth in petroleum production.

14. The loss of GDP in each of the other seven states of the region is harder to calculate as well as smaller. The key causal elements are the necessity for high security expenditure relative to non war or threat of war levels (Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi); excess transport costs as a result of war damage to or destruction of the economically preferable routes via Angola and Mozambique (Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and to a lesser degree Botswana and Swaziland); disruption of production by delay of key imports and or partial to near total blockades (Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland, Botswana); refusal to put in force more equitable - and already negotiated - customs union arrangements in order to exert political leverage (Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana). In addition to reducing human welfare and either increasing or causing decreases in falls of death rates as a result of reducing/diverting resources otherwise available for health, water, drought relief and nutrition support, these factors have reduced production in two ways. First, output lost as a result of delays in petroleum and fertilizer delivery cannot in general be recovered. Second, higher transport costs lower the free on border or GDP value of exports, and at the extreme render production unviable. Third, reduction in replacement and new investment erodes productive capacity and production. Very rough order of magnitude GNP loss estimates over 1980-1985 are:

Zimbabwe	$ 1.6	to	$ 2.00 billion
Zambia	$ 1.4	to	$ 1.75 billion
Malawi	$ 1.0	to	$ 1.33 billion
Lesotho	$ 0.5	to	$ 0.6 billion
Tanzania	$ 0.33	to	$ 0.5 billion
Botswana	$ 0.25	to	$ 0.33 billion
Swaziland	$ 0.2	to	$ 0.3 billion
Total	$ 5.25	to	$ 6.75 billion

This range suggests 1980-85 losses of the order of $4.5 billion and 1986 of $1.25 to $1.5 billion.

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Contributors to this report

Reg Green is a Professorial Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, where he co-ordinates work on sub-Saharan Africa. He has been a student of the political economy of Africa for over 23 years and has worked in over 30 African countries, including serving on the faculties of the Universities of Ghana, Makerere and Dar es Salaam. Professor Green is currently adviser to the Government of Tanzania, SWAPO, the United Nations Institute for Namibia and the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference, a trustee of the International Centre for Law in Development, and a member of the advisory bodies of the World Council of Churches and Catholic Institute for International Relations.

Dereje Asrat, an Ethiopian national, studied statistics at Addis Ababa and Stanford Universities. During a research fellowship at the Institute of Statistics and Economics, University of Oxford, he worked in several African and Asian countries advising United Nations agencies on data collection and survey methodology. Mr. Asrat became a UNICEF staff member in 1980 and is currently statistics adviser in Lusaka.

Marta Maurás was born in Chile in 1947 and obtained her master's degree in sociology at the Catholic University of Chile. After four years' research and teaching at the Catholic Universities of Chile and Rio de Janeiro, Ms. Martas worked for UNICEF as a consultant on population and women's issues. She joined the UNICEF staff in 1977 as co-ordinator of a regional project for women in development in Latin America, and subsequently became senior planning officer in Pakistan. In October 1984 she was appointed the UNICEF representative for Mozambique and Swaziland. She has published articles on a variety of topics, including local-level planning and women in development.

Richard Morgan took his bachelor's and master's degrees in development economics at the Universities of Oxford and East Anglia. Mr. Morgan spent seven years in Botswana, co-ordinating drought relief work and overseeing the formulation of the government's national food strategy. His publications include articles and government papers on nutrition strategies, agricultural co-operatives, drought relief and early-warning systems. Since early 1986 he has worked for UNICEF as an emergency project officer in Maputo.

QUESTIONS FOR UNICEF AND THE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

For UNICEF

1. Mr. Mayrides, the UNICEF report clearly describes that transports routes are routinely sabotaged, safe drinking water supplies are fouled by dumping dead bodies in village wells, schools and clinics are blown up, and corn fields where women and children work are littered with land mines that that maim and kill. How do UNICEF and other agencies reach the people? What can you realistically expect to accomplish?

2. What are the immediate needs of children in the frontline states? Can these needs be met with money? in-kind contributions of food and medicines?

3. In what ways are international agencies cooperating with each other and with private organizations in the region?

4. Now that the report has been issued, how doe UNICEF and other UN agencies propose to respond? What do they propose to do?

5. What resources do you need to provide relief and assistance to those affected by the emergency situation in Southern Africa?

6. What donors have been supporting your program in Southern Africa? How much has each donor contributed and for what purposes?

7. You mentioned that you have other activities besides emergency programs in these Southern African countries. What are they?

8. Could UNICEF use additional supplies of food aid for its programs in Southern Africa? Are there needed food supplies--especially supplementary feeding--which might be provided through the P.L. 480 ("Food for Peace") program?

9. If the international community is unable to deliver needed food and services to conflictive rural areas, what do you foresee will happen to people in those areas? Will they be forced to flee to the cities? Must we resign ourselves to establishing feeding centers as we did in Ethiopia where people will encamp?

For CARE

1. Care has been active in Mozambique for some time now. What are some of the transportation problems faced by CARE in getting food to needy areas? Do you have enough transportation? Is enough funding provided for transportation?

2. Assuming transportation becomes available, would there be enough food and supplies to deliver to needy areas?

For World Vision

1. In your statement you note that PVOs feed at least 1 million people a day in South Africa. How is this done? By whom? From where does the food come?

2. You recommend the establishment of "partnerships" between American and South African churches, universities, and communities. How would an interested American do this? What kinds of assistance could such partnerships offer?

3. What kinds of programs does World Vision have in South Africa?

4. Is there a role for additional American voluntary agencies in South Africa?

For U.S. Committee for Refugees

1. You note the need for regional coordination. What kinds of coordination do you recommend? What coordination is going on now which you deem effective?

2. In what ways does the U.S. need to expand the processing of refugees for resettlement from Southern Africa? What kind of program would you envision in order to make U.S. resettlement available to those who truly need it?

3. Regionally, do you consider the presence "on the ground" of U.N. and voluntary agency personnel sufficient? If you think an expansion is warranted, on what scale?

Question for the Record from: Senator Alan K. Simpson

To: Mr. James Mayrides

1) YOU NOTE THAT 140,000 INFANTS AND YOUNG CHILDREN DIED IN 1986 AS A RESULT OF THE SITUATION IN MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA. BASED ON THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS THAT APPEAR LIKELY FOR 1987, WHAT REDUCTION IN THIS DEATH RATE ARE WE LIKELY TO SEE?

To: Mr. Tom Getman

1) YOU MENTION IN YOUR TESTIMONY THAT THE FRONTLINE STATES MIGHT BE USED AS "STAGING AREAS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR CONFLICT ZONES." COULD YOU PLEASE CLARIFY AND ELABORATE ON THIS SUGGESTION.

unicef

United Nations Children's Fund
Fonds des Nations Unies pour l'enfance
Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia

866 United Nations Plaza
New York, New York 10017
212 415-8000
Telex 239521

20 February 1987
HSF/183/87

Dear Senator Kennedy,

I have the pleasure of responding to your letter of 6 February 1987 to Mr. James Mayrides, Deputy Regional Director for Eastern and Southern Africa and participant in the 5 February hearing on "THe Refugee Crisis in Southern Africa".

The resource needs for emergency and development assistance to Mozambique, Angola and several other Southern African nations, which we've included among the answers to your specific questions, are for specific UNICEF-supported activities. As you are well aware, the needs to rehabilitate, maintain and secure heavily damaged agricultural, transportation and other infrastructure, as well as to shelter growing populations of refugees are many times more than those we have indicated.

We appreciate your deep concern for the deteriorating situation in Southern Africa and the terrible price being paid by the children on the frontlines.

If you wish further amplification of our emergency and regular programme activities in this region, or any details on the people at risk, please contace me.

Yours sincerely,

Richard Jolly

Richard Jolly
Deputy Executive Director
Programmes

The Honourable Edward M. Kennedy
Sub-Committee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs
United States Senate
SD 224
Washington D.C. 20510

UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND FONDS DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ENFANCE

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4104M/jo.

RESPONSE TO SENATOR ALAN K. SIMPSON

Q.1 If UNICEF were to receive contributions to all of its currently unfunded emergency assistance projects for Mozambique and Angola (US $11 million and US $23 million respectively, as of 30 January 1987) by the end of the first quarter 1987, it could possibly effect the child death rate attributed to warfare and destabilization through the accelerated provision of drugs, vaccines and other relief supplies, as well as through generally improving conditions in health centres and displaced persons camps. Such an impact would probably not be felt until the last quarter of 1987 when we estimate that between 15,000-20,000 child deaths might be prevented, asuming that levels of destruction of infrastructure do not worsen further during this period. The timeliness of assistance is critical to stemming the widening cycle of death and despair. The response from the international community has been disappointing in recent months. During 1986, in spite of wide distribution of monthly situation reports and emergency assistance appeals, only 18%, or US $8 million in funding was met.

RESPONSE TO SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

Q.1 In Angola UNICEF continues to provide food, medical and other relief supplies by road transport to the 250,000 people in the Central Provinces seriously affected by the emergency. A number of trucks have been lost to mines, and there has been some pile up of commodities in the ports; however, through maintenance teams and co-operation with local NGO's, bottle necks of supplies have largely been overcome. UNICEF, in conjunction with UNDRO and UNV's (United Nations Volunteers) is maintaining an airlift from Benguela to Huambo and Bie for the immediate distribution of food commodities, medicines and supplementary feeding components. This airlift has been averaging three flights a day, lifting 300-340 tons.

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Similarly, in Mozambique, UNICEF is co-operating with CARE, the Red Cross and others to deliver food and other relief supplies to displaced and cut-off persons in especially Zambezia, Inhambane and Tete provinces. A key component of the road transport effort includes truck maintenance supervision, the provision of radio communications links, and the establishment of "secure" forward warehouses. In some areas tractors are required for towing trailers through poor, sandy roads. UNICEF supports the cost of airlifting essential supplies and medicines from Maputo to provincial capitals.

In spite of increased emergency assistance efforts of the international community and the recipient governments, large segments of the population remain inaccessible and consequently plagued by malnutrition, disease and banditry. Vaccine supplies, however, are reaching many, particularly in Mozambique and consequently some child deaths are being prevented. Additionally, UNICEF and other co-operating agencies are assisting tens of thousands of displaced persons resettle to secure zones, in camps, hospitals and orphanages through the provision of water supplies, seeds, farm implements and shelter.

4.2 The immediate needs for identified emergency assistance projects to benefit 400,000 severely affected children in Angola are as follows:

		$
-	Essential drug kits	800,000
-	Repair of Health Infrastructure	750,000
-	Water Supply - Pumps, Pipes and Equipment	1,500,000
-	Relief Supplies for Displaced Persons	10,200,000
-	Logistical Support - Road and Air Transport	9,400,000

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In Mozambique the urgent unmet needs for the 3,500,000 people seriously at risk, including 600,000 children under five, are as follows:

- Essential Drug Kits, Medical Supplies and Equipment	4,500,000
- Water Supply - Pumps, Pipes and Drilling Equipment	4,000,000
- Relief Supplies for Displaced Persons	1,500,000
- Logistical Support - Air and Road Transport	1,800,000

Emergency assistance needs for other front line Southern Africa countries (Botswana, Lesotho and Zambia) are currently set at US $5.2 million for mainly medical supplies and assistance to displaced people.

Except in Angola, UNICEF has limited capacity to administer food aid programmes. Yet, food needs for displaced persons and supplementary feeding for malnourished children remains critical, given the wide destruction and abandonment of farmlands. UNICEF co-operates with other UN agencies, such as WFP and UNHCR and NGO's such as CARE in the implementation of supplementary feeding programmes. Therefore, urgent needs for UNICEF assisted programmes as indicated above are essentially for cash contributions (or donations-in-kind) to procure drugs, medical supplies, relief materials, trucks and spares, water supply equipment, as well as funds to pay technical and supervisory personnel and to underwrite the cost of airlifting emergency supplies and relief workers.

4.3 As indicated above, UNICEF co-operates closely with other agencies of the UN system involved in the emergency assistance effort in Southern Africa, particularly UNDP (OEOA), UNDRO, WFP and UNHCR. It collaborates as well with bilateral assistance agencies, such as USAID, DANIDA and a number of local and international voluntary agencies, most particularly CARE and the Red Cross and Save the Children (U.K.).

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Q.4 Throughout 1986 UNICEF continued to make monthly appeals to donors for emergency assistance needs in Southern Africa, and, as noted the response to these appeals as of 31 December 1986 has been poor, with only 18% of the emergency assistance projects funded. It is hoped that the Children on the Frontline report will further galvanize the international community and will result in tangible funding support. The United Nations Secretary General's office is currently conducting a needs assessment in Southern Africa in co-ordination with all relevant UN agencies on the ground in the affected countries. It is expected that this assessment will result in a formal appeal to the international community by the UN Secretary General and will include UNICEF's resource needs (noted above) as well as those for other UN agencies engaged in repairing and rehabilitating transportation, agriculture and industrial infrastructure. It is anticipated that throughout the emergency UNICEF will co-ordinate both its appeals and its response with the Secretary General's special unit.

Q.5 UNICEF's resource needs for Southern Africa are covered in Q.2 above.

Q.6 As indicated above, response to emergency assistance needs fell sharply in 1986 after reaching almost 100% during 1985. The United States in 1985 provided an Emergency Assistance grant of US $3.250 million for Water and Logistical Support for Mozambique, as well as emergency food aid for Angola (PL480 Title II). As of January 1987, the donor response for the 1986 emergency assistance appeal is as follows:

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COUNTRY	PROJECT	
ANGOLA		
Sweden	- Water Supply/Logistics	$1,060,219
Japan	- Supplementary Feeding	260,000
Canada	- Health, Logistics, Water	1,811,594
Finland	- Water Supply	77,669
FRG	- Supplementary Feeding	112,500
Netherlands	- Health	191,580
BOTSWANA		
UK	- Health	200,922
UK Committee	- Health	200,000
LESOTHO		
Australia	- Drugs and Medicines	71,940
UK	- Health	240,000
UK Committee	- Health	275,000
MOZAMBIQUE		
UK	- Nutrition, Health	1,029,985
Canada	- Health, Water, Food	434,783
Sweden	- Water, Logistics	113,000
ZAMBIA		
Japan	- Health	500,000

4.7 UNICEF's regular programmes of assistance to Southern African countries are focused on supporting and extending primary health care systems; immunizing children against preventable diseases; assisting in pre and post-natal care; developing water and sanitation systems; equipping health clinics with essential drugs and other basic medical equipment; co-operating in rural development projects aimed at improving household food supplies and employment for women; nutrition and health education in formal and informal school systems, and providing training of paramedical personnel and traditional birth attendants.

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The regular programme is comprised of activities funded from UNICEF's general resources as well as those supplementary project activities supported by governments, national committees and others.

In 1986, regular programme expenditures for UNICEF activities in Southern Africa (excluding emergency assistance, which is noted above) ran as follows:

COUNTRY	$US Millions
Angola	3.5
Botswana	.7
Lesotho	.6
Malawi	1.8
Mozambique	8.3
Swaziland	.2
Tanzania	15.8
Zambia	.6
Zimbabwe	3.0
TOTAL	34.5

Note, expenditures for the regular programme of assistance is expected to rise by 10-12% in 1987 over the above levels.

4.8 As mentioned in Question 3 above, that except for Angola, UNICEF itself has limited capacity to administer large food aid programmes. UNICEF is currently receiving PL 480 Food for Peace commodities in Angola. In Mozambique where chronic malnutrition among children in most areas of the country is ranging between 25 to 40%, UNICEF is co-operating with CARE and others in supplementary feeding programmes. UNICEF directly could handle 3,000 to 4,000 tons of corn (maize) and some limited quantities of vegetable oil for Mozambique. Urgently needed as well are quantities of soap, blankets, cooking utensils and other relief supplies for both Angola and Mozambique.

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4.9 Already, particularly in Angola and Mozambique, large numbers of displaced persons are being fed in camps or have been resettled to "secure" zones, but are yet unable to engage in significant food production, due to shortages of supplies and agricultural inputs such as seeds and tools. The conflict and the "banditry" continues to be fluid and the current UN assessment team is attempting to quantify projected numbers of new displaced persons. While some relief trucks have been mined and ambushed, others are getting through under escort or through pre-arrangement with the parties in conflict. In sum, the spectre of the Ethiopian feeding centres has already reached down to Southern Africa, but it is unclear at this point how large a shadow has been cast.

CARE
660 First Avenue • New York, NY 10016 • (212) 686-3110 • Cable: PARCELUS NY

19 February 1987

Mr. Jerry Tinker
Sub-Committee on Immigration & Refugee Affairs
United States Senate
SD 224
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Jerry,

The following are our responses to the questions for CARE attached to Senator Kennedy's letter of February 6, 1987.

A. What are some of the transportation problems faced by CARE in getting food to needy areas? Do you have enough transportation? Is enough funding provided for transportation?

1. The major problem, without a doubt, is the unpredictable insurgent activities in the rural areas. Roughly 2.2 million (62%) of the at-risk population, is only reachable by heavy convoy, by sea or by air. Most commodities are dispatched from provincial capitals by truck convoys which require prearrangement with security forces which are erratic and sometimes difficult to coordinate.

2. There continues to be need for smaller (5 ton capacity) trucks and tractor/trailers which can move commodities from district capitals closer to the affected populations over terrain where roads do not exist, or are simply bush paths, or are in a state of total disrepair.

3. Attention should also be given to expanding the transport capacity of the private sector in order that the transport of essential commodities does not become entirely dependent on the government.

4. Funding for transport has been adequate to-date. We expect that WFP will continue to finance the operating costs of the coastal vessel 5 Juin and we also are expecting UNICEF to continue to provide funding for airlifts, although in the latter instance the new CARE budget will also include $200,000 for airlifts. UNICEF is also expected to continue to provide technical assistance to all the DPCCN/LSU vehicle workshops in the provinces.

The new CARE budget to cover the period May 1987 through April 1988 totals $4,215,000 of which $683,500 is for 4 light vehicles and 30 farm tractors with trailers or 5 ton trucks. The balance covers personnel and administration costs and the costs to keep a fleet of over 300 trucks on the road.

CARE has approached various bilateral donors to Mozambique seeking support for our new budget. The only positive response to date has been from the USG through OFDA. However, initial indications are that the USG will be able to cover at most 50% of the total requirement. Funding could be a very serious problem for 1987/88.

B. Assuming transportation becomes available, would there be enough food and supplies to deliver to needy areas.

1. In the past the problem has not been the level of pledges by the bilateral donors but the timeliness of the deliveries; the supply pipeline unfortunately experiences recurring breaks. To overcome this problem CARE has suggested that the U.S. approve a 30,000 MT food reserve for the DPCCN which would be called down when needed.

2. In September 1986 Mozambique's food deficit was estimated at 450,000 MT with the qualifier that this estimate may be conservative if rural insecurity continues. In January 1987 the total food deficit was re-estimated at 728,000 MT, the increase in the deficit being largely due to insurgent activities preventing farmers from planting their crops and a shortage of seeds. What is not certain is if the bilateral donors have adjusted their pledges to meet the 728,000 MT deficit. For example, the U.S. was proposing to meet one-third (150,000 MT) of the deficit. If the pledge is to meet 1/3 of the deficit the quantity must increase to 243,000MT of food.

3. As regards other supplies required by the at risk population, it must be stressed that there is dearth of virtually all consumer items in Mozambique, particularly in the rural areas. During the past year CARE has received dried fish, soap and cooking utensils from Norway and contributions in kind of clothing and shoes from manufacturers in the U.S.. While we welcome more of such donations we must be careful not to over extend ourselves, particularly from the U.S., as we are dependent on ocean freight reimbursement from the USG which is a fixed annual allocation.

We trust you will find these responses useful to your further deliberations on the Mozambique problem in specific and the more general problems prevailing and continuing to grow in Southern Africa. We thank you for having been given the opportunity to make a contribution to the recent hearing on "The Refugee Crisis in Southern Africa".

Sincerely,

Rudy Ramp
Regional Program Manager
RMU/East Africa

cc: Charles Sykes
1004

WORLD VISION

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate, SD 244
Washington, DC 20510

February 20, 1987

Dear Senator Kennedy:

Thank you for the opportunity to answer in more detail the following questions you and Senator Simpson raised as a result of the February 5 hearings.

1. "Could you please clarify and elaborate on suggestion that Front-Line States might be used as 'staging areas for humanitarian assistance for conflict zones'?"

Humanitarian assistance from WV's point of view is not meant to imply short-term relief. The present situation in South Africa will, from our perspective require long-term and ongoing concern.

Only with an extreme breakdown in the region would it be necessary to deliver assistance out of the Front-Line States. It certainly is not necessary or preferred in the present situation. There are structures (even some established by the SAG authorities) that can be channels of assistance if earmarked for delivery by private mechanisms.

This is a highly sensitive issue, just as it was in Ethiopia. Government channels, of course, could not be used to provide assistance to local organizations which are perceived as undercutting the image of the government. Herein lies the dilemma of operating within the country. Nonetheless, if an organization is present and providing assistance on humanitarian grounds, they would be likely to be a delivery mechanism regardless of the fact that may be "open to" the Freedom Movement.

Careful analysis is urged to help NGO's determine what the strategic threshold would have to be in order to require staging areas in the Front-Line States; especially in light of the fact that poverty is now generally greater in the Front-Line States than in South Africa.

Therefore, staging areas would have to of necessity be perceived as places to strengthen and increase staff capability and resource availability to indigenous partners within the Front-Line States. This would include:

1. More adequate refugee reception/resettlement centers;
2. Discreet (therefore numerous small) efficient supply depots and centers to assist increasing number of displaced/refugee people;
3. An increase in Title II and food barter arrangements throughout the region, but especially in Zimbabwe.
4. Careful research and negotiated understandings (accords) in regard to main South Africa port (Durban and Port Elizabeth) usage by PVOs in an extreme emergency;
5. Projection of need for pre-positioning and increase in use of ports while it is still possible; and
6. Possible Harare Consortium for stockpiling of surpluses.

In addition, an important facet of establishing staging areas would be to build relationships. Interested PVOs could enter more fully into collaboration and conference with indigenous groups such as through the proposed Lusaka meeting in June, to be sponsored by the International Council of Voluntary Agencies. The purpose will be to discover what our partner's desires are for us, and to establish a strong serving presence to acquire credibility, pass along technical support and increase leverage in sharing humanitarian concerns with the South African Government.

2. "How is the feeding done?"

The current estimation is that nearly 2 million people are being fed daily by Non-Governmental Organizations in South Africa. Operation Hunger alone claims to feed 1 million people a day. The channels for feeding include schools, churches, and clinics, as well as community groups. Operation Hunger purchases their food from major milling companies which tranport the food to local communities; the communities then distribute internally. The only other groups providing feeding programs on a national basis are the South African Red Cross and World Vision. World Vision secures its food at the local level in order to support businesses in the local communities. Distribution is linked to our 260 local development projects. Seperate from these are crisis situations, such as Crossroads, in which we are feeding 120,000 people daily.

3. "How would an interested American participate in 'partnerships'?"

Such partnerships are not new. The U.S.-South Africa Leadership Exchange Program (USSALEP) has provided educational exchanges for emerging black leaders for the past number of years. Church denominations such as Africa Methodist Episcopal, Presbyterian, Anglican, and Lutheran, have exchanged pastors and parishioners from time immemorial. World Vision, in our development projects, networks with 15 church denomination in a way that brings a constant flow of overseas visitors from England, Germany, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, as well as the U.S.A. In turn then support institutions host South Africans who find it useful to avail themselves of the respite they provide. USSALEP is currently working on an expanded "booster" program which would provide local courses and programs using American resource people.

Dean T.S. Farisani, a Lutheran pastor from Venda, who was recently released from detention, asked for an increase in these programs when he was in the U.S. in October of 1986. More partnership arrangements would enhance the information flow in order to increase support systems for detainees and their families, for finding refuge and retreat for South Africans who are able to travel, and for the development of a regularly informed and knowledgable partner public in the west who can help in the conciliation process. More direct, and discreet, funding of urgent needs and ongoing projects would result as well.

p. 3 Getman con't

4. "What kind of programs does WV Have in South Africa?"

World Vision has 140 child care projects supporting 18,000 children and their families in South Africa. In addition, there are a number of community development and training programs in the country. I have attached a representative list of 120 specific projects scattered throughout the country in both rural and urban areas, immediately effecting the lives of 600,000 people. They represent a full range of integrated community development projects with the following components: education, leadership training, primary health services, water/agriculture development, women advancement, youth programs, crisis/detainee intervention, and job creation.

(attachment)

5. "Is there a role for additional American voluntary agencies in South Africa?"

There are currently 4,600 registered fund-raising organizations in SA. So the idea of additional charitable organizations would not be new to most South Africans. However, the difficulty now for new organizations is to establish programs in concert with existing strict government regulations. Any PVO that could incorporate under existing law would face significant criticism. If they do not incorporate to avoid harsh judgment by the wider community the program impact will be significantly minimized. World Vision has avoided this dilemma by being in the country since 1963, and by having a successful and broad base of support projects that can be pointed to when criticism is raised from along the political spectrum.

In addition, there is some significant personal risk on a day to day basis because of the constantly changing and increasingly radical leadership in both extremes of the various communities. Bone fides must be reestablished each day, and having courageous friends amongst the authentic community leaders is absolutely necessary. The recent explusion (and then reinstatement) of the ICRC points out these political vagueries.

Several outstanding sister American agencies have recently reviewed the possibility of establishing operations in South Africa, but have not chosen to do so to date. In our view, it could only be done in close collaboration with local community leaders in a way described in Michael Sinclair's helpful guide to American donors, Community Development in South Africa (Investor Responsibility Research Center Inc. 1755 massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036, 202 939-6500).

In the interim, U.S. PVOs could increase their presence in the Front-Line States, and/or consider working as a consortium through existing international and indigenous private organizations in South and Southern Africa.

Sincerely,

Thomas R. Getman
Assistant to the President

TRG:hy

PROJECT NEW SOUTH AFRICA : FY87 BUDGET

PROJ. NO	NAME	NO BENE-FICIARIES	EDUC. & TRAINING	LEADER-SHIP	HEALTH SERVICES	AGRIC.	WOMEN IN DEVELOP.	WATER DEVELOP.	YOUTH PROGS.	CRISIS INTER.	JOB CREATION.	PROJ BUDGET $
431015	ST LUKES	2 000				X						13 620
431016	LIMA ZITHULELE	500				X					X	32 400
431017	VRYGROND	6 500	X				X					18 000
431018	EMMAUS	35				X						9 338
331071	LEHLOHONOLONG	300	X									34 398
431077	NEW LIFE CHRISTIAN MOVE.	900		X					X			16 500
431079	LAAIPLEK POKO	250	X									4 455
231080	HOPEFIELD	130	X									3 780
331081	DYSSELDORP	1 000	X						X			2 700
231082	CALITZDORP	3 000	X									1 980
231085	SISTER ENID	500	X				X				X	10 600
231086	KLANGANARI	300				X		X				13 500
531264	ORANGE RIVER	12 000				X						27 000
531267	DO WELL COMM	2 000					X				X	23 000
531274	GOOD SHEPHERD	31 500			X							5 400
531319	KRUISFONTEIN	250									X	4 950
531337	GRASSROOTS EDUC.	6 000	X									18 000
531358	VUKUKHANYISA	1 400								X		27 000
131380	CISKEI DEV.	1 300					X			X	X	6 750
131381	VANWYKSVLEI LOKTON PRIESKA	1 000	X									12 600
131382	VANRYNSDORP & KLAWER	600	X		X				X			7 470
331396	HEIDEDAL COMM	328	X				X					10 600
331397	ODI DEV.	5 000	X				X				X	16 119
331398	P.E. DEV.	2 700								X		15 750
331404	BARCLAY EAST DEV.	420	X									2 700
331405	WALKERVILLE MAMKA	250	X									5 610
131571	KWELERA COMM	500					X					5 400
131573	KUBEKAN	1 200			X	X	X			X		14 522

PROJ. NO	NAME	NO BENE-FICIARIES	EDUC. & TRAINING	LEADER-SHIP	HEALTH SERVICES	AGRIC.	WOMEN IN DEVELOP.	WATER DEVELOP.	YOUTH PROGS.	CRISIS INTER.	JOB CREATION.	PROJ BUDGET $
131574	TAUNG	1 200			X		X				X	15 300
131580	MANTSATA	2 000	X				X				X	26 396
131581	MUILA COMM	2 300	X			X	X	X			X	20 000
131586	MULIMA COMM	1 400	X				X	X			X	20 000
131588	KHAMBELO	1 000	X									13 000
131591	BAMBISANANI COMM	300	X									7 800
131596	KWAQUALAMI DEV.	2 000	X									17 550
131601	CROSSROADS OUTREACH	80 000								X		35 100
131609	WALMER TOWNSHIP	300	X									6 750
131611	DUNCAN VILLAGE	300								X		9 000
131612	KHOMA COMM	475	X									8 100
131620	ST BERNBA'S CLINIC	1 000			X		X					4 200
531633	POTSDAM COMM.	6 000					X				X	4 500
531635	EAST LONDON LEADERSHIP	900		X							X	5 400
531636	AFESIS DEV.	9 000								X		2 700
531637	CAPE RAVEN COMM	25	X									4 050
531638	VUKANI COMM	1 000				X			X			4 400
531639	MASINCEDANE	110	X								X	6 750
531641	BLOKOSI	100			X	X					X	8 550
531642	KWA NAKUTHA	2 000	X				X			X	X	13 455
531643	CRAAFF REINET DEV	300								X		4 950
531644	MASIBAMBANE	60 000		X								6 750
531645	WELCOMEWOOD COMM	200				X					X	5 400
531646	ISIBONELO ESEHLE	850	X							X		15 300
531647	NDALENI COMM	100	X									4 500
531648	NTVALUNE WATER	50									X	2 250
531732	TUKELA HEALTH	100			X	X	X					4 904
531733	COMPASSION CARE	3 000				X	X			X	X	15 752
531740	SWAMP RESETTLEMENT	100	X									2 250
531741	IMVUSELELANG	2 500	X			X		X				54 000
531742	MIDDELBURG DEV.	300	X									5 400

PROJ. NO	NAME	NO BENE-FICIARIES	EDUC. & TRAINING	LEADER-SHIP	HEALTH SERVICES	AGRIC.	WOMEN IN DEVELOP.	WATER DEVELOP.	YOUTH PROGS.	CRISIS INTER.	JOB CREATION.	PROJ BUDGET $
531743	HOUT BAY COMM	175	X							X		9 000
531744	ATLANTIS ADV. CENTRE	13 000								X		5 940
531745	CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DEV.	500					X				X	3 025
531746	COLESBURG DEV PROJ	1 000								X		1 375
531747	ZEKEILE COMM	15									X	3 600
531748	MANCHBURG DEV	800	X				X				X	5 580
531749	ST SCHOLASTICAS	500			X		X			X		2 700
531750	SUBIACO	300			X	X				X		4 200
531751	ST MARTINS	800			X					X		9 500
131751	GOOD HOPE COMM	450	X									15 118
531752	MABA CRECHE	100	X				X					15 300
531826	ST ANTHONY'S	1 352			X					X		3 600
100304	PORT ALFRED	350	X									4 500
100305	BOSPLAAS HEALTH	20 000			X			X			X	22 500
100306	BUSHBUCKRIDGE	5 000					X	X		X	X	18 000
100307	MOORDGESIG	200	X									9 000
100308	CHRISTIAN ACTION	500							X			22 500
100304	BRIEFONTEIN HEALTH	10 000			X		X			X		22 500
100301	ELDORADO PARK CRIPPLE CARE	60								X	X	5 482
100311	MONKQUEBELA EDUCARE	350	X									5 500
100313	ZIPHAKAMISENI	3 000					X				X	22 500
100314	ST MARTINS AFTERCARE	200	X			X	X					6 750
100315	BARCLAY WEST	200								X		3 000
100316	BRAKPAN S.A.H.T.A.	292	X							X		3 000
100317	WIELERS SQUATTER	200								X		3 000
100318	JOHILL REHAB.	150								X		3 000
100319	GEXANGANI HEALTH	300			X							2 250
100321	BEAUFORT WEST ADV.	200									X	2 250
100326	O'KIEP/CONCORDIA	100				X						2 700
100327	BHONGULETHU	300	X							X		2 700
NEW	BURGERSDORP	300					X				X	3 600

PROJECT NEW SOUTH AFRICA : FY87 BUDGET

PROJ. NO	NAME	NO BENE-FICIARIES	EDUC. & TRAINING	LEADER-SHIP	HEALTH SERVICES	AGRIC.	WOMEN IN DEVELOP.	WATER DEVELOP.	YOUTH PROGS.	CRISIS INTER.	JOB CREATION	PROJ BUDGET $
NEW	MLUNGISI-QUEENSTOWN	250	X									8 100
NEW	KWAZAKHELE	250	X									8 100
341288	KRUGERSDORP PRISON	250								X		11 340
141297	W CAPE DEV AND LEADERSHIP	10 000		X								21 240
341292	SUCA	250							X			6 750
341293	CRISIS NEWS	50 000								X		9 108
100312	CHILD EDUCARE	410	X									21 600
541336	LANGESBRG LEADERSHIP	5 000		X								7 875
541337	MANYENO MISSION	500	X	X			X				X	4 590
541350	FOUNDATION FOR CO-OP	10 000		X								22 500
541352	EMMANUEL TRAINING	600		X			X					73 770
131597	MDALENI MISSION	700	X	X					X			20 250
531951	MULDERSDRIFT	100	X									3 000
531952	MGANDUZWENI	100	X									3 000
531954	KHOTSENG FEEDING	100	X									3 000
531265	MAKOTOPONG	500					X					7 000
531268	BOLLANTLOKWE	500					X					5 000
221044	GELUKSPAN HOSPITAL	1 000			X							16 380
NEW	LAVIS M.G. S.K. CRECHE	100	X									1 125
NEW	BHONGULETHO DEV	100	X									2 700
	FY87 ACTIVITY EXP. $		434 000	80 100	107 800	180 500	203 100	55 500	90 000	110000	39 000	$1 300 000
	ACTIVITY EXP & MIN. SERV.$		543 000	100 000	135 000	226 000	254 000	69 000	113 000	138000	49 000	$1 627 000

UNITED STATES
COMMITTEE
FOR REFUGEES
815 Fifteenth Street NW, Suite 610
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 667-0782

Informing the public since 1958

February 18, 1987

Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman
Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs
United States Senate
SD 224
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Kennedy:

Thank you very much for your letter of February 6 regarding the Subcommittee's February 5 hearing on "The Refugee Crisis in Southern Africa". Your leadership on this issue is timely and warranted and--as I indicated in my testimony--the voluntary agencies are very aware and appreciative of your consistent efforts to hear out our views on humanitarian matters.

Our response to the questions contained in your letter is enclosed.

Sincerely,

Roger P. Winter
Director

Enclosure:

RPW:cm

QUESTION:
As we impose tougher economic sanctions against South Africa and demonstrate our contempt of apartheid by treating that country as a social outcast, how do you suggest we also successfully appeal to their moral duty to provide internationally accepted refugee protection standards?

ANSWER:
In some ways it should be easier to appeal to South Africa's moral duty to deal with Mozambican refugees in accordance with internally accepted refugee protection standards than it would be to resolve the internal problems of apartheid and distribution of power.

a. South Africa is clearly implicated in the fighting inside Mozambique.

b. The flight of Mozambican refugees to South Africa could be turned to Pretoria's propoganda advantage.

c. Flight to South Africa by refugees is primarily a reaction to violence and harassment within Mozambique. South Africa's policy of refouling Mozambicans caught enroute to Gazankulu is a deterrent, and as a deterrent, ultimately will not work because it does not deal with the causes of flight. Thus there will be a continuing, festering reaction to South Africa's policies towards the refugees until the situation inside Mozambique is resolved.

d. Treating the refugees appropriately does not involve new power sharing arrangements but rather a humanitarian response, a temporary committment to a bonafide refugee situation.

e. Inviting UNHCR to establish a presence in South Africa and an organized approach to assistance would be taken by many as a sign that the South African establishment can change in a humanitarian direction.

QUESTION:
It is becoming more and more possible that there will be a violent outcome rather than a peaceful settlement in South Africa. What are your views about the likelihood of a large exodus of white South Africans and the need for their resettlement outside of Africa?

ANSWER:
The possibility exists that a need will develop for large scale resettlement of both black and white South Africans outside the continent. The implications should be thought through carefully, especially in the U.S., since such an eventuality could have tremendous domestic political implications. It is likely that much discussion of the applicability of the so-called "second sentence", Section 101A(42)b of the Refugee Act of 1980, will develop. While the U.S. response to such an

eventuality should turn on humantarian issues, it is possible that our response will have implications for the post apartheid relations between South Africa and the U.S. By sorting out these concerns now--in concert with other friendly governments--the humanitarian and political issues can be reconciled.

QUESTION:

You note the need for regional coordination. What kinds of coordination do you recommend? What coordination is going on now which you deem effective?

ANSWER:

Regional coordination in respect to humanitarian relief and development efforts in southern Africa must take place on at least two levels. At the field level, the establishment of a consultative process for all non-governmental organizations in the region is required in order to build relationships among them, facilitate communication and allow for technical development collaboration. Perhaps most importantly, international NGOs in the region must reach agreement on which indigeneous relief groups should be assisted--and to what extent--both to avoid competition, duplication and/or gaps, and to promote the development of a moderate, nationalist leadership in South Africa. One approach to this end could be a series of meetings/seminars, involving representatives of indigeneous and foreign NGOs active in the region of the kind already organized within the region under ICVA auspices for next June 8-12.

On a broader level, the Organization of African Unity should adhere to its summit resolution of July 1986 to convene an International Conference on the Situation of Southern African Refugees, including within that conference the UNHCR, SADCC Secretariat, and NGOs actively involved in refugee work in southern Africa. We think there is benefit to be gained from the appointment of a Special UN Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Southern Africa, but issues of timing, political direction and definition of mandate must be carefully explored.

Political and economic initiatives, too, must recognize the regionality of southern Africa. The future vitality of the region depends heavily on the maintenance of economic links with a post-apartheid South Africa and measures taken to reduce present dependence by SADCC countries on South Africa, for example, will make most sense if they can be seen ultimately to compliment rather than replace existing SADCC-South Africa ties. Also, a non-violent transition to majority rule in South Africa depends in great part on white South Africans recognizing a viable post-apartheid future for themselves. Given the need throughout the region for their professional, managerial, and technical skills, a regional role for South African whites, following the dismantling of apartheid, should be considered now.

In respect to coordination efforts already underway, I have mentioned the positive steps taken by UNHCR, the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, InterAction, and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). Each of these agencies, however, has only recently

embarked on a coordinated, regional approach to the problems which plague southern Africa, and it is still too early to assess the effectiveness of their efforts.

QUESTION:

In what ways does the U. S. need to expand the processing of refugees for resettlement from southern Africa? What kind of program would you envision in order to make U. S. resettlement available to those who truly need it?

ANSWER:

There are two major deficiencies in respect to U. S. processing of South African refugees for resettlement. First, the lack of a truly available INS presence in the region often results in inordinate delays in processing, requiring that alternative resettlement opportunities be pursued. Second, former members of liberation movements have, it appears, been systematically excluded from consideration for resettlement in the U. S. on the basis of their having belonged to an organization that "advocates the violent overthrow of a legitimate government".

Eliminating, or at least minimizing, the processing delays requires that the U. S. either designate additional processing posts in the region (adding Lesotho, for example) and schedule more frequent visits by the INS "circuit rider" or, alternatively, designate certain southern African diplomatic posts as emergency processing centers where U. S. Embassy consular officers would be charged with interviewing and processing applicants for resettlement as the need arises.

Former members of South African liberation movements should be treated in a manner similar to that of Eritreans and others who have fought against a government with which the U. S. maintains diplomatic ties: their mere membership in an armed anti-government organization should not be the sole basis for exclusion from the U. S.

It is generally the case that resettlement of significant numbers is unnecessary at this time. Emphasis should be placed on being more responsive to those who do need it and contingency planning for possible future increases.

QUESTION:

Regionally, do you consider the presence "on the ground" of UN and voluntary agency personnel sufficient? If you think an expansion is warranted, on what scale?

ANSWER:

By all accounts, voluntary agencies in southern Africa are significantly understaffed even for their present level of activity, and there is considerable need and opportunity for expansion of their programs. The U. S. Committee for Refugees, however, does not have precise information on the numbers and skills of the personnel required. It is clear, however, we are a long way from meeting the region's legitimate humanitarian needs.

In respect to activities in South Africa, it is important to note that any increase in voluntary agency activities should be undertaken only in collaboration with established, respected indigenous organizations, while in "front-line" states voluntary agencies must invest considerable time and effort in establishing their bona fides with governments and indigenous groups prior to initiating any program of activities. Priority should be given to building permanent local capacity to deal wth humanitarian emergencies

UN agencies in southern Africa are, at least in some instances, also severely understaffed. Again, we do not have comprehensive data but UNHCR, for example, has assigned only two officers to Malawi to carry out activities that would normally be done by a large contingent.


ISSUE PAPER
REFUGEES FROM MOZAMBIQUE
SHATTERED LAND,
FRAGILE ASYLUM
U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES
NOVEMBER 1988

This paper was written by Tom Brennan, consultant to USCR. It was edited by Virginia Hamilton, and produced by Koula Papanicolas of the USCR staff. The cover was designed by Sharon Fassler. The cover photograph is courtesy of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

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REFUGEES FROM MOZAMBIQUE:
SHATTERED LAND, FRAGILE ASYLUM

Important events are rapidly unfolding in Mozambique, perhaps the most strategically placed nation in southern Africa.

In October 1986, against the backdrop of activity surrounding the imposition of international sanctions against South Africa, the South African government announced it would not renew work permits of 68,000 Mozambicans legally working in South Africa, thus eliminating Mozambique's major source of foreign exchange earnings. The authorities claimed their action was in retaliation for a landmine explosion inside South African territory, which they attributed to guerrillas of the African National Congress operating from within Mozambique.

In the same month, South African-supported insurgents in Mozambique wrested from government control huge tracts of territory and a number of towns, in what may signal the start of a major insurgent offensive. More than 100,000 Mozambicans, fleeing in terror, joined more than a quarter-of-a-million of their compatriots who had already taken refuge in Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and even—indeed, especially—South Africa. As refugee numbers swelled, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the only international agency caring for refugees in South Africa, was expelled from that country in retaliation for the expulsion of a South African government delegation from a Red Cross conference in Geneva.

As Mozambique struggled to cope with its growing insurgency, massive population displacements, and the prospect of drastically reduced foreign exchange earnings, its president, Samora Machel, died in an air crash, in disputed circumstances, just inside South African territory. His death has shaken the nation and has deprived it of a strong leader and an internationally respected head of state.

In short, the nation of Mozambique is in a state of crisis, and some four million of its citizens who are seriously affected within Mozambique or seeking sanctuary in neighboring states require immediate international protection and assistance if a major human tragedy is to be averted.

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The making of this crisis, however, did not begin in recent months. It can be traced to the threat perceived by neighboring white-minority regimes when Mozambique achieved independence eleven years ago, and it has grown steadily more violent ever since.

Until very recently, however, little has appeared in the U.S. media regarding the domestic situations of Mozambique or of the other nations of southern Africa, or regarding their relationships with each other and with the South African government. Even less has appeared on the impact that existing and potential armed conflicts in the region—stemming from ideological, as well as ethnic and racial differences—are likely to have on the civilian populations of the area as the struggle to eliminate apartheid gains momentum.

Yet, the potential for catastrophe—for human suffering and population displacements that are truly massive in scale—pervades the entire southern third of the African continent, and a broader understanding of the problems of the region is essential if overwhelming physical suffering is to be avoided during the next several years.

This paper briefly discusses the conflict that is currently causing large population displacements from and within Mozambique, summarizes the status of Mozambican refugees in their respective countries of asylum, and offers recommendations to reduce the suffering these refugees are experiencing. It views their displacement within the historical context of events that have periodically impelled Mozambicans to seek safety in neighboring countries. While historical migratory patterns continue to influence the direction of Mozambican refugee movements, however, the existence of nation-states, fixed borders, spurious systems of government, and modern weaponry have immeasureably complicated their existence and have made their present situation untenable.

Shattered Land

Following its eleven-year struggle for liberation from Portugal, the present government of Mozambique came to power in 1975, recognizing many of the challenges immediately facing the fledgling nation of 13 million people, but also expecting ultimately to achieve dynamic economic and social growth.

The problems the leadership faced were substantial. While the peoples of Mozambique had demonstrated initiative and tenacity in their resistance to Portuguese rule, for example, actions directed against the colonial authority had traditionally been local or tribal in nature, and there was little popular sense of nationhood. Also, while Mozambicans were highly regarded for their industriousness as migrant workers—in the mines or on agricultural estates in neighboring countries—relatively little agricultural development had taken place in Mozam-


The Flight of Mozambican Refugees
ZAIRE
TANZANIA
MALAWI
ANGOLA
ZAMBIA
Lilongwe
Blantyre
Nacala
Lusaka
Harare
ZIMBABWE
Beira
Indian Ocean
NAMIBIA
BOTSWANA
Gazankulu
MOZAMBIQUE
Lebowa
Kangwane
Pretoria
Komatipoort
Johannesburg
Maputo
SWAZILAND
LESOTHO
Kwazulu
SOUTH AFRICA
AFRICA
Mozambique
South African "Homelands" with Mozambican refugees.
Arrows and numbers indicate major flows of Mozambican refugees.
UNHCR refugee camps.

bique during the Portuguese era, and more than 85 percent of the population was illiterate at independence.

Nevertheless, the expectations of the nation's leadership were not unfounded. Twice the size of California and strategically situated on the Indian Ocean, Mozambique possessed a coastline equivalent to that of the United States from Boston to Miami. Several modern and well-placed deep-water ports—linked by rail to the land-locked nations of Zimbabwe (previously Southern Rhodesia), Zambia, Malawi, and Swaziland, and to the principal mining and industrial region of South Africa—offered substantial opportunity for generating foreign exchange. Mozambique was also earning modest revenue from the export of agricultural commodities—cashews, cotton, sugar, and tea—and the nation had been generously endowed with mineral resources. Perhaps most importantly, Mozambique achieved independence under a charismatic leader, Samora Machel, whose personal integrity inspired the loyalty of great numbers of Mozambicans and the respect of a diversity of African and Western heads of state.

Mozambique's hopes for prosperity, however, have not been realized. From the moment of its independence, the new nation fell victim to foreign influence and to pressure from a persistent insurgency that have turned Mozambique into an international battleground. And, while Machel retained much of his personal popularity, the policies of his ruling party alienated many within the country.

Rigid Marxist policies, civil disorder, and pernicious drought combined to devastate the nation's economy, and, as Mozambique's financial infrastructure crumbled, the insurgency gained additional momentum. By the early 1980s, national unrest had evolved into a bitter civil war, displacing or seriously affecting close to two million people within Mozambique. Heinous and widespread atrocities against noncombatants—skulls crushed, infants boiled alive, throats slit, and women and girls brutally raped—have been reported by numerous eyewitnesses, ascribed most often to insurgent forces, but on occasion to Mozambican government troops, as well.

Since mid-1983, the numbers of those internally displaced or seriously affected have doubled to almost four million people, and an estimated 350,000 persons have fled from Mozambique into neighboring territories, about half of them into South Africa.

Part of a Pattern

The movement of large numbers of black Africans into racist South Africa in search of asylum is, on the surface, an anomaly. But, while the oppressive policy of apartheid in South Africa attacks their human dignity and well-being, the brutality these refugees fled in Mozambique immediately threatened their very survival. And the flow of refugees to South Africa—like the flows to Mozambique's

other neighbors—is rooted in the historical patterns of migration in southern Africa, and in the family and tribal relationships that have developed throughout the region as a result of these movements.

Large-scale migrations have been a feature of African life for many centuries, at times in the peaceful form of a slow infiltration of relatively small groups seeking new economic opportunities, at times in the form of conquerors seeking to dominate new areas, and at times, as now, by those seeking escape from subjugation and brutality. The history of Mozambique is replete with such migrations.

Early History

Small numbers of hunters and gatherers were probably the only inhabitants of present-day Mozambique until sometime around 350 A.D., when iron-working Bantu speakers from the north and west began a series of migrations that continued intermittently well into the nineteenth century.

The Tsonga, for example, expanded in stages out of what are now the regions of Transvaal and Natal in present-day South Africa, from the fourth to the tenth centuries, and settled in southern Mozambique. Shona-speaking peoples, from present-day Zimbabwe and Botswana, conquered the upper Zambezi River Valley and some coastal areas by 1450. Warrior tribes of the Maravi cluster, who originated probably in Zaire and migrated through Malawi and Zambia, arrived on the northern bank of the Zambezi River in the sixteenth century. And Ngoni warriors swept in from South Africa between 1820 and 1850 to escape a rival Zulu chief, eventually settling in scattered locations in Mozambique.

From outside Africa, too, groups came seeking opportunities to profit from the land and the people. Arab traders had come to Mozambique as early as the eighth century, setting up outposts along much of the East African coast in order to trade manufactured goods for gold and ivory. The Arabs concluded military and trade agreements with individual African chieftains, prospered immensely from these arrangements, and ultimately established a distinctive Islamic culture along much of the Mozambican coast.

The first visit of Europeans probably occurred toward the end of the fifteenth century, when a Portuguese expedition travelled along the East African coast as far south as Mozambique and reported to their king on the lucrative Arab trade in gold. A few years later, Vasco da Gama, on his epochal voyage to India in 1498, reprovisioned on the coast of Mozambique and bombarded an Arab town as a warning that the Portuguese were prepared to challenge Muslim control of trade in the area.

By 1505, the Portuguese had returned to sack another Arab town and began construction of a fort at Sofala, on the Zambezi River—the first European settlement in southern Africa. Within five years, the Portuguese controlled the flow of

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By the early 1980s, national unrest had evolved into a bitter civil war, displacing or seriously affecting close to two million people within Mozambique. Since mid-1983 those numbers have doubled to almost four million, and some 350,000 refugees have fled into neighboring territories.

commerce out of every major port between Sofala and the Horn of Africa, 3,000 miles to the north. Portuguese attempts to penetrate the interior of the continent, however, were much less successful, and Portuguese presence beyond the coast was sporadic and limited to isolated settlements for several hundred years.

During these centuries, the huge profits that Portugal had hoped to derive from trading in gold and ivory failed to materialize, as trade was repeatedly interrupted by civil wars waged in the interior by competing factions of African kingdoms. These hostilities also resulted in continuing population displacements around the border areas of present-day Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South



Africa. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Portugal was coming to doubt the efficacy of its limited presence in Mozambique.

As Portugal sought to reconcile its visions of empire with its extremely limited resources, however, the demand for slaves in Brazil, Madagascar, and overseas French territories precipitated a transformation of Mozambique's economy that would enrich the Portuguese authorities and that has profoundly affected its population even to the present day: Mozambique, in effect, became an international labor reserve.

The rise of slavery established a precedent for the authorities in Mozambique

to derive profit from the export of indigenous manpower. But, for the peasant, flight from enslavement reinforced the patterns of migration established during the centuries of civil conflicts. As slavery was abolished, these patterns were largely maintained by migration for wage labor, by flight from Portuguese colonial rule, and, today, by refugees once again seeking escape from civil strife that has shattered their land.

Human Commodities—Phase I

The earliest significant overseas market for Mozambican labor was on the islands of Mauritius, where French settlers had begun to establish sugar plantations. During the 1770s, Afro-Portuguese settlers, Indian merchants, and Swahili traders in Mozambique responded to the relatively modest French demand for labor by exporting about 1,000 slaves annually.

As the need for new sources of slaves developed in Brazil and Central America, however, slaving operations grew dramatically, and by 1790, the colonial government was deriving substantial tax revenues from the legal exportation of approximately 9,000 slaves annually from Mozambique. This trade continued to grow well into the nineteenth century, peaking at about 15,000 slaves legally exported across the Atlantic each year during the 1820s and 1830s. Probably twice that number were exported through unofficial channels to avoid government taxation, and an unknown number were also exported to Indian Ocean markets.

As demand for slaves rose, the potential for profit increased accordingly, and slaving parties ranged farther afield in their search for exportable humans. Entire villages were razed, crops were devastated, and large populations, particularly in northern and central Mozambique, fled farther inland along long-established migratory routes in order to escape enslavement.

In response to international protests, Portugal sought to minimize slavery by taxing it more heavily, but even in 1875, slaves were still Mozambique's dominant export commodity. Finally, Portugal decreed a complete abolition of slavery in 1878 and began taking forceful measures against it. By some reports, however, covert slave trade within the region continued until as late as 1913, and it is almost certain that the combined legal and illegal exports from Mozambique exceeded one million slaves in the course of the nineteenth century.

Human Commodities—Phase II

Circumstances in southern Mozambique during the first half of the nineteenth century created an opportunity for the export of wage labor that would come to replace slavery as the principal source of revenue for the colonial government, and would further reinforce Mozambican migratory patterns.

To survive in that century, the settled peoples of Mozambique had not only to

avoid slaving parties, but, particularly among the ethnic Tsonga in southern Mozambique, had also to contend with migrations of warriors from South Africa. The warrior tribes decimated the cattle herds of the Tsonga and seriously disrupted their cultural patterns, which relied heavily on the accumulation of cattle for social esteem and for bride payments. The Tsonga saw their future as very bleak, indeed.

In the second half of the century, as the international demand for slaves began to wane, the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa resulted in intensive mining operations requiring vast resources of unskilled manual labor. At the same time, young Tsonga males needed a new means for acquiring cattle—or cloth and agricultural tools, which were becoming popular substitutes—in order to obtain wives and social stature.

The need of the mining authorities to obtain steady labor, uninterrupted by absences during planting and harvesting seasons, also fit neatly with the division of labor common to the Tsonga, in which most agricultural tasks were regarded ideally as women's work. Men were thus free to be away from their farms for extended periods while their families subsisted on what the women grew.

For many Tsonga men, the opportunity for wage labor was not only welcome, it was irresistible.

Labor recruiters from the mines in the Transvaal quickly recognized southern Mozambique as the best available labor pool, and the journey to the Transvaal to spend a year or two under the earth soon came to be viewed almost as a rite of passage for the young Tsonga male. By 1889, already about half of the 90,000-man labor force in the Transvaal were from southern Mozambique. This flow of migrant labor increased dramatically during the next decades as the Portuguese colonial government, anxious to profit once again from the export of the indigenous population, formalized migrant labor arrangements with the official labor recruitment agency of the Transvaal mining industry.

Under the terms of an accord signed in 1901, the Portuguese colonial government received a head-tax for each worker recruited for the mines—just as it had received a tax on each slave exported a quarter-century earlier—plus an additional payment for each month's service beyond the initial one-year contract period. Also, half of each worker's wage was paid directly to the colonial government in gold. This payment was calculated at a rate fixed significantly below the world market price for gold, permitting the Portuguese government to resell it at a substantial profit. Together, the recruitment taxes and these wage remittances accounted for about one-third of Mozambique's total annual revenue.

Equally important, in return for cheap labor, the Transvaal government agreed to divert a percentage of its imports and exports through the Mozambican port of Lourenco Marques (now Maputo), which had been linked by rail to the Transvaal in 1895. Customs duties and transshipping charges were soon yielding

an additional one-third of the colony's total revenue and represented the largest single source of colonial income.

Similar arrangements were later made with Southern Rhodesia, permitting that country to recruit 25,000 Mozambicans annually in return for moving Rhodesian goods through the Mozambican port of Beira. By 1913, rail and port charges against Southern Rhodesia had already reached almost a quarter-of-a-million dollars per year.

Escape from Tyranny

The draconian colonial policies applied by the Portuguese within Mozambique also contributed significantly to population movements that were spontaneous in nature, and, once again, these followed and reinforced the established migratory patterns.

As Portugal gradually gained effective control of Mozambique between 1894 and 1912, it imposed a particularly severe colonial regime. After putting down popular revolts against its rule, the colonial administration used the whip and cudgel to collect taxes from the populace and instituted policies requiring all adult males to be gainfully employed as migrant workers, as wage earners within Mozambique, or as farmers possessing very large holdings.

As some 90 percent of Mozambican men were considered unemployed under the colonial labor codes, they were subject to impressment on public projects and on the estates of Portuguese settlers. They were entitled to neither food nor lodging, were subject to repeated physical abuses, and received little or no remuneration. Additional burdens, notably the requirement to grow cotton and rice on behalf of the government, were later placed on the peasantry. These circumstances drove additional thousands of Mozambicans across the border into neighboring territories, either as illegal migrant workers or as permanent settlers.

Legal migration to South Africa grew to more than 91,000 by 1919, and from 1920 onward remained at about 100,000 annually. But at least that many again are believed to have fled clandestinely from southern Mozambique to escape forced labor on the European farms concentrated there. Thousands fled as well from northern and central Mozambique to join ethnic enclaves in neighboring countries.

By 1919, it was estimated that more than 100,000 Mozambicans from the north had resettled in Nyasaland (now Malawi), and at least another 200,000 fled there during the next 25 years. In Southern Rhodesia, the number of migrant workers from central Mozambique grew from 25,000 in 1936, to 72,000 in 1946, and to more than 122,000 in 1956. By 1950, more than 100,000 Mozambicans

were living in permanent exile there. Similar numbers fled to Zambia and to Tanganyika.

Exiles Arise

While the colonial authorities effectively suppressed any political dissent within Mozambique, among the great numbers of Mozambicans who had fled to the neighboring British territories were many who were influenced by the ideas and successes of nationalist parties in their host countries. In Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia, and Tanganyika, they formed separate exile political organizations, each concluding that independence from Portugal was essential.

In 1962, these groups came together in Tanzania, where they formed the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Chosen as FRELIMO's president was Eduardo Mondlane, a committed Mozambican nationalist, who at the time was on the faculty of Syracuse University. Under Mondlane, FRELIMO established an administrative structure with political and military wings, and gained the recognition of the Organization of African Unity as the legitimate representative of the Mozambican people. FRELIMO's guerrilla struggle to liberate Mozambique from Portugal began in earnest in 1964.

In its early years, FRELIMO was plagued by internal ethnic, regional, and ideological disputes which led to the assassination of a number of FRELIMO leaders by rival factions within the party. Operating initially from bases in Tanzania, FRELIMO was nevertheless able to carry out an ever-increasing number of guerrilla attacks in the northern provinces of Mozambique where Portuguese control had historically been weakest. In 1969, Eduardo Mondlane was also assassinated—probably by the Portuguese secret police—and the presidency of FRELIMO was ultimately assumed by Samora Machel, who had risen rapidly through the ranks of the guerrilla organization. Under Machel, dissidents were purged, and the party quickly came under the control of those committed to establishing a socialist society in Mozambique.

During the next several years, FRELIMO continued to improve its military position and eventually gained effective control of the northern third of Mozambique. The colonial government's overreaction to the insurgency, and abuse of the civilian population by Portuguese troops during this period, contributed to increasing support for FRELIMO in areas which had previously been indifferent to the liberation struggle. Portuguese soldiers had, in any case, been only half-hearted in their pursuit of victory, and, in 1974, a coup by military reformists in Lisbon led to an offer of self-determination for Mozambique and other Portuguese overseas territories.

In Mozambique, the colonial government proposed an immediate cease-fire to be followed by a popular referendum to determine the country's future.

Courtesy of Dick Lockwood

Most of the displaced villagers have been relocated to areas near the cities and larger towns, and are now almost wholly dependent on food donated by Western governments.

FRELIMO was invited to participate openly in the democratic process in competition with a number of smaller liberation groups.

FRELIMO, however, insisted on the granting of independence without a referendum. Despite its lack of a political organization in two-thirds of the country, it also demanded Portuguese recognition of FRELIMO as the sole representative of the people and the transfer of all governmental authority directly to FRELIMO. The Portuguese government attempted to negotiate these issues, but FRELIMO remained adamant, Portuguese resolve weakened, and FRELIMO achieved all its demands.

While FRELIMO was generally popular throughout Mozambique for having won the war for independence, it appears there was neither widespread understanding nor support for its political doctrine or economic policy. Smaller liberation groups, concentrated in southern and central Mozambique, voiced their concern at FRELIMO's commitment to establishing a one-party, socialist state. The vast majority of Portuguese, who comprised virtually the entire managerial and technical resource of the country, immediately fled.

The Independence Government

During the nine-month transitional government which preceded complete independence in 1975, FRELIMO made clear its intolerance of dissent, arresting

and imprisoning the leadership of all opposition groups. Within a few months after independence, FRELIMO had established its own secret police to replace those of the Portuguese, and had arrested several thousand more purported opponents, most of whom were sent to "re-education" camps. All property was nationalized, the private practice of medicine and law was made illegal, all mission schools were taken over by the state, religious activities were discouraged, and some churches were closed.

The FRELIMO government also abolished the rights of political detainees to *habeas corpus*; citizens were subject to arbitrary arrest and detention, and, throughout the late 1970s, the population imprisoned in the camps at any one time was estimated at up to 10,000 individuals. Prisoners were reliably reported to be routinely bound and flogged, deprived of food, and, in some cases, murdered. Despite President Samora Machel's "Legality Offensive"—launched in 1981 and relaunched in 1984—to curb such abuses, reports indicate that a considerable number of untried detainees continue to be tortured and subjected to cruel and degrading treatment.

Even within FRELIMO, no popular participation in the decision-making process was allowed, and frequent purges of party ranks prevented the rise of rivals to challenge the leadership of the elite group that had controlled the party since Mondlane's death in 1969. With excessive reliance on ideology, FRELIMO instituted many policies that were predictably misguided, unpopular, and economically disastrous. Socialization of the agricultural sector, followed by heavy emphasis on state farms and neglect of cooperatives, for example, contributed to a significant decline in both subsistence and cash-crop production.

An Insurgency Established

In addition to its commitment to establishing a society guided by the principles of "scientific socialism," the FRELIMO government was firmly pledged at independence to engage actively in eliminating white-minority regimes in southern Africa. Toward this end, FRELIMO began in 1975 to provide a haven and launching point for guerrilla operations against Ian Smith's white-minority government in Southern Rhodesia.

The Smith government, together with Portuguese ex-colonialists and others who had fled the FRELIMO regime, responded by establishing and supplying a group of Mozambicans to gather intelligence on the anti-Smith guerrilla operations. They also established a clandestine radio station aimed at creating disaffection among the rural populace for FRELIMO's socialist policies. Given the havoc these policies were wreaking on the economy, the task did not prove particularly difficult, and, before long, what had started as an intelligence and propaganda operation had blossomed into a nascent insurgency that proclaimed itself the Mozambican National Resistance (commonly known by its Portuguese acronym, RENAMO). The insurgency grew gradually during the next several

years, as the FRELIMO government continued to alienate some of its citizenry by heavy-handedly applying its Marxist policies.

After the British-brokered election process was completed in 1980, however, minority-ruled Southern Rhodesia became majority-ruled Zimbabwe, and RENAMO lost its source of essential outside support. Also, President Machel was coming slowly to recognize some of his government's failings. His increasing pragmatism resulted in the evolution of a more popular mixed economy of state, collective, and private sectors, and he moved forcefully to improve relations with the West.

For many in Mozambique, however, the government's new emphasis on private farming came too late, as poor rains and mismanagement continued to restrict growth in the rural areas. With backing from South Africa, the insurgency was revived, and, as drought helped to cripple the rural economy, peasants were more easily recruited. By mid-1985, RENAMO had become active in all ten provinces of Mozambique, and its strength had grown to about 14,000 combatants.

Using classic guerrilla tactics—striking at economic targets and sowing insecurity among the civilian population—RENAMO has scored major military gains. The government has demonstrated that—with the help of Zimbabwean troops, and Soviet and Cuban technicians and advisers—it can mount effective attacks against guerrilla strongholds. But, in the absence of specific coordinated offensives, the insurgents are free to operate throughout much of the countryside.

Close to four million civilians have been displaced or seriously affected within Mozambique, including about one million who were initially displaced by drought in 1983 and 1984, but who have been unable to return to their villages because of the prevailing security situation. Most of the displaced villagers have been relocated to areas under government control near the cities and larger towns. They have been forced to abandon their homes and their farms, and are now almost wholly dependent for their survival on food rations distributed through government and international relief agencies. The gap between domestic production and total food requirements, however, greatly exceeds the amount of food available from donor agencies, and constant interdiction of supply routes by guerrilla forces has severely curtailed distributions.

Malnutrition and its related diseases are common, and famine threatens large areas of the country. Most severely affected are the areas immediately north and south of the Zambezi River—the provinces of Zambezia, Sofala, and Tete—where RENAMO threatens to cut the country in two, and the provinces of Gaza and Inhambane, north of Maputo, where there have already been reports of isolated cases of starvation.

The government's administrative and development activities are also restricted almost entirely to the immediate environs of the cities and larger towns. Indeed,

the FRELIMO government is utterly dependent on military support from the Soviet Union to maintain its hold even on these limited areas.

In seeking to gain diplomatic recognition and international support, RENAMO has been much less successful—although it has made concerted efforts in this regard in recent months—due to its largely negative image among African and Western leaders. The nominal leader of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama, for example, is widely perceived as an agent of Portuguese colonialist and South African interests, and the organization has presented no political program which might justify its existence.

Whatever the merits of the case against RENAMO, the guerrilla movement clearly does receive material, logistic, and technical support from South Africa in violation of the Nkomati Accord, signed by South Africa and Mozambique in March 1984. Under the terms of that compact, Mozambique agreed to stop providing a sanctuary for guerrillas of the African National Congress, and South Africa agreed to stop supporting RENAMO.

Also, unlike the guerrilla campaign against the Portuguese—during which FRELIMO sought only to disrupt economic activity and was selective in targeting civilians—RENAMO has often completely destroyed productive economic infrastructure and has been generally indiscriminate in its attacks on the civilian population.

RENAMO's attacks on the important economic links—the railways and the oil pipeline—between Mozambique's ports on the Indian Ocean and the landlocked nations of Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi have increased the dependence of each of these nations on South Africa, their primary alternative access to the sea. And, while there is undoubtedly widespread disenchantment with FRELIMO's rule in Mozambique, it is largely RENAMO's wanton slaying and brutalization of the civilian population that have forced hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans to seek refuge in neighboring countries.

Fragile Asylum

That refugees from Mozambique are fleeing a chaotic and life-threatening situation is not disputed. That they are almost invariably welcomed in their countries of asylum by distant relatives, or by those with whom they share ethnic affinities or clan ties, is also beyond question. Yet, the governments of the asylum countries have been reluctant to recognize the plight of the Mozambican refugees. Only when faced with an overwhelming refugee presence—and following the persistent promptings of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—have most of these governments begun to respond in accordance with internationally accepted standards of support and protection. Indeed, in each of the nations of asylum, Mozambican refugees continue to face severe hardships that have yet to be addressed.

SOUTH AFRICA Despite its opposition to white-minority rule in Africa, the FRELIMO government, since independence, has maintained the profitable migrant labor arrangements originally established with South Africa by the Portuguese colonial authorities. Migratory flows to South Africa have thus continued virtually uninterrupted for more than a century.

Since 1984, however, the traditional attraction of wage labor in South Africa has been overtaken by the life-threatening situation in Mozambique, and the 68,000 Mozambicans legally working in South Africa have been joined by some 160,000 to 220,000 others who entered without documentation, seeking refuge, as well as economic opportunity, there. Although there are important differences in their treatment in the various nations of asylum, the flight of Mozambican refugees along traditional migratory routes to South Africa is, in many ways, illustrative of their escape to countries throughout the region.

In keeping with established migratory patterns, Mozambican refugees in South Africa have not settled along the border—as they have in other neighboring countries—but have moved further inland, to the black African "homelands" of Gazankulu, KaNgawane, Lebowa, and KwaZulu, and to the industrial, mining, and agricultural areas around Johannesburg.

In contrast to late-1985 and early-1986, when many thousands of Mozambicans fled into these areas each month, the flow of refugees into South Africa decreased in late-1986 to about 500 monthly, as both RENAMO and government forces gained greater control over the populations in their areas of operation. But, the intense ordeal that these refugees endure in order to reach the relative sanctuary of South Africa provides some indication of the magnitude of the horrors they have fled.

Typically, in order to leave Mozambique, the refugees must flee their villages in small groups, and in the dead of night, to avoid detection by the government army or insurgent troops. Both forces are displeased at the prospect of villagers escaping their "protection," and invariably express their displeasure in violent ways, brutally beating and sometimes killing would-be escapees.

Usually travelling by night and hiding by day, the villagers reach the border in three days to a week. Arriving there hungry and exhausted, they still face their worst obstacles.

On the Mozambican side of the border are terrifying minefields. Soviet-made "jumping-jacks"—spring-loaded anti-personnel mines that can literally cut a person in two at the waist—have been laid by the Mozambican government to deter incursions from South Africa and to stem the tide of runaways. Bleached skeletons along the border bear silent testimony to the threat these mines present.

Beyond the minefields, South African Border Police and Defense Forces patrol rows of ten-foot high security fences, erected by the South African authorities to

stop the refugee influx. Since August 1986, sixteen miles of the security fence have been charged with potentially lethal doses of electricity. The South Africans have posted signs to this effect, but virtually all of the refugees are illiterate, and, during August, at least two refugees are reported to have died as a result of electrocution. If the refugees are able to negotiate their way through the minefields, to skirt the electrified fence, and to scale or crawl through the remainder of the fence undetected, they are still only half-way to safety.

Once in South Africa, the Mozambicans must cross Kruger National Park, southern Africa's largest game reserve, avoiding detection by park rangers and additional South African Defense Force personnel, and the possibility of attacks by savage animals. If caught, the refugees are handed over to Mozambican authorities at Komatipoort and repatriated to Mozambique in accordance with an agreement between the South African and Mozambican governments.

During the height of the exodus, in 1985, approximately 1,500 refugees were captured at the border and in the park each month, and were forcibly returned to Mozambique. Now that figure is estimated at 300 to 400 monthly. Also, some refugees, often children, have been attacked and killed by wild animals before they could complete their trek across the park.

Once inside South Africa, the women, children, and elderly refugees make their way to one of the black "homelands" established by the South African government as part of its effort to perpetuate apartheid. These are barren, impoverished wastelands, but the refugees have family or clan ties with the homeland residents, and they know they will find welcome there. Between September 1984 and February 1986, an estimated 45,000 refugees arrived in this manner in Gazankulu, about 25,000 in KaNgwane, and about 5,000 each in Lebowa and KwaZulu.

According to doctors working in the homelands, refugees continue to arrive in these areas in deplorable physical condition, near starvation and suffering from exhaustion and dehydration. The flesh on their feet has been torn by rocks and brush, and their legs are swollen from the arduous trek. Many suffer from malaria, tuberculosis, and skin infections. Children typically have bronchial infections and gastro-intestinal diseases; many show the effects of malnutrition. But most difficult to treat, say the doctors, is the psychological depression that most refugees are suffering as a result of their experiences in Mozambique and during their escape.

South Africa has no legal or organizational mechanism for determining refugee status or ministering to refugee needs, and the government initially regarded these refugees as illegal immigrants, subject to deportation. Following strong representations from the homeland authorities of Gazankulu, however, the government agreed to treat the refugees within that homeland as "visitors", and sought to regularize their status through a registration exercise. In the other homelands, no formal policy regarding the refugees has been announced. Under-

Robert Winter UNCR

This blind Mozambican refugee crossed minefields and a high fence and eluded wild animals to reach asylum in South Africa's Gazankulu "homeland." He demonstrates here how the children who accompanied him led him to safety.

standably suspicious of the government's motives, and fearful of being repatriated to Mozambique, the great majority of refugees have refused to register, and so remain in a kind of limbo.

At the request of the government, the International Committee of the Red Cross was, until its expulsion from South Africa in October 1986, providing emergency assistance in proportion to the numbers who had registered their presence (about one-third of the total). This has been supplemented by contributions from local church and community groups, and by the activities of organizations such as World Vision and Operation Hunger, a South African voluntary relief organization. Also, some women have been able to obtain employment—though illegally and at meager wages—making bricks or working as domestics.

Through a combination of such self-help measures and international assistance, and nurtured by a prevailing spirit of sharing among themselves and their hosts, the refugees in the homelands are eking out a bare existence.

The expulsion of the International Committee of the Red Cross delegation from South Africa, however, has eliminated this important source of material assistance and international protection for these refugees. The burden of assisting them is now further depressing the already low living standards of the indigenous populations.

Able-bodied male refugees generally by-pass the homelands and make their way directly to the agricultural, industrial, and mining areas around Johannesburg.

Here they have friends or relatives among the Mozambicans legally employed in South Africa.

Some of the refugees have purchased false papers and pose as legal immigrants, while others simply use their contacts—or trade on the southern Mozambicans' reputation for industriousness—to obtain illegal employment, albeit at lower wages, in the mines, the factories, or on the large estates of farmers in the area. The South African government estimates that there are approximately 160,000 Mozambicans working illegally in the country.

As the West moves toward applying stricter sanctions against South Africa for its failure to move more rapidly away from its apartheid policy, the plight of these refugees has become of particular concern. The South African authorities have already indicated that they will not only forcibly repatriate illegal workers when sanctions are invoked, but have even raised the prospect of repatriating refugees from the homelands under such conditions.

The future of Mozambicans in South Africa is further complicated by the accusations exchanged between the Mozambican and South African governments. Maputo charges that some Mozambicans are receiving guerrilla training from the South African Defense Force, to be infiltrated back into Mozambique as insurgents. Pretoria countered, in October 1986, that Mozambique is once again providing a sanctuary for guerrillas of the African National Congress operating in South Africa. In retaliation, the South African government stated it would not renew the work permits of the 68,000 Mozambicans legally working in South Africa.

Close observers of the southern Africa situation acknowledge that there is probably some basis for both countries' allegations. In any case, except for registered migrant workers, male Mozambicans repatriated from South Africa would undoubtedly be regarded with great suspicion by the Mozambican authorities. They would likely be subject to intense interrogation followed, at best, by conscription or incarceration in a "re-education" camp.

SWAZILAND In 1980, when only a small number of Mozambican political refugees had sought asylum in Swaziland, the Swazi authorities yielded to Mozambican pressure and applied to these refugees a previous agreement with the Mozambican government requiring repatriation of illegal immigrants. As a result, and in violation of United Nations protocols and the Organization of African Unity convention on refugees, 68 individuals were forcibly repatriated to Mozambique, where they met an uncertain fate. More recently, refugees entering Swaziland from Mozambique have been fleeing civil strife in general, rather than the Mozambican regime in particular, and the agreement has not again been invoked.

Mozambicans now in Swaziland, most of whom have entered during the past two years, total about 4,500, a relatively small number when compared to those fleeing to other nations in southern Africa. But Swaziland is also host to about 7,000 ethnic Swazi refugees from South Africa, and, to this tiny land-locked country, these numbers already represent a considerable burden. By overcrowding the existing refugee settlement for South Africans, the Mozambican influx has disrupted the government's program to help the South African refugees achieve self-sufficiency and has increased pressure on already scarce natural resources.

Nevertheless, the Swazi authorities, with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Lutheran World Federation, are now attempting to deal humanely with the Mozambicans. The Swazi government has accorded the refugees temporary asylum, is providing education for their children, and is assisting them to establish small farmsteads where they will eventually be able to produce much of their own food.

To attain full self-sufficiency, however, the Mozambican refugees will ultimately require additional land to cultivate. For now, they depend largely on the food rations distributed by the Lutheran organization. The severe limits on the amount of arable land in Swaziland have raised the concern of the Swazi authorities and international organizations as to what will happen if the flows of refugees from Mozambique continue or increase.

ZIMBABWE Mozambique's closest political ties in southern Africa are with the government of Zimbabwe, a nation that achieved majority-rule in 1980 with the assistance of the present Mozambican regime, and that today has 12,000 soldiers in Mozambique to help that government contain the RENAMO insurgency.

Substantial numbers of refugees began flowing into Zimbabwe from central Mozambique in 1983, and, for the most part, spontaneously settled along the border where many had relatives among the existing population or shared clan ties with them. Reluctant to acknowledge that the Mozambican government was unable to provide security for these refugees, and concerned that their presence along the border might be used to mask insurgent activity against Mozambique, the Zimbabwe government reportedly forced some of the early arrivals back into Mozambique. As the influx continued, however, the government acknowledged the inevitable and agreed that UNHCR should establish camps for the refugees away from the border region.

In 1984, UNHCR established four camps for the exiles, but, by the end of that year, only 12,187 of the then-estimated 45,000 Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe had moved into them. By mid-1986, the camp populations had doubled, but the increase was attributed largely to new influxes from Mozambique, and

the total Mozambican refugee population in Zimbabwe had grown to almost 70,000. The majority of these continue to live in scattered locations along the border.

Although only those refugees residing in the camps are receiving direct assistance through UNHCR, a number of private, voluntary organizations—including Save the Children Federation (U.S.) and World Vision—have been encouraged by the government to expand their activities in villages along the border, thus providing indirect developmental assistance to refugees in those communities. Also, the relatively sophisticated Zimbabwean social service system has been assisting needy persons in the area without questioning their national origin. In these ways, the government of Zimbabwe, while not having to acknowledge the magnitude of the influx, has been generally able to ensure that the material needs of Mozambican refugees are basically met.

Significantly, however, the government of Zimbabwe has not yet officially accorded asylum to refugees from Mozambique, and these refugees are therefore without the legal status essential to their protection. There continue to be isolated reports of refugees in Zimbabwe being forcibly repatriated to Mozambique.

ZAMBIA Estimates of Mozambican refugees in Zambia range from 25,000 to 40,000, most of whom arrived in 1985 and early 1986, settling along the border in Eastern Province, one of the most remote regions of Zambia.

The remoteness of the refugees and the fact that they were often sheltered by Zambian relatives and clansmen allowed the government of Zambia generally to ignore their presence until UNHCR drew attention to their situation. By mid-1986, the government had agreed to establish with UNHCR a refugee camp at Msanzara, some distance from the border, and had requested the assistance of several voluntary agencies in meeting the needs of the refugees until the camp could be completed. Tents for those in need of shelter, as well as cooking utensils and blankets, have been distributed to refugees along the border.

Once ready, it is expected that residency in the camp will be required for any further assistance and, perhaps, simply to remain in the country. Reports from the field, however, indicate that most of the refugees are reluctant to move away from the border area where they are among their own people, are able to return periodically to tend their fields in Mozambique, and, at least for the moment, are out of harm's way. As in Zimbabwe, the government of Zambia has not officially accorded asylum to refugees from Mozambique, and there have been reports of some refugees being repatriated to Mozambique against their will.

MALAWI Between mid-1985 and late-1986, estimates of the Mozambican refugee population in Malawi have fluctuated between 20,000 and 50,000, with

Prospects for peace in Mozambique are not encouraging. In all likelihood, refugees will be forced to remain in exile for a number of years.

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refugees crossing and recrossing the border as hostilities between the Mozambican government and rebel forces dictated. Despite their ethnic ties with border peoples in Malawi and their generally short periods of refuge, the constant disruption of the lives of these refugees has had significant deleterious effects on their economic, physical, and psychological well-being. In October 1986, this ebb and flow became of even greater concern, as the numbers of refugees increased dramatically to more than 100,000, and as the government of Mozambique repeatedly accused Malawi of providing a haven for Mozambican insurgents and of possibly even providing them material and logistic support.

Malawi has consistently denied the charges, but many observers remain doubtful of its intentions. The conservative government of Malawi, alone among southern Africa's independent nations, maintains full diplomatic relations with South Africa,

and is not among the "front-line" states of southern Africa, whose leaders have outwardly maintained common policies in opposition to white-minority ruled states and territories in the region. Border crossings in both directions by uniformed anti-Maputo insurgents, most recently involving several thousand guerrillas moving into Mozambique in early October, have been reported.

There is no permanent UNHCR presence in the country, and the government of Malawi has not yet allowed UNHCR officials into the border area to assess the needs of the refugees.

Several hundred of the refugees have fled the border area to the Malawian cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe, where they are receiving assistance through UN agencies. For the near future, the remaining tens of thousands of Mozambican refugees are expected to stay in the border region. However, a recent threat by the government of Mozambique to close the border "with a chain of missiles"—and South Africa's allegation in November 1986 that Mozambique and Zimbabwe were, prior to President Machel's death, planning hostile actions against Malawi—raises the very real prospect that these refugees may find not only that their revolving door to asylum is no longer open to them, but also that their lives are imperiled by new, even less predictable, assaults.

Prospects for Peace

While it is doubtful that RENAMO possesses any widespread political support within Mozambique, its military forces have established themselves to such an extent that the government has little hope of defeating them in the foreseeable future without very substantial military assistance from outside Mozambique.

President Samora Machel had been unable to regard RENAMO as anything more than a surrogate for Pretoria, intent on destroying the economy of Mozambique in order to increase its dependency—and that of its majority-ruled neighbors—on South Africa. That view of RENAMO is widely shared in southern Africa, and, with the probable exception of Malawi, RENAMO is without friends in the capitals of Mozambique's majority-ruled neighbors. If Machel was aware of any substantial legitimate opposition to FRELIMO's Marxist rule—and even this is doubtful—he clearly did not recognize Dhlakama's RENAMO as representative of genuine political disaffection.

To Machel, the real opposition was the Pretoria regime, with which he had already reached an agreement—the Nkomati Accord of 1984—that South Africa has repeatedly violated. From Machel's point of view, peace in Mozambique could only be achieved by a transition to majority rule in South Africa. This, he suggested, was possible within ten years, and he claimed his FRELIMO government was prepared to contain the insurgency for that long.

Machel's successor, former Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano, is, like Machel, regarded as a pragmatist, and has suggested he will continue the economic and political reforms initiated by Machel in recent years. Indeed, many of these reforms were originally proposed to Machel by Chissano, and continued improvements in Mozambique's relations with the West are, therefore, quite probable. In respect to RENAMO, however, Chissano is unlikely to accord them political legitimacy by entering into peace negotiations.

Anxious to acquire political stature, RENAMO is therefore likely to focus its diplomatic efforts on obtaining the recognition of opposition groups within neighboring countries and support from the West. Particular efforts in this regard are already underway in the United States, where RENAMO is attempting to draw parallels between itself and the UNITA forces of Jonas Savimbi, which are receiving U.S. assistance in their attempt to overthrow the Marxist government in Angola. Lacking a political program, however, and burdened by a reputation for brutality, it is extremely doubtful that RENAMO will be able to obtain diplomatic backing from Western quarters.

Recognizing the improbability of a political solution, both RENAMO and the government of Mozambique may attempt to widen the war. RENAMO has already suggested it will carry its guerrilla campaign into the cities of Mozambique and into Zimbabwe, and there have been credible reports that the Mozambican government is considering attacking RENAMO bases in Malawi. There are also indications that South Africa may carry out military strikes in Mozambique.

The apparent strategies of FRELIMO and RENAMO are both long-term in nature, and the military support they receive—from the Soviet Union and South Africa, respectively—is unlikely to cease in the foreseeable future. Thus, the prospects for peace in Mozambique, at least for the moment, are discouragingly dim, while there are very real prospects for a widening war and a substantial escalation of violence.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Within Mozambique, millions of civilians find themselves in an extremely perilous situation, as conflict in that country continues to escalate and brutalities are inflicted upon them. Hundreds of thousands who have managed to escape to neighboring countries, often under the most arduous and terrifying circumstances, have only a tenuous grasp on a fragile asylum.

In South Africa and Malawi, in particular—but also in Zimbabwe and Zambia—the refugees from Mozambique are in urgent need of international protection. Unless and until international protocols are applied to these refugees, they must live in constant fear of being cast back into the fray they risked their lives to escape.

The conflict in Mozambique also has serious regional implications; for, in the absence of conflict, Mozambique's three major ports—linked by rail to each of its eastern neighbors—offer the opportunity for the landlocked nations of Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa. While the prospects for reconciliation are unfortunately few, the stakes are enormous. Peace in Mozambique is vital, not only for the sake of the people of that long-suffering nation, but also in the interest of social and economic growth throughout the region.

While massive political and armed conflicts convulse the region, the world community must not ignore the humanitarian needs of the hundreds of thousands—even millions—of displaced persons and refugees who are caught in the crossfire. In the hope of improving protection and assistance for these civilian victims, the U.S. Committee for Refugees makes the following recommendations:

1) The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with full diplomatic support from the international community, should heighten its presence in the region, in particular making every effort to: a) establish a formal presence in Malawi; b) obtain from the governments of Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi declarations of asylum with respect to Mozambican refugees in their respective countries; and c) formulate appropriate plans to move refugees away from the border areas in these countries as their security situations, and those of the asylum countries, warrant. More permanent settlements, where refugees can attain a measure of self-sufficiency, should be established in each country of asylum.

In recent months, the major flows of refugees from Mozambique have been into Malawi, as FRELIMO and RENAMO forces have been launching major military offensives in the Mozambique-Malawi border area.

Malawi's refusal to allow UNHCR officials into its border areas is particularly worrisome, and further calls into question that government's attitude toward these refugees and its role in the conflict in Mozambique. UNHCR's mandate is to protect refugees in this situation, but it cannot hope to do this without an official presence in the asylum countries and without forceful and coordinated support from the international community—in this case, from Malawi's major trading partners: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, West Germany, and Japan.

The failure of the governments of Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe to issue formal declarations of asylum for refugees from Mozambique suggests an unwillingness to acknowledge openly and live up to their obligations under the United Nations and Organization of African Unity conventions on refugees. By this failure, these governments are subjecting refugees in their countries to additional anguish, and to continuing uncertainty and fear.

In all of their nations of asylum but Swaziland, the refugees from Mozambique have been able to rely for initial consolation, shelter, and sustenance on networks of relatives and clan members, networks established and reinforced by previous migrations and by arbitrarily drawn national boundaries.

The presence of family and tribal structures in the countries of asylum, however, also tended at first to mask the magnitude of the refugee flows from Mozambique and to encourage the spontaneous settlement of refugees in border areas. Now, with the threat of a widening war, the very presence of these refugees along international borders is likely to create legitimate security concerns, not only to the host country governments, but to the government of Mozambique, as well.

It must also be recognized that the prospects for a resolution of the crisis in Mozambique are not encouraging, and that, in all likelihood, the refugees will be forced to remain in exile for a number of years.

2) The South African government should immediately de-activate the electrified portion of its border security fence and cease the forced repatriation of Mozambican refugees, regardless of where in South Africa they may be apprehended. South Africa's compliance with international norms of refugee protection should be monitored by UNHCR.

The problems associated with large numbers of black refugees seeking asylum in the Republic of South Africa are especially complex due to South Africa's anomalous status in the region. In some respects, Mozambican refugees residing in the South African homelands are being treated in a manner not unlike those in neighboring majority-ruled states, inadequate as that has generally been. At the same time, South Africa's forced repatriation of large numbers of refugees apprehended before reaching the homelands and its electrification of a portion of its border security fence are callous and intolerable acts, graphically symbolic of the worst violations of internationally accepted refugee protection standards.

Despite its status of pariah in Africa and elsewhere, South Africa must be made aware that it will be held to account by the international community for violations of accepted standards of refugee protection. As a member of the United Nations, South Africa remains at least morally obliged to apply to refugees United Nations standards of protection, and its performance in this respect should be monitored by the appropriate United Nations agency. To that end, UNHCR should be invited to establish a presence there.

3) The South African government should regularize the status of all Mozambicans in South Africa, formally recognizing that those in the homelands, and those working illegally elsewhere in the country, are in a genuine refugee situation. The government should further grant them the most generous form of temporary residence under applicable South African law, and accord them the right to seek employment.

It must be recognized that South Africa, by supporting the insurgency in Mozambique, is, to a significant degree, responsible for creating the influxes of refugees into its own and into neighboring territories. Mozambique's charge that South Africa is training some of the refugees as guerrillas further complicates the situation and may signal that many of the estimated 160,000 Mozambicans illegally working in South Africa cannot return to Mozambique without potentially dire consequences. Thus, these workers will be at risk if forcibly repatriated to Mozambique.

4) The Western media, donor governments, and international organizations should pay considerably more attention to events and issues which affect human rights and precipitate humanitarian emergencies throughout the southern African region.

The problems which plague southern Africa—refugees, apartheid, civil wars, hunger, and oppressive regimes—are interrelated issues, each has important regional aspects, and none is amenable to solutions which ignore the related problems or which focus entirely on any single country. Yet, there has been little recognition of this reality in the public debate on these matters.

While no abuses of human rights by majority-ruled nations in southern Africa can rationalize or justify the evils of apartheid, the legitimacy of the struggle against that system should not be allowed to obscure the other major humanitarian issues in the region. It should be recognized that disregard for the principles of refugee asylum, for example, or the denial by governments of the basic rights of their citizens, is unacceptable regardless of the identity of the culpable state.

The Western press has a duty to investigate and report more fully on such issues throughout southern Africa, while major Western donors, in particular, must act in an aggressive and in a more coordinated manner to promote basic human rights there.

Equally important, donors, international agencies, and nongovernmental organizations—while responding to current humanitarian tragedies in the region—should also prudently commit resources toward establishing regional capacities to deal with potential future humanitarian emergencies. Realistic planning and preparation now could save many thousands of lives in the future.

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The political and armed conflicts that pervade southern Africa mirror a web of synergistic relationships that inextricably bind together all nations in the region, including South Africa. Unfortunately, these conflicts will almost inevitably intensify in the near future, and there is no question that justice in the region is the prerequisite for peace on the broad scale. But saving the lives of the innocent—one by one—must become a clearer priority. Displaced persons in the shattered nation of Mozambique and Mozambican refugees in fragile asylum deserve such consideration.

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The U.S. Committee for Refugees is a public information and advocacy program of the American Council for Nationalities Service. Publisher of the annual *World Refugee Survey*, USCR has, since 1958, encouraged the American public to participate actively in efforts to assist the world's refugees.

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Refugee Reports. Monthly. $28.00 per year for subscription. Focuses on refugees in the United States. It includes information about policy, legislation, programs, resources to assist refugees or inform the public, and research on refugee resettlement. It also contains articles on international refugee developments and statistics on refugee populations.

The World Refugee Survey: 1985 in Review. 1986 in Review will be available in February 1987. $6.00 single copy. This authoritative annual report features country reports on refugee conditions, a directory of organizations, bibliography, and definitive statistics. Includes articles by authorities on refugee protection and assistance.

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
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